The campaign for the municipal elections on March 31 proceeded without major incidents in most provinces of the country, except in Kurdistan where the police arrested several hundred Kurdish activists before Newroz celebrations.
Held during the Ramadan fast, this campaign did not mobilize large crowds. Tired of elections that have been taking place since 2011 without bringing any improvement to their situation, the population shunned political meetings and gatherings. Although it was a local election, Turkish President Erdogan invested heavily in the campaign as the leader of the AKP, mobilizing media and all state resources in favor of his party's candidates. Tireless despite being 70 years old, he held rallies in 52 out of the country's 81 cities, promising wonders for a near future where the scourge of inflation will finally be controlled and reduced to a single digit, despite officially standing at 67% per year, or according to independent Turkish economists, over 120%, with credit rates exceeding 50%.
The coverage of the election campaign in the media, controlled by the government by over 90%, was particularly biased. President Erdogan had unlimited airtime on television channels, which also gave the lion's share to candidates from his party and those of his coalition ally, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The main opposition People's Republican Party (CHP), which has its own television channel, HALK TV (People's TV), nevertheless managed to receive minimal coverage in media close to the government. In contrast, the pro-Kurdish party HDP, the second largest opposition party in Parliament, was completely ignored by both public and private Turkish television channels. It also suffered from mass arrests of its members. Several thousand of its cadres, including its former co-leaders, 8 former MPs, and 25 mayors elected in 2014 and 2019, are still in prison.
In this uneven electoral competition, President Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered its heaviest defeat in history. With 35.8% of the votes cast, it recorded its worst score in municipal elections in over 20 years and became the second party behind its rival, the People's Republican Party (CHP), Kemalist and nationalist, which, with 37.8% of the votes, becomes the country's first party for the first time since 1977. The CHP won decisively in 35 out of the country's 81 cities, up from 21 cities in 2019, including 6 out of the 10 metropolises. Among them are Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Antalya. In the major metropolis of Istanbul, particularly coveted by President Erdogan, the incumbent mayor Ekrem Imamoglu defeated his AKP opponent with an unequivocal margin of 11.5%, which amounts to over a million votes difference. The incumbent CHP mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavas, did even better by outperforming his AKP rival by 28.19%.
In clear decline, the AKP won in 24 cities, mostly medium-sized cities in Anatolia and the Black Sea coast, representing approximately 23% of the country's population. Cities governed by the CHP represent 64% of the population and over 80% of the country's economy.
On its side, despite all the obstacles in its path, the pro-Kurdish DEM party won in 10 cities, including, of course, Diyarbakir, the political and cultural capital of Kurdistan, as well as Batman, Mardin, Siirt, Agri, Mus, Igdir, Hakkari, and Dersim, the hometown of Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, former leader of the CHP, and Van. In this major city, the DEM candidate, former MP Hadep Ahmet Zeydan, released from prison for thought crime just a year ago, obtained over 55% of the votes, and the HDP achieved a landslide victory by winning the mayoralties of all sub-prefectures (ilçe) and districts of this province. In total, the DEM captured the mentioned 10 cities and over sixty sub-prefectures of Kurdish provinces. Three cities, Bitlis, Sirnak, and Kars, narrowly escaped from it due to manipulations by Turkish security forces, who, under the pretext of protecting polling stations, brought nearly 50,000 Turkish soldiers and police officers, often dispatched from distant provinces on the Black Sea coast and favorable to the AKP, who were allowed to vote in these sparsely populated Kurdish cities where they could change the outcome of the elections. This "electoral engineering," which the Turkish military considers legal, outraged the local population, who denounced it on social media and, without illusions, intend to appeal to the Turkish High Electoral Council for new elections to be organized in these three cities, respecting the rights of their inhabitants to elect their local representatives without manipulation or interference.
Municipalities governed by the DEM represent 7% of Turkey's total population.
Although with fraudulent maneuvers the AKP managed to win in 4 sparsely populated Kurdish provinces (Bingol, Bitlis, Sirnak, Kars), its electoral scores are significantly lower compared to the 2023 and 2019 elections. The Kurdish Islamic party Huda Par, supported and encouraged by the government, instead of reducing the influence of the secular pro-Kurdish DEM party, attracted some conservative Kurdish voters from the AKP, achieving an exceptional score of 15.6% in Batman, but more modest results elsewhere, ranging from 3% to 5%. Another party, the New Prosperity Party, claiming the legacy of the historical leader of Turkish political Islam Necmettin Erbakan and led by his son Fatih Erbakan, managed to gather some disillusioned AKP supporters. Campaigning against the increasing impoverishment of the popular classes, demanding a substantial revaluation of salaries and pensions to catch up with inflation, calling for the severance of diplomatic relations with "the genocidal Zionist regime," and the banning of LGBT associations, this new party attracted the most Islamist fringe of the conservative Muslim electorate, winning in two cities including Urfa (Edessa), previously considered an AKP stronghold, and several small towns in Anatolia with candidates who recently defected from the AKP. It significantly outstrips the MHP, a partner of the AKP coalition, in votes.
The results of the Turkish municipal elections have led to varied analyses. For President Erdogan himself, who intervened on television on the evening of the elections, this is a turning point from which lessons should be drawn as soon as possible. Without congratulating the elected mayors, he promised to "respect the decision of the nation" and urged his camp to engage in self-criticism, admitting that "unfortunately, we did not achieve the results we wanted." On the other hand, the new leader of the winning CHP party, Ozgur Ozel, in his statement welcomed his party's victory while acknowledging that it did not reflect the party's influence in the country because many Kurdish democrats and AKP dissenters voted for CHP candidates to defeat those of the AKP. The contribution of Kurdish votes to CHP candidates was decisive in some metropolises like Istanbul. However, this party achieved only marginal scores in Kurdish provinces.
Analysts note that the relatively high abstention rate (26% compared to 13% in 2023) also contributed to the AKP's debacle. Approximately 14 million out of 61.4 million voters did not go to the polls. More than half of them are believed to be former AKP voters, disappointed by the government's poor economic performance but unwilling to vote for an opposition party either, choosing instead to stay home to send a message of discontent to the government. Other observers point out that, having isolated himself, President Erdogan could not present to the voters, including in his hometown of Istanbul, candidates with stature or charisma, unable to attract popular support.
Finally, a word on the role of women in these elections. In total, 11 women were elected mayors, including 6 from the CHP, 4 from the DEM, and only 1 from the AKP in Gaziantep. In Kurdistan, Ms. Serra Bucak was elected with 64% of the vote as mayor of Diyarbakir, Ms. Gulistan Sönük elected with 64.5% of the vote as mayor of Batman, Ms. Sofya Alagas elected mayor of Siirt, the hometown of Turkish First Lady Emine Erdogan, and Ms. Hazal Aras elected with 50.07% of the vote as mayor of Agri, a northern province bordering Armenia where Mount Ararat is located.
In all other medium and small Kurdish cities governed by the DEM, there is always a co-mayor tandem, 1 man and 1 woman. While Kurds are close to gender parity, the rate is 6/35 in the CHP and 1/24 in the AKP.
Unless early elections are called, there will be no more elections in Turkey until the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2028, and legally President Erdogan, who has been in power for 20 years, is no longer eligible to run.
The holding of elections for the Kurdistan Parliament, scheduled for June 10 in principle, is becoming increasingly uncertain. After Christian and Turkmen parties protested against the abolition of a quota of 11 seats that had been reserved for them since 1992, which a recent decision of the Iraqi Supreme Court questions, it is the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the main political force in the Region, that threatens to boycott these elections. In a statement released on March 18, the Political Bureau of the KDP declared: "We believe that it is in the interest of our people for our party not to comply with an unconstitutional decision and an imposed system from the outside." The KDP asserts that it will not participate in a vote imposed by the Court which "violates the law and the Constitution".
The decision of the Supreme Court is clearly contrary to the Iraqi Constitution, Article 141 of which states that "Legislation adopted in Kurdistan since 1992 remains in force and decisions taken by the government of the Kurdistan region, including judicial decisions and contracts, are considered valid, unless they are modified or repealed in accordance with the laws of the Kurdistan region, by the competent body of the Kurdistan region, provided that they are not contrary to the Constitution.
The electoral law of Kurdistan is part of the legislation adopted in Kurdistan since 1992 which provides for a contingent of 11 seats for Christians and Turkmen of Kurdistan so that they can be represented adequately in parliament and in other instances of the Kurdistan Government. It is within the framework of this legislation that pluralistic elections have been organized since 1992, that is, before the fall of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in 2003 as well as after his fall and after the adoption by referendum of the current Constitution in 2005 without any observation or reservation on the part of this Supreme Court. It was established in 2005 on a transitional basis for the period preceding the final adoption of the Constitution. Article 92 of the Constitution provides for the creation of a Federal Supreme Court whose composition, functioning and prerogatives must be determined by a law adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of Parliament. However, such a law, despite repeated calls from Kurdish authorities as well as Sunni leaders, has not yet been enacted. Instead, the Iraqi Parliament adopted in 2021 by a simple majority of 204 deputies a law "validating" the legal existence of this Supreme Court set up in 2005 on a provisional basis. This law adopted by the Shiite majority is totally unconstitutional because its adoption, according to Article 92 of the Constitution, requires a two-thirds majority.
Thus patched up, the Constitution has become a war machine used without restraint to dismantle the autonomy status of Kurdistan and to bring Sunni leaders, considered insufficiently docile, under control, such as the Sunni president of the Iraqi Parliament, al-Habousi, who without trial or parliamentary debate was removed from his post and his parliamentary mandate. Since then, the post of President of Parliament has remained vacant, a vacancy that further aggravates the current political chaos in Baghdad.
The Federal Supreme Court, set up on a transitional basis, was composed of 9 members, including 5 Shiites, 2 Kurds and 2 Sunnis. The unconstitutional law of 2021 removed the right of the Kurdistan Region to appoint two members of this Court in coordination with the Judicial Council of the Kurdistan Region. Since its revitalization in 2021, it has rendered about ten judgments violating the constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Kurdistan Region. The Kurds, who after a dozen years of quasi-independence, had agreed in 2003 to reintegrate the Iraqi framework at the insistence of the United States and the commitment that their full autonomy would be respected and guaranteed by the new Iraqi Constitution, find themselves once again helpless. The Constitution guarantees their rights and autonomy but is unable to guarantee the full implementation of this Constitution and to oppose the centralizing and authoritarian drift of a federal government under the influence of Tehran which does not respect its commitments neither economically nor financially nor politically.
Evoking this insurmountable crisis, a Kurdish leader stigmatized the dictatorship of federal judges in these terms: "In Iran there is a Supreme Leader whose fatwas are final; in Iraq we have a Supreme Court that decides everything, often replacing the legislative power whose judgments are final. To submit to it is to accept that the hard-won rights of the Kurdish people are trampled one after the other at the instigation of Baghdad and Tehran, to oppose it and to provoke a crisis that will be all the more devastating since the suspension of its oil exports in March 2023 Kurdistan has been suffering financial suffocation.
On March 5, one of the two Kurdish judges of the Supreme Court, Abdulrahman Sulaiman, resigned, considering that after a series of judgments unfavorable to Kurdistan, he had come to the conclusion that there was "an obvious intention in these consecutive decisions of the Court to return to central authority and to move away from federal principles". Powerless in the face of a politically motivated Shiite majority and undoubtedly acting on orders, he chose to resign in order not to appear complicit by silence in this centralizing and unconstitutional drift.
The decision of the KDP to boycott the elections has provoked numerous reactions. This historic party, which has been fighting since 1946 for the autonomy of Kurdistan, which holds 45 seats out of 111 in the Kurdistan Parliament, is an essential actor in local Kurdish political life. The President of the Region, the Prime Minister, and most ministers come from its ranks. Without its participation, the elections could not be held, and in the event that they were organized as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) wishes, which only has 21 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament, they would be meaningless and illegitimate. Alerted, the US Ambassador to Baghdad, Ms. Alina Romanowski, expressed "her concern" while the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) stressed that "elections are essential and called on all parties to work in the interest of the people to find a solution".
A sensible call but without impact or consequence. Nevertheless, the Kurdish authorities are considering sending yet another delegation to Baghdad after Ramadan to try to find a compromise, inevitably temporary and imperfect, on the numerous ongoing disputes including budgetary issues, the resumption of oil exports, and the legal imbroglio created by the judgments of the federal court.
The Iraqi government, despite several agreements and the adoption of the national budget law, is still not willing to release all the funds intended for the salaries of civil servants in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) stated that the Iraqi government had released 568 billion Iraqi dinars for salaries in February, 300 billion dinars less than what was actually needed. The KRG supported its claims by publishing a report emphasizing that the recently adopted budget law obliges Baghdad to pay more than 9,000 billion dinars (about 6 billion dollars) to Iraqi Kurdistan for 2023.
The Kurdistan Oil Industry Association (APIKUR) released a report on the state of the ongoing freeze of oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan on the occasion of the first anniversary of the freeze. Exports were halted in March 2023 when the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris ruled in favor of Baghdad rather than Ankara regarding the latter's support for independent oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan via Turkey. The APIKUR report estimates that Iraq has lost at least 11 billion dollars in revenue and hundreds of millions of dollars in investments since the beginning of the freeze. The APIKUR report also calls on the Biden administration and the US Congress to cancel the planned visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Soudani unless the pipeline linking Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey is reopened, foreign oil companies begin receiving payments, and Baghdad implements the 2024 budget and provides the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with its share of the federal budget. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Minister of Natural Resources (MNR) stated that since March 2023, Kurdistan had delivered 11 million barrels of oil to Baghdad but had not received "a single dinar" in return. The MNR emphasized that oil exports from Kurdistan represented only 10% of Iraq's total exports and that oil revenues were only part of the financial entitlements allocated to the region under the Iraqi budget. The MNR also pointed out that the halt in oil exports had precipitated a "financial crisis," causing delays in the disbursement of public salaries.
In Washington, eight American Republican congressmen submitted a letter to President Joe Biden urging him to demand that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Soudani authorize the resumption of oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan via Turkey. The letter expressed "deep concern" about the Biden administration's plan to host al-Soudani at the White House on April 15. The congressmen also asked the Biden administration to stop the transfer of US dollars to Iraq until the Treasury Department certifies that these transfers are not made to benefit Iran or its militias.
Throughout March, Turkish bombings and Iranian destabilization activities continued.
On March 1, a suspected Turkish drone struck an office of the Kurdistan Free Society Movement (Tevgera Azadî) in the Kalar district, Suleimanieh governorate, killing one person. Tevgera Azadî was founded in 2014 and is considered an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). A Kurdish doctor Abdulkadir Toprak was assassinated in Suleimanieh. Toprak was originally from Turkey and had been living in Iraqi Kurdistan for over a decade after being persecuted by the Turkish government.
On March 7, Turkish drones killed two members of the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) in the Yazidi district of Shingal (Sinjar).
On March 10, a Turkish airstrike near the Shiladeze sub-district resulted in the deaths of two civilians on March 10. Turkish attacks on the Kurdistan region have cost the lives of more than a hundred civilians since they began in 2015, under the pretext of combating the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). On the same day, another Turkish airstrike in the Yazidi town of Shingal killed one member of the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) and injured another.
According to the Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT), since 2024, Turkey has bombed the Duhok province 141 times, including 75 on Mount Gara, the stronghold of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The CPT report notes that four civilians have been killed by Turkish airstrikes and bombings, and another has been injured. "The aim of the bombings is to pressure and force the villagers and civilians of Mount Gara to leave so that Turkey can establish and control a larger area for its operations. This tactic has been frequently used by the Turkish army in Iraqi Kurdistan to take control of civilian areas," the report reads. Hundreds of Kurdish and Christian villages have been evacuated due to Turkish operations since 2015.
In addition, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan announced that the Iranian regime had assassinated a member of the party near its headquarters in the village of Zerguez, in the Suleimanieh governorate, on March 16. "Shuaib Zarei, a brave Peshmerga and a loyal member of Komala, was murdered by the dark hands of the militias of the Islamic Republic" reads the statement from Komala, which states that its members expect the security forces of Iraqi Kurdistan to protect them from Iranian attacks. The Kurdish channel Rudaw reported that security forces arrested the author of the assassination on March 16 in Penjwin. The Iranian regime has a long history of assassinating anti-regime dissidents in Iraqi Kurdistan, Europe, and even the United States since it came to power in 1979.
The highly contested Iranian regime organized parliamentary elections on March 1 to select the 290 members of its National Assembly (Medjlis) in order to prove its legitimacy to the local and international public opinion.
In addition to the Parliament, the 61 million voters out of 85 million inhabitants were called upon to renew the Assembly of Experts tasked with eventually designating the supreme leader, the highest authority of the Islamic Republic.
The outcome of the election was unsurprising as all candidates even remotely independent, moderate, centrist, or reformist had been sidelined. Preparing for a period of confrontation with Israel and the United States, the theocratic regime aims to have a single-colored, reliable, combative, and loyal chamber faithful to its supreme leader. Faced with this denial of democracy, representatives of civil society, the Front of Reformist Parties, as well as former "moderate" presidents, Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, leaders of the Green Movement, and all Kurdish, Baluch, and Arab parties had called for a boycott of this electoral farce (Le Monde, March 4). Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khamenei repeatedly urged Iranians to "participate in these strong and fervent elections" because "it is important to show the world that the nation is mobilized" (AFP, March 1). This call apparently had little effect because despite the extension of polling hours from 6 p.m. to midnight and the incessant media blitz, the majority of the population boycotted the polls.
In the capital Tehran, where many journalists and observers saw sparsely attended polling stations, the Ministry of Interior reported a turnout of 26.24%. Nationwide, it was officially 41%, the lowest turnout since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. However, this figure is strongly contested by civil society NGOs, which assert that it is significantly below 25%, and in many provinces, such as Kurdistan, it is below 12%. Nevertheless, despite images of deserted polling stations in most Kurdish cities, the Ministry of Interior posted a turnout of 32.65% for the Kurdistan province, with its capital in Sanandaj (Senna), 42.85% for the Kurdish province of Kermanshah, 47.58% for Lorestan, and even 60.8% for Ilam province. In the province of Urmia, officially called Western Azerbaijan but predominantly Kurdish, the reported turnout was 48.32%. Out of the 12 seats up for grabs in this mixed-population province, 7 went to Kurdish candidates and 5 to Azerbaijanis. In Sanandaj, Kurdish candidates won 6 out of 6 seats, in Ilam 3 out of 3, in Kermanshah 6 out of 8 in the first round, with 2 seats remaining undecided for a second round as no candidate obtained more than 20% of the vote. The same goes for Lorestan province, where 7 Kurdish candidates were elected in the first round and 2 seats remain to be filled in the second round.
The election of around thirty "acceptable" Kurdish parliamentarians for the regime is unlikely to represent the aspirations of the population they are supposed to represent. At most, they could advocate for the economic and social demands of their constituents in a Parliament that, in any case, lacks real power. The majority of power being held by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guards, and various unelected institutions of the Islamic Republic. As a result of these elections, the Islamic Republic emerges weakened with its legitimacy significantly undermined in the eyes of its own population.
The final composition of the Parliament will only be known after a second round, to be held later in April or May, to fill the 45 seats left vacant in the first round. Out of the 245 deputies already elected, 200 are classified as "principalists," meaning fundamentalists defending the "foundational principles" of the Republic such as mandatory veiling and hostility towards Western countries. 11 women in chadors and veils were elected to this assembly of 290 members, compared to 16 in the previous one, including President Mohammed Bagher Qalibat, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, who was re-elected as a MP "difficultly" probably thanks to divine intervention.
The election for the Assembly of Experts resulted in the designation of ultraconservative candidates pre-approved by Ayatollah Khamenei, who pushed his radical zeal to the point of excluding candidates from this body such as former President Hassan Rouhani or another pillar prelate of the system Sadegh Amedi Larijani.
Commenting on the results of these elections, former President Mohammed Khatami, founder of the reform movement, declared, "Based on official figures, we can say that the majority of Iranians are dissatisfied with the status quo and current governance, and this gives us little hope for the future" (New York Times, March 8). Another former radical president who has become critical of the current government said in a video message that "the official manipulation of the vote makes him personally and for the country. What victory are we talking about? Setting aside the people is not a victory, it is the greatest defeat". The most cautious Iranian commentators, like the reformist Saeed Shariati, estimate that even taking into account the official turnout rate of 41%, the rate of expressed votes remains around 30%, as many voters cast blank votes. He expresses hope that "the message of the nation will be heard and understood" (NYT, March 8).
A minority, militarized, and highly contested, the Iranian regime ensures its survival through massive and fierce repression. According to the annual report of the NGO Iran Human Rights, released on March 5 (AFP, Le Figaro), in 2023 at least 834 people were executed in Iran, including at least 22 women. This tally marks "an alarming increase of 40% compared to 2022" and sets a record since 2015. It is "the second time in 20 years that the number of executions has exceeded the threshold of 800 per year. It's a horrifying figure," warns the NGO.
From her prison, the recent Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ms. Narges Mohammadi issued a call on March 18 (Le Figaro) to the UN and the international community demanding "systematic and comprehensive pressure" against Iran in the face of escalating repression. This repression is also denounced at the UN by dozens of countries and NGOs who also demand the renewal of the mandates of the UN investigation mission on Iran and the Special Rapporteur. The mandates of these UN experts, who have never been allowed to visit Iran, expire in April.
Unfazed, Tehran continues its all-out repression against opponents and protesters or those perceived as such. Unveiled women in public spaces are arrested and punished, sometimes leading to altercations with the morality police or zealous religious figures like the filmed incident of an altercation between an unveiled woman and a religious figure on March 13 in a clinic in the city of Qom reported by RFI which went viral on social media.
In Iranian Kurdistan, repression targets all social strata and particularly kolbars, these impoverished peddlers who try to earn a few pennies by engaging in cross-border trade with Iraqi Kurdistan.
According to Hengaw, the Iranian regime killed four kolbars and injured 63 in February. Moreover, the regime arrested three Kurds in Diwandara, two Kurdish adolescents in Saqqez and Bokan, a Kurdish athlete accused of criticizing a political candidate in Qorveh, and a Kurdish activist in Kermanshah.
The Iranian regime continued its practice of executing Kurdish prisoners, including four people sentenced for non-political charges. Two Kurdish activists, Zaniar Fatahi in Bokan and Sasamn Jamnara in Ilam, were respectively sentenced to eighteen and three months in prison by Islamic Revolutionary Courts. On the occasion of International Women's Day, the Hengaw NGO reported the execution of twenty-two women in Iran, and 325 women were arrested in 2023.
Iranian and Iraqi border guards continued to target Kurdish border carriers (kolbars) along the Iran-Iraq border, injuring at least two dozen in the first two weeks of March, one of whom died nine days after being injured. The Iraqi government complements its increasing repression of cross-border activities by erecting hundreds of kilometers of fencing along the border between Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi government's uncompromising approach to its northern border with Iran stems from a recent security agreement concluded with the Iranian regime. However, the Iraqi government's decision to fence off the border has sparked protests from local residents of Halabja and other border towns who claim that the planned fences would traverse their properties. Furthermore, Hengaw reported that Iranian regime security forces had arrested several Kurds, including two teenagers in Diwandara, an environmental activist in Senna, an activist in Saqqez, and a man in Shinno. Hengaw also claimed that regime forces had tortured to death a protester from Takab in a Saqqez prison. Finally, regime courts sentenced six activists in Shinno and Bokan for participating in anti-government demonstrations.
Iranian security forces arrested several Kurdish militants and organizers of Newroz celebrations, including a renowned singer named Hassan Kakai, who was tortured after performing at a Newroz concert, and a militant, Semko Naserollahi, in Bokan. Iranian authorities also arrested Jalal Khwamardi and singer Arman Saedpanah in Senna, Saber Ebrahimi and four others in Shino, and Lutfollah Parwiz in Kermanshah. Although celebrated by non-Kurds as well, Newroz is the most important festival for Kurds and holds special significance for them as it commemorates the triumph of freedom over oppression. Furthermore, Hengaw reported that the regime had sentenced five Kurds to prison for "membership" in opposition parties. Additionally, the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Mahabad sentenced a former political prisoner to 13 years in prison for "waging war against God."
At the end of March, Iranian border guards injured at least six Kurdish border carriers (kolbars). Two other kolbars died after falling from a cliff near Sardasht, and another succumbed to frostbite in Urmia. Hengaw reported that the Iranian regime killed four kolbars and injured 54 in March. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Senna sentenced a teenage Kolbar to two years in prison and 77 lashes.
On the diplomatic front, on March 25, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had a telephone conversation with Iranian President Ebrahim Raïsi and threatened to launch new incursions into Iraq and Syria on multiple occasions, most recently in a speech on March 31. The semi-official Iranian media Mehr News claimed that Raïssi hoped that "cooperation between Tehran and Ankara would ensure the interests of both nations and increase unity within the Islamic Ummah."
Furthermore, according to the New York Times on March 15, secret American-Iranian talks took place in Oman. The Americans reportedly asked Iran to use its influence on allied militias to cease their attacks in the Red Sea and against American bases in the Middle East. Tehran, on its part, asked Washington to work for a quick ceasefire in Gaza. It is unknown whether these preliminary talks will continue and eventually lead to a thaw in Iranian-American relations after the US elections in November, in case President Joe Biden is re-elected.
Meanwhile, severely hit by international sanctions, the Iranian regime announced on March 17 (AFP, Le Monde) significant contracts worth $13 billion to boost its oil production, which in 2020 had fallen to its lowest level in 30 years. Iran hopes to increase it to 4 million barrels per day by 2025 and thereby generate an additional $15 billion in oil revenue, which constitutes an essential part of its budget.
The international human rights defense organization released on February 29, 2024, a damning report on the massive violations of human rights in the Syrian Kurdish territories under Turkish occupation.
Entitled 'Everything is by the Power of the Weapons,' this 97-page report, published in English, Arabic, and Turkish, documents these violations and abuses committed by the authority of the occupying power, thus accountable under international law, which remain unpunished to this day.
The text begins with a warning and contains alarming descriptions and graphic details that may be disturbing to readers.
EXTRACTS
Turkey Bears Responsibility for Turkish and Proxy Forces’ Actions
Turkey bears responsibility for the serious abuses and potential war crimes committed by members of its own forces and local armed groups it supports in Turkish-occupied territories of northern Syria. Turkish officials are not merely bystanders to abuses, but bear responsibility as the occupying power and, in some cases, have been directly involved in apparent war crimes in what it calls a “safe zone.” Turkey is obliged to restore public order and safety, protect inhabitants, hold those responsible for abuses accountable, provide reparations, and guarantee the rights of property owners and returnees.
(Beirut) – Turkey bears responsibility for the serious abuses and potential war crimes committed by members of its own forces and local armed groups it supports in Turkish-occupied territories of northern Syria, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Kurdish residents have borne the brunt of the abuses due to their perceived ties to Kurdish-led forces that control vast swathes of northeast Syria.
The 74-page report, “Everything is by the Power of the Weapon: Abuses and Impunity in Turkish-Occupied Northern Syria” documents abductions, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, sexual violence, and torture by the various factions of a loose coalition of armed groups, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), as well as the Military Police, a force established by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and Turkish authorities in 2018, ostensibly to curb abuses. Human Rights Watch also found that Turkish Armed Forces and intelligence agencies were involved in carrying out and overseeing abuses. Human Rights Watch also documented violations of housing, land, and property rights, including widespread looting and pillaging as well as property seizures and extortion, and the failure of attempted accountability measures to curb abuses or to provide restitution to victims.
“Ongoing abuses including torture and enforced disappearances of those who live under Turkish authority in northern Syria will continue unless Turkey itself takes responsibility and acts to stop them,” said Adam Coogle, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Turkish officials are not merely bystanders to abuses, but bear responsibility as the occupying power, and in some cases have been directly involved in apparent war crimes.”
Human Rights Watch interviewed 58 former detainees, survivors of sexual violence, relatives, and witnesses of violations, as well as representatives of nongovernmental organizations, journalists, activists, and researchers. Human Rights Watch researchers also spoke to an informed source who directly engages with the Military Police, and a Syrian source previously close to Turkish intelligence officials who had access to and oversight of various factions’ conduct in Afrin between July 2019 and June 2020, and who has since left Syria.
Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria since 2016 resulted in its control of the predominantly Arab region north of Aleppo that includes Azaz, al-Bab, and Jarablus, the previously Kurdish-majority Afrin, and a narrow strip of land along Syria’s northern border between the ethnically diverse towns of Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain.
Through its armed forces and its intelligence agencies, Turkey exerts control and directly oversees the Syrian National Army, providing it with weapons, salaries, training, and logistical support. Türkiye also exercises administrative control over occupied regions via governorates in provinces of Türkiye bordering Syria.
The Turkish government has declared its intention to establish “safe zones” in the areas under its occupation, contending that the Kurdish-led forces in northeast Syria are affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey, the United States, and the European Union regard as a terrorist group, and with which Turkey has been engaged in a decades long conflict. The Turkish government also sees the “safe zones” as facilitating the return of Syrian refugees from Turkey.
However, Turkey has failed to ensure the safety and well-being of the civilian population, and life for the 1.4 million residents of the region is marked by lawlessness and insecurity. “Everything is by the power of the weapon,” said one former resident who lived under SNA rule for just under three years.
SNA factions and the Military Police have arbitrarily arrested and detained, forcibly disappeared, tortured and otherwise ill-treated, and subjected to unfair military trials scores of people with impunity. Kurdish women detainees have reported sexual violence, including rape. Children as young as six months old have been detained alongside their mothers.
In cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the UN Commission of Inquiry, and other human rights organizations, Kurds have overwhelmingly borne the brunt of these abuses. Arabs and others perceived to have close ties with Syrian Democratic Forces have also been targeted.
Factions of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and Military Police committed abuses in detention centers where Turkish military and intelligence officials were sometimes present, according to former detainees, who also said Turkish officials were sometimes directly involved in their torture and ill treatment.
Human Rights Watch interviewed 36 people who experienced housing, land, and property rights violations.
Since Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in the Tel Abyad – Ras al-Ain strip in 2019, hundreds of thousands of residents in the area have been displaced from their homes. Subsequently, SNA factions engaged in widespread looting, pillaging, and seizure of properties. The majority of those affected remain without proper restitution or compensation. “The hardest thing for me was standing in front of my house and not being able to enter it,” said a displaced Yezidi man from Ras al-Ain. The cycle of looting, pillaging, and property seizures persists, leaving those who challenge these actions vulnerable to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, kidnapping, and enforced disappearance.
Accountability for serious human rights abuses and possible war crimes in Turkish-occupied territories remains elusive. Human Rights Watch investigated the cases of four high-ranking people alleged to be involved in serious abuses. None have been prosecuted, and three currently hold high-ranking positions within the SNA structure, according to informed sources.
Neither the SNA's military courts, lacking independence, nor Turkey as the occupying power and primary backer of the SNA, have adequately addressed the serious crimes by those in power in Turkish-occupied territories. Human Rights Watch attempted to engage Turkey in dialogue on these matters and shared detailed research findings in a letter sent twice by email to Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on November 21, 2023 and on January 4, 2024, but the letterhas been met with silence. A letter to the SIG Defense Ministry on November 20, 2023 and January 8, 2024, inquiring among other things about any judicial proceedings related to four publicly reported deaths in detention, has also received no reply.
Turkey is obliged to ensure its forces strictly observe international human rights and international humanitarian law, including the law governing its duties as the occupying power and the de facto government in these areas of northern Syria. This includes restoring and maintaining public order and safety in territories it occupies, protecting inhabitants from violence, holding those responsible for abuses accountable, providing reparations for all victims of serious human rights abuses at the hands of its forces and local forces it controls, and guaranteeing the rights of property owners and returnees, including compensating them for the unlawful confiscation and use of their property and any damage caused. Turkey and the Syrian Interim Government should grant independent investigative bodies immediate and unhindered access to territories under their control.
“Turkey’s occupation of parts of northern Syria has facilitated a lawless climate of abuse and impunity – it’s the furthest possible thing from a ‘safe zone,’” Coogle said.
Full report URL :https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/29/everything-power-weapon/abuses-and-impunity-turkish-occupied-northern-syria
Furthermore, a report recently published by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria has characterized Turkish airstrikes against the infrastructure of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) as "violations of international humanitarian law." The commission emphasized civilian casualties resulting from Turkish attacks and underscored the urgent need for a ceasefire in Syria.
Here are other major events that occurred in Rojava.
Armed clashes between Turkey-backed factions resumed on March 3 in occupied Afrin. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that a civilian and two members of Jaysh al-Nasr were killed in clashes with Nur al-din Zinky militants in the Jinderes district of Afrin. Since the occupation of Afrin, Turkey-backed groups have engaged in multiple conflicts for the looting of Kurdish-occupied resources and territories, as well as for control of checkpoints that serve as sources of revenue.
On March 6, consecutive Turkish airstrikes on four vehicles near Direk (Al-Malikiyah) killed three Christian officers of the Internal Security Forces (Asayesh) of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Asayesh stated that the initial strikes targeted two vehicles, and subsequent strikes targeted the rapid response force sent to aid the victims and the vehicle transporting the injured from the scene of the attacks. Additionally, Asayesh stated that it had arrested 13 ISIS terrorists, 31 Assad regime militants, and three members of Turkey-backed groups in security operations in Al Hasakah governorate. Simultaneously, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) released footage of the seizure of twenty million Captagon pills in Manbij. The SDF claimed that the drugs originated from the coastal city of Tartous, controlled by the Assad regime. The Assad regime and pro-Assad militias produce and smuggle Captagon to generate revenue, disregarding regional and international efforts to counter this deadly trade.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported thirty-seven arbitrary arrests and kidnappings by Turkish intelligence services and their Syrian mercenaries in the occupied Afrin region in February. Twelve Kurds, including elderly individuals, were reportedly targeted due to their alleged association with the former Kurdish administration before the Turkish invasion of Afrin.
During the second week of March, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported the Turkish intelligence services' arrest of ten Kurds in occupied Afrin on March 6 and 12. Meanwhile, a Syrian regime attack on villages near Afrin resulted in the death of one woman and injuries to four civilians.
A settler in Afrin, occupied by Turkey, killed a young Kurdish boy Ahmed Khaled Ma’amo on Thursday, March 14, sparking outrage among the Kurdish community already facing demographic changes and ethnic cleansing by Turkey and its mercenaries. The Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria (AANES) condemned this murder, denouncing Turkey's six-year invasion of Afrin as a "stain of shame" on humanity. They accused the Turkish government of instructing its Syrian mercenaries to carry out "demographic changes, killings, kidnappings, and violations of women's rights." This incident coincides with the resumption of internal conflicts between Turkey-backed factions in Afrin, with SOHR reporting 8,700 kidnappings and arbitrary arrests since the invasion began. The SOHR also highlighted the displacement of 310,000 civilians, representing 56% of the indigenous population, due to the Turkish invasion. In another incident, a Turkish airstrike in rural Aleppo (Shahbaa) killed one civilian and injured another.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) thwarted an escape attempt from the al-Hol camp, which houses ISIS prisoners and their families. The SDF reported that two individuals, identified as "cubs of the caliphate," from Turkmenistan and Indonesia, attempted to escape with the help of a Syrian smuggler. However, the operation failed, leading to the arrest of the three perpetrators. While the al-Hol camp remains a "ticking time bomb," hundreds of Iraqi families returned from al-Hol earlier in the month to mitigate security risks and prevent the resurgence of the "caliphate," as a significant portion of the camp population remains loyal to the terrorist organization. Additionally, the FDS eliminated Samir al Shikhan, a prominent Iraqi jihadist, in an operation in Raqqa on March 24. Furthermore, on the fifth anniversary of the physical defeat of the "caliphate" of ISIS, the SDF issued a warning that the terrorist organization "still poses a great danger," urging the world to effectively collaborate with the SDF and highlighting the vital role of the International Coalition in the ongoing fight.
On the occasion of World Water Day, celebrated on March 22, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) urged the international community to intervene and end Turkey's "water war policy" in the region, which has left millions of Syrians without access to water. In recent years, as part of its campaign against the AANES, led by the Kurds, the Turkish government has significantly reduced the flow of the Euphrates to Syria, thereby violating an international treaty signed between Syria and Turkey.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the Turkish organization "White Hands" inaugurated a new housing complex for families affiliated with Turkey-backed Syrian factions in the occupied Afrin region. The newly created neighborhood comprises 80 apartments located in the Shirawa district. Since Turkey's occupation of Afrin in 2018, thousands of housing units have been built as part of Turkey's demographic restructuring plan, primarily aimed at altering the ethnic composition of the region by resettling non-Kurdish populations.
On March 27, ISIS jihadists launched an attack on a security forces administrative office in Raqqa. The assault resulted in the deaths of two police officers and injured one civilian. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reported the arrest of one jihadist and are working to apprehend other individuals involved in the attack. Meanwhile, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented the beheading of eight Syrian soldiers by the terrorist group, while three others perished in fighting in the Syrian desert. Russian military aircraft also conducted dozens of airstrikes in the region, including in Raqqa. Retired U.S. General Frank McKenzie spoke to ABC News about the increasing threat posed by ISIS, including attempts to target the United States. Recently, the SOHR reported that six ISIS terrorists were clandestinely smuggled by Turkish mercenaries from occupied Afrin into Turkey.
Newroz celebrations, the Kurdish New Year, took place in all regions of Kurdistan and in the diaspora in a festive atmosphere with a spirit of defiance.
In Iranian Kurdistan, more than a year after the death of Jîna Aminî and the fierce repression that fell upon the protests of the Women, Life, Freedom movement, and three weeks after the parody of the elections, Kurds, dressed in their traditional costumes, joyfully and massively celebrated this pre-Islamic festival marking, in the ancient Kurdish tradition, the victory of popular resistance against tyranny, that of light over darkness. From the city of Khoy in the north, bordering Armenia, to Qasr-e Shirin in the southernmost part of Iranian Kurdistan, people danced around fires, sang, expressed their joy, their contempt, and their defiance against a theocratic regime that spends its time celebrating the dead and "martyrs" while reveling in a grim culture of mourning and flagellation.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the celebrations were peaceful in all localities, with the highlight being the torchlight procession of thousands of people at dusk in Aqrê. Many diplomats and expatriates present in Kurdistan were invited to attend this spectacular event.
In Rojava, the festival was celebrated everywhere, especially in Kamishli, as a strong moment of resistance against enemies of freedom like Isis but also against the Turkish occupation of certain Syrian Kurdish territories. The commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, General Mazlum Kobanê, released a message of peace and a call for dialogue on this occasion.
In Turkish Kurdistan, the festivities this year coincided with the campaign for municipal elections. The pro-Kurdish party DEM took the initiative to organize gatherings with the dual purpose of celebrating resistance and mobilizing for the elections. From March 17 to March 25, celebrations took place in all Kurdish cities and in Turkish metropolises hosting significant Kurdish communities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, etc. The largest of these celebrations gathered nearly a million people in Diyarbakir, the political and cultural capital of Kurdistan, on March 21. In addition to election candidates and party leaders, Kurdish Pasionaria Leyla Zana spoke, calling on Kurds to unite and mobilize to elect Kurdish mayors defending the interests of the Kurdish people and to put an end to the scandalous regime of the "kayums," Turkish officials appointed by Ankara in place of mayors democratically elected by the population.
In the diaspora, Newroz was celebrated all over Europe, the United States, and even in distant Kurdish communities in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan. One of the most remarkable celebrations was that of the Kurdish community in Japan, in a suburb of Tokyo, in a park adorned with numerous Kurdish flags.
In Paris, as every year, the Kurdish Institute organized the Newroz festival on March 20. This year, it took place in the town hall of the 20th arrondissement of Paris, with the participation of over 800 guests, including many children, in the presence notably of the mayors of the 10th and 20th arrondissements of Paris, numerous elected officials, and many non-Kurds who came to celebrate the New Year with their Kurdish friends accompanied by Kurdish music and dances.
