While repression continues unabated in Kurdistan and Iran, Kurdish and Iranian women are being honored abroad.
On October 6, the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the imprisoned Iranian activist Narges Mohammadi for "her fight against the oppression of women in Iran" and her struggle to promote human rights and freedom for all, according to a statement by the President of the Norwegian Nobel County, Ms Meis-Andersen (AFP).
Ms. Mohammadi has been convicted and imprisoned numerous times over the past 25 years for her human rights activism. She is vice-president of a Human Rights Defenders Center founded by Mrs. Shirin Abadi, the 2003 Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who led a vast campaign in support of her colleague and compatriot, whose moving and courageous op-ed was published on the front page of the New York Times a few days before the Nobel Prize was awarded.
The UN reacted by calling for her immediate release. For her part, in a statement to AFP, the President of the Norwegian Nobel Committee appealed to Iran: "Free her. Do something dignified". This appeal was immediately rejected by the Iranian regime, whose spokesman expressed his indignation in a statement: "We note that the Nobel Committee has awarded the Peace Prize to a person who has been found guilty of repeated violations of the law and who has committed criminal acts... We condemn this biased and political decision".
On October 19, the European Parliament awarded its prestigious Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Jîna Mahsa Amini and the "Women, Life, Freedom" Movement in Iran. Jîna Mahsa Amini's candidacy was supported by three main parties in the European Parliament. Created in 1988, the Sakharov Prize is the European Union's highest distinction for individuals and organizations defending human rights and fundamental freedoms, and carries a cash award of 50,000 euros. In 1995, another emblematic Kurdish woman, Leyla Zana, the first woman to be elected to parliament in Turkey, was awarded the prize while imprisoned in the Turkish prisons for expressing her opinion. She spent ten years behind bars and, on her release, was triumphantly re-elected in her home town of Diyarbakir.
Iran's repression of women defying the Islamic veil, their lawyers and journalists covering the events has continued unabated. On October 1, a 16-year-old Kurdish high-school girl, Armita Geravand, was savagely beaten by vice officers in the Teheran subway because she was not wearing the Islamic veil. Evacuated to an inaccessible military hospital, she spent four weeks in a coma and died on October 28. Her fate, a year after the death of Kurdish student Jîna Mahsa Amini, shocked Iranian public opinion. The Iranian government, fearing mass protests, banned her burial in her hometown of Kermanshah. A request for a parliamentary inquiry into "this serious event" by a courageous deputy, Ahmed Alirezabegui, went unheeded.
Furthermore, on October 25, a dozen Iranian actresses were banned from work for failing to comply with the Islamic veil law (see AFP p.73). Two journalists, Elaheh Mohamadi, 36, and Nilofer Hamedi, 31, were sentenced to 12 years in prison for "collaborating with the United States, plotting against the country's security and propaganda against the Islamic Republic". Nilofer Hamadi was guilty of visiting Jîna Mahsa Amini in hospital on her deathbed and posting a photo of her grieving family on social networks, while Elaheh Mohamadi had gone to Saqqez, the Kurdish martyr's hometown, to cover her funeral.
The Iranian regime has been very busy with the war between Israel and its protégés Hamas and Islamic Jihad, while denying any responsibility for the conflict. Meanwhile, it has demanded the "disarmament" of several Iranian opposition parties in Iraqi Kurdistan following their relocation in accordance with a recent Baghdad-Tehran security agreement. The Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammed Bagheri, said, "The main agreement is not limited to a tactical change of these groups and their transfer to distant points of the border, but rather stipulates that they permanently lay down their weapons." The Iraqi government has already relocated four Kurdish parties in Iraq, but some Kurdish leaders believe that Iran will eventually try to exile these parties from the region. The Iranian Freedom Party of Kurdistan (PAK) was expelled from its headquarters in Kirkuk governorate and disarmed after Baghdad and Teheran signed a "border security" agreement. PAK members were then transferred to a camp in the Saedekan sub-district of Duhok governorate by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which moved its own forces into the evacuated PAK compound. The Baghdad-Tehran security agreement also led to the closure of the headquarters of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Komala.
Here's a summary of the month's other highlights.
The Hengaw Organization for Human Rights reported that the Iranian regime had arrested 463 civilians across the country in September, a 75% increase on August. Around 44% (203) of those arrested were Kurdish citizens and 26% were Baluchis. The publication of the Hengaw report coincided with the regime's arrest of Kurdish activists in Dewalan, Qorveh, Bokan, Saqqez, Karaj, Swlaw and Piranshahr. In addition, a regime court in Quchan sentenced a Kurdish activist, Sakina Parwana, to seven years and six months in prison on charges relating to anti-government demonstrations. Another regime court sentenced a Kurd from Saqqez, Abdullah Hamza, to one year in prison for membership of the PDKI.
In October, numerous Kurdish activists were arrested, including Assad Amiri and Kaiwan Rahimi in Saqqez, Ahmed Taklifi in Abdanan, Farzad Shiri and Kianosh Cheraghi in Diwandara, Melad Haiderian in Qorveh and seven demonstrators in Tekab. In addition, the regime's courts handed down harsh sentences: Yousif Barki from Mahabad was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment and a Kurdish writer was sentenced to one year's imprisonment.
To mark the 20th World Day against the Death Penalty, the NGO Hengaw announced that the Iranian regime had so far executed 538 people in 2023. Iran carries out more executions than any other country except China. In mid-October, the regime sentenced to death a Kurd named Riza Rasai for allegedly killing a security guard during anti-government protests. Rasai denied the charges and said he had been forced to confess to the crime under torture. At the same time, several Kurdish militants were arrested in Mahabad and Abdnan.
Iranian border guards killed a Kurdish border porter (kolbar) near Marivan and wounded five others in separate attacks near Nowsud and Baneh. At the same time, a mine claimed the life of a Kurd in Iraqi Kurdistan, near Chwarta. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime imposed a second death sentence on a Kurdish activist imprisoned in Ourmia, named Naib Askari, for inciting rebellion. Similarly, a Senna regime court sentenced the lawyer representing the family of Jîna Mahsa Amini to one year in prison for "propaganda". The regime also sentenced a Kurdish activist from Senna named Mikael Manbari to six years in prison. Simultaneously, the Iranian authorities banned a doctor in Kermanshah from using social networks to criticize the government after the death of a pregnant doctor. Finally, the regime arrested several Kurdish activists in Senna, Qorveh and Saqqez.
At the same time, the Iranian regime arrested Hamza Pirozi and Soran Sahragard in Marivan, Saman Mohammedi and Woria Ibrahimi in Senna, Mohammed Kadakhoda in Bokan, and Ramin Wali Nazhad and Hamid Himati in Ilam. In addition, the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Jiwanro sentenced a Kurdish environmental activist named Yasser Noori to four months in prison for "propaganda against the state". The Senna Islamic Revolutionary Court sentenced two members of the Nojîn organization, which focuses on cultural and linguistic issues, to ten years in prison. Idriss Manbari and Serwa Pourmohammadi were charged with activism and participation in Jîna Amini's funeral.
Turkish-American relations are at an all-time low, and disagreements are now being made public. President Biden's decision on October 12 to extend by a year the duration of Executive Order 13894 authorizing the presence of US troops in Syria cited, in addition to the need to fight ISIS, the risks of a Turkish invasion threatening US security interests in the region. "The situation in and in relation to Syria, and in particular the actions of the Government of Turkey to conduct a military offensive in northeastern Syria, undermines the campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, endangers civilians, and furthermore threatens to undermine peace, security, and stability in the region and continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States" stresses the US president in his statement of reasons for extending the mandate of US forces in Syria (see p. 46).
Another sign of the tension between Ankara and Washington is US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who, in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, visited the main capitals in the region but did not see fit to stop off in Ankara. This at a time when the Turkish president, after initially offering to mediate in the conflict, has rapidly established himself as the main defender and spokesman for Hamas, which he presents as "a Mujahideen resistance organization", i.e., fighters of the Islamic faith. To which an EU spokesman replied that others might describe the PKK as a resistance organization.
The Turkish president has decided to champion the Arab street. Turkey's command media devote most of their programming to militant coverage of the plight of the people of Gaza. All the AKP's activists and members of religious brotherhoods are mobilizing in high-profile public demonstrations in support of "the brothers in Gaza". Demonstrations in support of the martyred Kurdish populations of the Syrian Kurdish territories under Turkish occupation were banned, as were those in support of women's rights and prisoners of conscience languishing in Turkish jails. On October 18, following the attack on a hospital in northern Gaza by a failed Islamic Jihad rocket according to the Americans and Israelis, and by Israeli fire according to Hamas, Ankara declared three days of national mourning. The mourning was also reflected in the half-hearted celebrations of the centenary of the Turkish Republic, which is hardly appreciated by Turkish Islamists nostalgic for the Ottoman caliphate abolished by Ataturk. Solidarity with "Muslim forces" also has the advantage of obscuring the country's serious economic crisis. The euro, which was worth a full 2 Turkish pounds in 2010, is now approaching 32. Borrowing rates are approaching 40%. The engine of Turkish growth for decades, the construction industry, is suffering, and the balance of payments is increasingly in deficit. Doctors, engineers and IT specialists with jobs in demand are leaving the country, and the flow of asylum seekers to Europe is accelerating.
In addition to "solidarity with Muslims and the oppressed" - except, of course, the Kurds - the government's rhetoric is also based on the never-ending "war against terrorism, which poses an existential threat to the homeland". When the homeland is in danger, it would be inappropriate to talk about the menial problems of survival, purchasing power and unemployment. In this respect, Turkish power was served by a bizarre attack on a Turkish public security building in Ankara on October 1. On the first day of the Turkish parliamentary session, two individuals launched a suicide attack against this highly secure headquarters. The two assailants were killed, while two police officers were wounded. A site close to the PKK claimed responsibility for the attack, which was not intended to cause civilian casualties, but to send a message about the exactions and crimes perpetrated by the Turkish state in violation of international law. The attack was immediately condemned by large sectors of Turkish public opinion, and without hesitation or investigation, the Turkish authorities attributed it to the YPG, claiming that the perpetrators had come from Syria, where they had received their training. In this case, the training is very poor and not very credible, given that the Rojava fighters were able to defeat the formidable ISIS jihadists. And how were they able to cross a border guarded day and night, including by thermal imaging cameras, and escape the supposedly infallible vigilance of the Turkish border guards? By paraglider (see p.98), without the border guards being able to spot them!
Despite all these implausibilities, the Turkish regime used this pretext to complete its strategy of destroying the infrastructure of Rojava in order to make life difficult for the civilian population and push them to leave the region and thus accelerate dekurdization. of these border areas. According to a count by the local North Press agency, from October 5 to 9, Turkish drones and planes struck more than a hundred sites in Rojava, seriously damaging infrastructure. The damaged sites include 87 residential buildings, a school, a hospital, 24 infrastructure buildings and 24 military sites, 14 of which belong to the Damascus regime. Six farms and three factories were also destroyed. 17 people, including 11 civilians, were killed during these bombings, which left numerous civilians injured and affected the water and oil supply for the five million inhabitants of the region.
During these attacks, a Turkish drone, which ventured into the vicinity of an American base, was shot down by American aircraft, arousing the ire of the Turkish president (see pp.22-23 and also the article on Rojava)
To prevent demonstrations against its operations in Syria and Iraq, the Turkish regime arrested more than 2,500 Kurdish activists (see p. 31).
European countries have hardly reacted to these murderous and devastating Turkish attacks. China called for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity to be respected! In Turkey, six Turkish lawyers' organizations have issued a joint statement calling for an end to strikes against civilian targets and calling on "Turkey to comply with the international agreements to which it is a signatory" and to "resolve the Kurdish question peacefully with the parties concerned". The NGO statement described the Turkish attacks on civilian targets as unacceptable "war crimes".
Pursuing its strategic objective of destabilizing the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria, on October 17 the Turkish government adopted a two-year extension of its army's authorization to carry out military operations in these two countries (p.100).
On the subject of the repression of Turkish civil society, the Turkish businessman and philanthropist Osman Kavala saw his life sentence confirmed by the 3rd Criminal Chamber of the Turkish Court of Cassation, a court dominated by judges close to the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) associated with the ruling coalition. Accused of organizing and financing protests by defenders of Istanbul's Gezi Park, threatened by government building projects in 2013, he is alleged by the Turkish president to have attempted to "overthrow the government". Seized of the case, which does not stand up to any serious examination, the European Court of Human Rights has issued a ruling stipulating Osman Kavala's release, a binding ruling which Turkey refuses to respect, and which should, if the texts are respected, lead to Turkey's suspension or even exclusion from the Council of Europe. This is a highly political decision, to be taken by the Committee of Ministers of the Council's member countries, who seem in no hurry to act.
It should also be noted that the Green Left Party (YSP), successor to the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which is currently on trial before the Constitutional Court, decided to change its name at its congress. It is now called the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (HEDEP).
Turkey's forced demographic change in the Syrian Kurdish territories it occupies is resulting in complete ethnic cleansing. In the town of Serê Kaniyê (Ras al-Aïn), occupied by the Turkish army and its Syrian auxiliaries since October 2019, only around 50 Kurds remain.
Before the Turkish invasion, this mixed Kurdish-Arab town had a population of 175,000, including over 80,000 Kurds. Following the occupation forces' policy of terror, the Kurds were driven out, their homes, businesses and possessions confiscated by Syrian Islamist militiamen in the service of the Turks, including a large number of recycled ISIS jihadists and Islamists from Idlib who came to share in the Kurdish booty. These jihadists, who were militarily defeated by the Kurdish fighters of the Syrian Democratic Forces, are thus taking their revenge, thanks to the Turkish army. With access to these occupied territories strictly forbidden to the international media, the ethnic cleansing could not be publicized, and this crime against humanity was perpetrated in silence, with complete impunity.
Ankara continues to settle Syrian refugees in these occupied territories, who have become undesirable in Turkey and are being expelled. In September alone, 16,000 Syrians were deported to these areas. Before their expulsion, their identity documents are confiscated and their biometric data, such as fingerprints, are recorded to prevent any return to Turkish soil.
Turkish policy is increasingly aimed at emptying Syria of its Kurdish population. This is the aim of its relentless bombing campaigns, openly targeting civilian energy, school and hospital infrastructures, which it designates as "legitimate targets". Thus, by asserting without any proof that the two perpetrators of the curious Ankara attack on October 1 had come from the Kurdish-controlled regions of Syria, where they had been "trained", and that they had landed in Turkey by paraglider (see p. 98), Ankara is trying to justify its new "punishment" bombing campaign.
The Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES) has announced that the Turkish campaign of air, drone and artillery strikes targeting northeastern Syria from October 5 to 9 has affected more than five million people, causing extensive damage to the region's energy installations and infrastructure. AANES counted 580 strikes targeting 104 sites, causing severe damage to 11 power plants, 18 water pumping stations, two hospitals, 48 educational establishments and three industrial facilities. One strike caused extensive damage to an Internal Security Forces (Asayish) military academy and killed 29 people. Charged with the fight against drugs (see p.31-33), AANES called on the international community to take a clear stand against Turkey's aggression and hold it accountable for its repeated violations of international law.
SDF commander Mazloum Abdi strongly condemned the attacks, saying, "This is a brutal crime and a flagrant violation of human rights that demands our immediate attention." He pledged to oppose Turkish forces in response to this devastating incident. Mazloum Abdi, rejected Turkish claims that the two perpetrators of the October 1 suicide bombing in Ankara had received training in Syria or had passed through northern Syria on their way to Turkey. Abdi's statement was in response to claims by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan that the People's Protection Units (YPG) were complicit in the Ankara attack.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have announced that they have attacked three Turkish military bases near Tel Tamr in retaliation for Turkey's ongoing campaign of aggression against northern Syria. The SDF media center issued a statement that claimed "as part of our legitimate right to respond to the Turkish occupation and the attacks and aggressions of its mercenaries, our SDF forces carried out precise and qualitative operations targeting the Turkish occupation based in the villages of al-Arba'in, al-Aliyah and al-Manajir on October 17, 2023." The statement also claims that the attacks resulted in casualties among Turkish forces.
The Turks went so far as to send a drone into the vicinity of an American base, presumably to test the American reaction to the risk of provoking a confrontation between two NATO allies. The United States shot down a Turkish drone in northern Syria for the first time. Pentagon spokesman Brigadier General Pat Ryder said the drone carried out strikes in the Hassaké governorate and came dangerously close (less than half a kilometer) to US forces before being shot down by F-16 fighter jets. Ryder also stated that there was no evidence that the drone was targeting US military personnel. This is the third incident in which Turkish forces have targeted positions close to US forces, with previous events in 2019 in Syria and last April in Iraqi Kurdistan. Following the downing of the drone, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed revenge, declaring that "the necessary measures will undoubtedly be taken when the time comes".
The US military also struck two facilities belonging to pro-Iranian militias and the Iranian Pasdaran (IRGC) in Syria. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said the strikes were in response to recent drone and rocket attacks against US forces across the Middle East, and were ordered by President Biden. No Americans were killed in the attacks, but several were wounded. The Tehran-backed group known as "Islamic Resistance" claimed responsibility for most of the attacks. On October 30, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency claimed that pro-Iranian forces had targeted an American base in the Al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor governorate with 15 rockets.
Assad regime militias, under the banner of the National Defense Forces (NDF), also attempted to attack territory controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) east of the Euphrates, in the governorate of Deir ez Zor. They also tried to infiltrate the towns of Diban, Abu Hardoub and Abu Hamam and attacked them with artillery, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. At least 19 FDN militants have reportedly been killed in the latest round of clashes in the governorate, and the pro-Damascus and pro-Tehran groups say they are determined to infiltrate, overthrow and retake all of northeastern Syria.
Iranian-backed militias also attacked American personnel stationed in the al-Tanf garrison, near the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian border, with several Shahed-101 drones. US forces shot down two of the drones before they could reach the base. Pro-Iranian militias also launched two Fajr rockets at a US base near the Conoco oil field in Deir ez Zor governorate. The Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance, affiliated with the IRGC, took credit for the al-Tanf attack.
On the diplomatic level, the Syrian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Bassam Sabbagh, affirmed that “Turkey must withdraw its military forces [from Syria]. All other aspects, yes, of course we will be open to discuss with them, but not to do so and insist on staying – this is an illegal occupation and will block all efforts for any kind of contact and relationship with the Turkey ". Turkish Defense Minister Yaser Guler responded to Syrian objections to Turkey's occupation in Syria by saying Turkey would only withdraw its forces once several conditions were met. These demands included writing a new constitution, holding democratic elections, and forming a government inclusive of all religious faiths.
Separately, Russia claimed to have repatriated 34 children from camps housing Daesh suspects in northeast Syria and announced plans to repatriate 150 more in the coming weeks. More than 4,500 Russian nationals traveled to Syria to fight alongside ISIS during the organization's peak between 2013 and 2018. The SDF arrested thousands of ISIS fighters and their relatives during the US-backed campaign. United States to defeat the organization. More than 50,000 Daesh members and their relatives are still detained in the Al Hol camp in Hasakah governorate, and thousands more are still detained in the Roj camp. AANES has repeatedly asked the detainees' countries of origin to repatriate them, but few have responded to this call.
The new episode of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relaunched by the massacre on October 7 of more than 1,200 Israelis by Hamas commandos coming from the Gaza Strip who also kidnapped 240 hostages, is causing great apprehension in Iraq and Kurdistan. An extension of this conflict to Lebanon or Iran would risk dragging the entire region into a vicious circle and destabilizing Iraq.
The main financial, military and political supporter of Hamas, Iran denies any direct responsibility for Hamas attacks while threatening to intervene in the event of an extension of the conflict to Lebanon where its other protégé Hezbollah is on alert. In this perspective, and to show its muscles, the Islamic Republic has set in motion its vast network of Shiite militias stretching from Yemen to Iraq. In the latter country, threats and actions against the Americans were not long in coming. The leader of the Badr militia, formed in Iran during the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1979-1988, armed and financed by Iran and well established in Iraq, Hadi al-Ameri mobilized his troops and threatened to attack to American bases present on Iraqi soil as part of the International Coalition to Fight Daesh. For his part, the powerful and unpredictable Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr organized numerous anti-American demonstrations in Baghdad and demanded the departure of American troops and the closure of the American embassy in Baghdad.
Other pro-Iranian groups, claiming to be part of an obscure Islamic Resistance Movement, sent armed drones against American bases in the Sunni Arab province of al-Anbar and Kurdistan on October 18. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) indicated that two drones had been successfully intercepted and that a third had caused several minor injuries. A new attack took place a few days later. According to a spokesperson for the US Department of Defense, Pat Ryder, it failed by causing only minor damage to local infrastructure. Following this series of attacks, the US State Department raised the warning level to 4 for its citizens in Iraq or planning to go there and ordered all non-essential personnel of its representations diplomatic officials to leave the country.
Since 2018, the number of attacks by pro-Iranian militias and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard against American troops based in Kurdistan, against Kurdish energy infrastructure, against the Peshmerga and against Iranian Kurdish parties taking refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan has increased. raises to 32. Deprived of anti-aircraft means, the Peshmerga can only count on the international coalition to neutralize the drones and foil the air attacks. The departure of American forces would have serious consequences on the already fragile security situation in Kurdistan.
This is constantly threatened by Turkish incursions and aerial bombardments which continued throughout the month of October. These operations, carried out officially against the PKK's rear bases in Kurdistan, have, since 2015, caused the death of 102 Iraqi Kurdish civilians and the destruction and evacuation of nearly 400 villages.
On October 1, the PKK announced the withdrawal of its defense units from the (Turkish Kurds) refugee camp of Makhmour, near Erbil. The Iraqi army immediately attempted to occupy three abandoned military posts even though they were in Kurdish territory. The clashes left three dead on each side before a ceasefire was reached. The Iraqi Prime Minister has ordered an investigation into this incident. Pending an agreement on the settlement of this dispute, the positions concerned remain unoccupied.
Separately, the 11th Division of the Iraqi army stormed the Tobzawa camp in Kirkuk governorate and issued expulsion warnings to Kurdish residents of the village of Tobzawa. The Ba'athist regime's Defense Ministry once ran the camp, which was the scene of numerous crimes against Iraqi Kurds, including the genocidal Anfal operations in 1988. Post-Saddam Iraqi governments have been criticized since 2003 for refusing to return the land to the inhabitants: “The Tobzawa camp is a symbol of the brutality of the fascist Baath regime. Every corner of this camp tells us the tragic story of the Anfal crimes,” reads a joint statement from dozens of human rights organizations and activists. The statement also said the Iraqi government has a "legal and moral" responsibility to transform the camp into a museum to commemorate the victims of the Anfal campaign.
The Kurdish Institute organized an international conference on October 27 in the Salle Clemenceau of the Palais du Luxembourg entitled “Kurdish Diaspora, historical context, current situation and perspectives”
Closing the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the Kurdish Institute, whose foundation and action are closely linked to the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, the conference brought together around twenty researchers and actors from this diaspora for plural debates and discussions on its importance, its role in Kurdish cultural, artistic and political life and its perspectives.
The conference took place all day from 9 a.m. to 19h. and the interventions and debates were organized around five thematic panels. (see the program). A very large audience attended this conference, whose interventions, already online on the Kurdish Institute website, will then be included in a special issue of Kurdish Studies.
Here are extracts from the presentation text of this conference:
With a community of more than 2 million stateless members, distributed mainly in Germany, France, England and Scandinavian countries, the Kurdish diaspora was formed from 1960 and became very visible from the 2000s as and as its demographic weight increased due to military operations in different parts of Kurdistan. Despite its recent constitution and despite the hostility of the Turkish, Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi states even in European countries, the Kurdish diaspora is considered the best organized and most active diasporic community in Europe according to Olivier Grojean (2011).
If the first generation of members of the diaspora is made up of activists, intellectuals, journalists fleeing political and cultural repression, we are now witnessing a second, or even a third, generation fully integrated into their host countries, as several deputies and ministers testify. of Kurdish origin in Sweden, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Great Britain, not to mention numerous mayors and municipal councilors. Likewise, members of the Kurdish diaspora maintain strong relationships with their regions of origin by establishing economic, political, financial and social links and networks. Information and communication technologies, the Internet and social media have helped to create new opportunities for this process and to build bridges with their regions of origin and between generations.
Through its activism and its different forms of mobilization, the Kurdish diaspora has played a decisive role in raising awareness of the international community about the Kurdish cause. It is also thanks to these forms of activism that “Kurdish studies” in Europe and the United States are experiencing a real rise in power, with numerous journals and theses devoted to the study of history, language, culture, and Kurdish society.
The Kurdish diaspora has also been very active in the development of literary, cultural and artistic expression as can be noted in the revival of language, literature, the development of Kurdish cinema and new forms of culture. youth. It is the diaspora that has given new impetus to the Kurdish written language, literature and music, long banned in Turkey, Syria and Iran. It is also thanks to this expression that members of the diaspora maintain, negotiate and reconstruct their identity.
The growing Kurdish entrepreneurship testifies to the considerable economic weight played by the diaspora both in Europe and in its solidarity actions with Kurdistan, in many sectors of the market, reconstruction, health services, etc.
In this tense and conflictual context, the serious disputes between Erbil and Baghdad have still not been resolved. The question of exporting Kurdistan oil via Turkey still remains unresolved, despite the announcement made on October 2 by the Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of a “resumption within a week”. The cessation of these exports since March has already cost more than 7 billion dollars to Kurdistan, which is on the verge of financial asphyxiation. Agreements on paying the Kurdistan Regional Government its share of the federal budget are not respected. Baghdad makes a payment and then without any further explanation suspends its payments in the following months, depriving Erbil of the means to regularly pay the salaries of its employees and civil servants and to meet its other obligations.
Exasperated by these intrigues, the President of Kurdistan Nechirvan Barzani once again called on the federal government to quickly pay the salaries and pensions of the citizens of Kurdistan who, according to the Constitution, have the same rights as other Iraqi citizens who receive them regularly. their due. This is a fundamental right, he added, recalling that blackmail over the payment of salaries would be unworthy of a democratic government. The UN special representative for Iraq and the ambassadors of friendly countries agree and seek to find a solution to preserve the fragile stability of Iraq.
