The long-running Kobane trial, which has dragged on for years, reached a shocking conclusion on May 15. Most of the 108 defendants were handed heavy prison sentences. Among them was the charismatic Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtas, former co-chair of the People's Democratic Party (HDP) and former presidential candidate, who was sentenced by Ankara’s 42nd Penal Court to 42 years in prison.
Imprisoned since November 2016 in Edirne prison, in Thrace, near the Bulgarian border, over 1500 km from his hometown of Diyarbakir, he faced 47 charges including “undermining the unity of the state and territorial integrity” and “incitement to commit a crime.” The other HDP co-chair, Ms Figen Yuksekdag, was sentenced to 30 years and 3 months in prison. Former Diyarbakir mayor Ms Gulten Kisanak received a 12-year sentence, and Ahmet Turk, recently re-elected mayor of Mardin, was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
According to Human Rights Watch (see p.51), the indictment against the 108 defendants is based on four tweets posted on October 6, 2014, on the HDP’s Twitter account and political speeches. Years after the events, the prosecutor added several statements, including anonymous witness allegations against Kurdish parliamentarians. Human Rights Watch criticized this as “an arbitrary procedure that did not respect basic guarantees for a fair trial,” labeling the trial political in nature.
Members of the DEM (new name for the HDP), who protested vehemently in Parliament upon hearing the verdict while holding portraits of the condemned co-chairs, called it a “judicial massacre” and a “new dark mark in Turkish judicial history.” This indignation was shared by hundreds of thousands of Kurds who, despite protest bans, took to the streets in major Kurdish cities and Turkish metropolises to denounce the perceived miscarriage of justice. Many voices from the Turkish opposition, including CHP leader Ozgur Ozel and Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, condemned the verdict. Despite the general outcry, President Erdogan and his spokespeople maintained their usual stance, asserting the “independence of the Turkish judiciary” and reminding that the defendants could appeal. The defense lawyers plan to appeal, though with little hope given the ultranationalist bias within the Turkish judicial system, which often aligns with the government. When domestic avenues are exhausted, and lawyers turn to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, Ankara has a history of ignoring its rulings.
In a 2018 ruling, the ECHR had found that Demirtas’s prior 4 years and 8 months sentence for “terrorist propaganda” was a matter of free expression, ordering his release “as soon as possible,” stating that his imprisonment aimed to stifle political pluralism. Turkey refused to comply, as it did with a similar ruling for philanthropist Osman Kavala, 66, detained since October 2017 and accused of financing protests against an outregous development project for Istanbul’s Gezi Park.
The heavy sentences against Demirtas and his colleagues, totaling 407 years, were justified by the Turkish judiciary on the basis of their social media calls to protest Turkey’s inaction, or even complicity, during the ISIS siege of the Syrian Kurdish border town of Kobane in October 2014. ISIS fighters could cross Turkish territory to reinforce their siege of Kobane, witnessed by numerous local and foreign journalists. The Turkish army refused to intervene, and Erdogan publicly welcomed the “imminent fall of Kobane.” Injured jihadists were treated in Turkish hospitals. This anti-Kurdish stance outraged the Kurdish population on both sides of the border. Massive anti-government protests erupted in Kurdish cities, especially Diyarbakir. Turkish police and anti-riot forces responded with extreme brutality, using live ammunition. The death toll was high: 37 dead, including about thirty protesters and a few others killed in the chaos. All the victims were Kurds. Instead of investigating the disproportionate use of force by security forces, the government chose to incriminate those who had called for peaceful protests, holding them responsible for the carnage.
Ultimately, thanks to the heroic resistance of its people and the arrival of heavily armed Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters with American air support, Kobane did not fall to ISIS. This symbolic first victory encouraged Kurdish forces, gradually supported by the US, France, and other allies, to defeat ISIS and end the so-called Islamic caliphate.
The severe sentences for Demirtas and his comrades received widespread international media coverage (see pp. 45-51). It was noted that “the Kurdish Obama” had in the June 2015 elections won 80 parliamentary seats, securing over 6 million votes, thus for the first time putting Erdogan’s AKP in the minority, earning Erdogan’s enduring resentment. Western countries, which vocally protested against Navalny’s persecution by Putin’s regime and imposed sanctions, remained relatively silent about Demirtas’s plight.
Ordinary repression of opponents continued throughout May. May Day protests were repressed, resulting in 210 arrests (p.2). Over 500 suspected supporters of cleric Gulen were detained (p. 44). On May 8, Kurdish disappeared’s mothers held their thousandth rally against forgetting in Istanbul (Le Monde, May 8). They continue to demand the truth about their children abducted and killed by Turkish gendarmerie death squads (TEM), especially in the 1990s, a particularly dark and deadly period of the “dirty war” between Turkish forces and PKK fighters, which officially claimed over 50,000 lives, not counting the thousands (estimates range from 12,000 to 17,000) of disappeared.
This tragedy inspired, among other works, the new documentary “The Blind Spot,” which recently won several awards at the Deutsche Filmpreis, the German equivalent of the Oscars (see further).
On the economic front, post-election, the government faces the harsh realities of inflation, deficits of the budget and the balance of payments. It announced a “three-year austerity plan” (Le Figaro, May 13). Additionally, on May 2, Ankara decided to suspend all trade relations with Israel (pp. 6, 8) and to strengthen its ties with Hamas.
For the first time since the local elections, the pro-Kurdish DEM party leaders met with the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey’s main opposition party, in Ankara. The Democratic Party delegation included co-chairs Ms Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan, as well as vice co-chair Ms Özlem Gündüz. The two parties stated that the meeting aimed to discuss election results and the current political landscape in Turkey and the broader region. CHP leader Özgür Özel expressed his gratitude to the DEM, stating: “We had the opportunity to exchange ideas and evaluate the results of the local elections and their implications for the upcoming general elections and the challenges facing democracy in Turkey.” Additionally, Turkish authorities postponed the verdict in the case of Kurdish political figure Ms Leyla Zana to July 2. Zana, a 1995 Sakharov Prize laureate, is accused of “propaganda for a terrorist organization.” Meanwhile, Turkish police arrested two other journalists associated with a pro-Kurdish media outlet and detained fourteen DEM party members in Urfa. In Mardin, thirteen Kurdish politicians were sentenced to long prison terms for supporting Kurdish autonomy in 2015.
After the elections, DEM party leaders also engaged in discussions with the Felicity Party (Saadet), focusing on topics such as “views on the new constitution,” among other national issues. As President Recep Tayyip Erdogan plans to draft a new constitution, the DEM party prioritizes resolving economic problems and creating conditions for potential constitutional amendments, particularly regarding the rights of Kurds and other minorities. Meanwhile, DEM party leaders maintain dialogues with other Turkish parties.
The event is quite rare and deserves attention. The President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Nechirvan Barzani, undertook an official visit to Tehran from May 6 to 8 at the invitation of Iranian authorities. Iranian and Kurdish media extensively covered this visit, labeling it as "historic."
During the visit, President Barzani met successively with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Parliament President, Foreign Minister, and Secretary General of the National Security Council. President Barzani, who grew up and was educated in Iran, and therefore speaks Persian fluently, aimed to reassure his Iranian counterparts that Kurdistan is not and will not be a base for destabilizing the Iranian regime. He emphasized that contrary to some Arab and Iranian media propaganda, Kurdistan harbors no Israeli military or intelligence bases or installations. The only foreign presence on its soil is the US-led International Coalition against ISIS, with bases in Erbil and Harir, crucial for air support and training in anti-ISIS operations. ISIS remains a common enemy of Kurdistan, Iraq, and recently committed a significant massacre in Iran. Despite its weakened state, ISIS remains highly active and could thrive if joint efforts were relaxed.
Another crucial message from N. Barzani concerned the stability of Iraq and Kurdistan. He highlighted that any destabilization in Kurdistan due to militia attacks, drones, financial or budgetary restrictions would have severe consequences not only for Iraq's stability but also, indirectly, for Iran's. Tehran was urged to leverage its considerable influence over Baghdad's leaders to resolve political, budgetary, and legal disputes with the Kurdistan Regional Government through dialogue.
The Kurdish delegation, which included Deputy Prime Minister Qobad Talabani, two vice-presidents from UPK and Goran movements, and the Minister of Interior, represented Kurdish political unity. They received a reception described as "cordial" and "warm" by participants and media. Iranian leaders pledged to contribute to Kurdistan's stabilization, marking a "revitalization of bilateral relations" and a "new chapter in Iran-Kurdistan relations."
Coming shortly after Turkish President Erdogan's highly publicized visit to Erbil, this visit likely balanced Kurdistan's delicate relations between its two aggressive and rival neighbors, potentially easing tensions temporarily. Commenting on this visit, US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller stated, "We have consistently encouraged all talks that could lead to de-escalation and greater stability in the region, including with Iran, which has been one of the largest contributors to instability in Iraq and beyond in the Middle East."
A week after his Tehran visit, President Barzani visited Baghdad on May 15, meeting Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Soudani, the Chief Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, and the President of the Supreme Judicial Council. Discussions centered on restarting Kurdistan's oil exports suspended since March 2023, disbursing Kurdistan's budget allocation, paying overdue salaries to government employees, and the Kurdistan parliamentary elections in accordance with constitutional provisions. Termed "constructive" and "positive," these talks did not yield concrete results, but both leaders agreed to "continue discussions between the two parties on all relevant subjects to find sustainable solutions in accordance with the Constitution and the law," as stated in the final communiqué of Barzani's third visit to Baghdad since early April.
However, on May 7, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court temporarily suspended procedures to organize Kurdistan's parliamentary elections on June 10, pending a ruling on a challenge filed by the Kurdistan Prime Minister arguing the "unconstitutionality" of the electoral constituency divisions planned for the ballot (AFP, May 7, see p. 104). This decision followed the Court's February ruling to reduce Kurdistan Parliament seats from 111 to 100, effectively eliminating 11 seats reserved for Christian and Turkmen minorities, sparking widespread outcry and exacerbating the political crisis. Following the suspension decision, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission proposed September 5 as a new date for the parliamentary elections. Consultations among Kurdistan's political parties continue on this matter, with no definitive date set by Kurdistan's presidency.
Additionally, on May 11, the Iraqi government officially requested the UN to terminate its assistance mission by late 2025. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), established in 2003 at Iraq's request, its mandate strengthened in 2007 and renewed annually since, includes supporting inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, organizing elections, or reforming the security sector. UNAMI played a crucial role in dialogue and mediation between Erbil and Baghdad and supervised election organization. Its observations and recommendations on rule of law, democratic standards, and minority rights have not been favored by Baghdad's predominantly Shiite government. Criticizing a recent Iraqi law heavily penalizing homosexual relations, UNAMI irked the authoritarian and conservative Iraqi government, which no longer wishes to hear local or foreign critical voices and seeks to swiftly end this mission deemed "no longer needed" (Le Monde, May 11). Responding to this request, US State Department spokesperson Vedan Patel stated on May 13, "The United States strongly supported the Mission's work, providing not only electoral assistance but also facilitating regional dialogue." He added that the US was working with Iraq and the UN Security Council for an "orderly and responsible closure."
Meanwhile, US Deputy Secretary of State for Energy Resources, Geoffrey Pyatt, met officials in Baghdad and Erbil to discuss "resuming Iraqi oil exports via the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP)." The Kurdistan Oil Industry Association (APIKUR) welcomed Pyatt's visit, ready to resume Iraqi Kurdistan oil exports if an agreement between Baghdad and Erbil ensures payment guarantee for past and future exports and preserves commercial and economic rights. APIKUR also noted Iraq's loss of nearly $14 billion since halting oil exports through Turkey in March 2023.
On May 17, the Kurdistan Security Council (KSC) announced the arrest of a senior Islamic State (ISIS) leader named Socrates Khalil (alias Abdullah al Tafkheikh) in Erbil. KSC's statement affirmed Khalil closely collaborated with ISIS's caliph and had resided in Turkey for five years until Kurdish forces apprehended him with a fake passport. Following his capture, Khalil disclosed numerous details about Mosul's fall and admitted transferring five million dollars to the terrorist organization.
On May 20, Iraq's Electoral Judicial Authority allocated five seats out of 100 as a quota for Kurdistan's minority regions. Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces will each receive two seats, with Duhok receiving one. The court decision followed the Supreme Court's annulment of the previous allocation of eleven quota seats, reducing Kurdistan's representation to 100 seats. Several Kurdish Christian and Turkmen political figures expressed dissatisfaction with the final quota seat count, demanding greater representation and equitable distribution among Kurdistan's provinces.
Moreover, Kurdistan's Ministry of Finance and Economy announced returning 50% of non-oil domestic revenues from February to the federal government. This action was part of a fragile agreement between Baghdad and Erbil to ensure timely payment of Kurdistan government employees' salaries. On May 27, the Iraqi Prime Minister called for an "accelerated" nationalization of Kurdish employees' payroll systems. However, the federal government seeks to unlock salaries through banks affiliated with Baghdad, while Erbil operates its own electronic payment system called "My Account." Kurdish employees continue to struggle in receiving their April salaries, a persistent issue since 2014.
Qatari Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Hassen Al-Hammadi visited Kurdistan and attended the inauguration ceremony of the new Consulate General building in Erbil. High Kurdish officials highlighted that the consulate's opening marked a significant step in strengthening relations with Qatar. Currently, Kurdistan hosts 39 consulates, representations, and foreign envoys.
Finally, with the Khor Mor gas pipeline now connected to the Kirkuk Gas Company, the Iraqi government aims to sign a contract with Dana Gas, the field's operator. However, Kurdistan's Natural Resources Ministry emphasized that Dana Gas already has a contract to supply gas for electricity in Kurdistan. Disagreement persists between Baghdad and Erbil over the gas field's production, located within Kurdistan's territory. The region has also faced multiple attacks from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the past.
Tensions between indigenous Kurds and Arab settlers sparked unrest in five villages in Kirkuk governorate after the Iraqi army supported settlers in preventing Kurdish farmers from harvesting their crops. Residents told Rudaw that the problem occurs annually just before the harvest. Arab settlers also attempted to seize over 12,000 acres from Kurds in Daquq district, Kirkuk governorate. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense continued its lawsuit against Kirkuk governorate for attempting to transfer Kurdish-owned land titles to municipalities. The Ba'athist regime had previously confiscated nearly 300,000 acres of Kurdish farmland and distributed them to Arab settlers and government ministries in "contested territories." Iraq's constitution, ratified in 2005, mandates the return of confiscated lands and cancellation of previous regime Arabization laws. However, the Iraqi government has yet to implement these provisions. According to the American NGO CPT (Civilian Peace Team), cited by Rûdaw on May 8, Turkish and Iranian airstrikes have killed at least 850 civilian in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1990.
The Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who was expected to succeed Ayatollah Khamenei, died in a helicopter accident on May 19. Earlier that fateful Sunday morning, he had inaugurated a dam on the Aras River in the Iranian province of Khoda Afarin alongside his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev. On the way back to Tabriz, his helicopter had to traverse a mountainous area affected by turbulent weather. While the other two helicopters in his convoy safely crossed through the bad weather, his crashed into a foggy valley. President Raisi, along with his Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, the governor of East Azerbaijan province, Malek Rahmati, and the Tabriz governor, all perished in the crash. It took search teams 19 hours to locate the crash site and recover the charred bodies of the victims.
The circumstances of the accident, occurring after a meeting with Azerbaijani President Aliyev, gave rise to conspiracy theories and numerous jokes popular among Iranians. One of the most widespread jokes suggested that Raisi died because the weather was 'moody,' alluding to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, believed to be active in Azerbaijan. Beyond the anecdote, a significant portion of Iranians celebrated the tragic end of this president often described as the 'Butcher of Tehran.' International press coverage on this occasion highlighted his violent past. For instance, the French weekly Nouvel Obs published an article on May 20 by its Iran and Middle East specialist, Sara Daniel, titled 'Requiem for a Torturer,' recounting, 'Here are the circumstances in which, on August 15, 1988, three weeks after the start of an operation carried out by the young Islamic Republic that led to the death of more than 30,000 political prisoners, Ayatollah Montazeri asked to see the four members of the "Death Committee" who decided the fate of opponents to the revolution. Raisi, then 27 years old, was the deputy prosecutor. The pacifist cleric was horrified by what he was told. He said to them, "This is the worst crime perpetrated in the Islamic Republic since the Islamic Revolution, and history will condemn us for it. It was perpetrated by you. And you will be considered among the war criminals of history."'
Ayatollah Ali Montazeri was once designated as Imam Khomeini's heir. Upon Khomeini's death, internal clerical maneuverings resulted in the selection of the ultra-conservative Khamenei, who experts say was far from having the required theological qualifications.
Meanwhile, an Amnesty International report details the massacres committed under Raisi's rule: children killed for accompanying their parents to demonstrations, fake burials, and parents arrested for mourning at a loved one's grave.
While a part of Iran saw Raisi's tragic end as a manifestation of 'divine justice' and publicly rejoiced, including in Tehran and other Iranian cities, another part close to the regime mourned his passing. Tens of thousands gathered on May 22 in central Tehran to pay tribute to him before his burial the following day in the Shiite mausoleum in his hometown of Mashhad. Governments close to Iran, such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey under Erdogan, declared days of mourning. Russia's Putin praised the memory of a 'true friend.' No Western country sent a representative to the 'national funeral' held in Tehran, as Raisi was, until his election, on the U.S. list of war criminals banned from entering the United States.
Raisi's sudden death at the age of 63, who was expected to succeed the elderly 85-year-old and ill Ayatollah Khamenei, opens a period of uncertainty at the top of the Iranian regime, which has scheduled presidential elections for June 28. Elected in 2021 after a heavily boycotted election, Raisi appeared to be one of the last assets of the ultra-conservative camp. Former 'reformist' or 'moderate' presidents like Hatami or Rohani are in disgrace. The vice president, Mohammad Mokhber, who has become interim president, is largely unknown and lacks both charisma and theological pedigree. The mullahs' republic seems to be running out of steam and struggling to prepare for the succession of its Supreme Leader. In the meantime, the ultra-conservatives won a Pyrrhic victory in the second round of parliamentary elections, which were also heavily boycotted. During the March 1 election, marked by very low turnout, candidates receiving less than 20% of the ballots were disqualified for a second round held on May 10. According to Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi, the election saw 'good participation,' although no specific figures were provided, and elected candidates received 'a relatively good and acceptable number of votes,' also without any detailed figures. Most of the 45 MPs 'elected' belong to the camp of fundamentalists who seek to impose more cultural and social restrictions based on Islamic Sharia law on society. They particularly demand stricter enforcement of the obligation for women to wear the veil. Le Figaro, on May 15, published a report on 'the hunt for poorly veiled women,' which is 'increasing in brutality' (see p. 40). According to the newspaper, a police patrol ensures the enforcement of the obligation to wear the veil in the streets of Tehran, while in the provinces, away from the media, repression is even harsher.
On May 18, seven people, including two women, were hanged in Iran, as reported by AFP (see p. 108), as the Islamic Republic intensifies the use of the death penalty for political purposes. Norway-based NGO Iran Human Rights has counted 223 executions since the beginning of the year, including at least 50 in the first half of May. The mullahs' regime holds the grim title of the world's leading executioner of women.
In addition to women, dissenting artists are also among the primary targets of repression. One symbol of dissent, rapper Toomaj Salehi, has been sentenced to death. This sentence continues to provoke outrage in Iran and most Western countries, where the idea of dying for an opinion, for songs, recalls the darkest hours of Nazi Germany or Pinochet's Chile. Another renowned artist, filmmaker Mohammad Rasoulof, sentenced to 8 years in prison and fearing for his safety, fled Iran to seek refuge in Europe. He was able to present his latest film 'The Wild Fig Tree Seeds' at the Cannes Film Festival, which tells the Faustian pact of a judge in Iran and probes the generational gap within a family whose father has become a watchdog for the regime (Le Monde, May 24). The film received applause from the audience and was awarded the Special Jury Prize.
Finally, here are the most striking facts of repression in Kurdistan documented by the Kurdish human rights NGO Hengaw.
Iranian border guards shot dead two Kurdish border couriers (kolbars) in Hangajal village near Baneh, and ten others were injured in various incidents near the same area. In April alone, at least four kolbars were killed and thirty were injured by Iranian guards.
An Hengaw NGO report stated that medical negligence led to the death of a Kurdish prisoner from Kermanshah in Tehran. Iranian authorities arrested five Kurds in Bokan, seven in Saien Qala, two in Sardasht, and two in Piranshahr for participating in Newroz celebrations on March 21. The regime also arrested three Kurdish men and one woman in West Azerbaijan province. Simultaneously, an Iranian court sentenced four Kurds from Piranshahr to prison terms ranging from one to ten years for their affiliation with the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party (PDKI). Finally, Iranian border guards killed two Kurdish border couriers (kolbars) near Baneh and Sardasht and injured five others in the same areas in separate incidents.
The Iranian regime has executed several people for non-political offenses. Hengaw reported that the regime had executed 25 Kurds in May and 72 since January 2024. The regime also arrested several Kurds for political activities, including a language teacher and a philanthropist in Bokan, as well as two participants in Newroz celebrations in Miandoab, a former protester in Kermanshah, and two young Kurds in Pawa. At the same time, Iranian security forces summoned 20 former protesters in Awdanan and forced them to sign a commitment to no longer participate in further demonstrations. Meanwhile, the revolutionary court in Ourmia sentenced a Turkish Kurd to death for 'rebellion.' Finally, Iranian border guards killed a young Kurdish civilian in Marivan, Ajwan Kiani, suspected of smuggling goods. In late May, Iranian courts handed down several prison sentences in the Kurdish region, including 21 years for prominent Kurdish journalist Jîna Gorji in Sena, six years for the father of a deceased protester in Karaj, five years for a Kurd in Bokan, and two years for a Kurdish journalist in Kermanshah.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), led by the Kurds, plans to hold municipal elections across its controlled territories on June 11. The High Electoral Commission is tasked with organizing these elections, including updating electoral registers and inviting governmental and non-governmental organizations to monitor the elections. AANES sponsored a forum in Hassaké with dozens of Arab tribal leaders, who called for "broad participation" in the elections and sought solutions to the Syrian crisis, reaching agreements on dialogue among Syrians and condemning violence, terrorism, and occupation. This forum is the second of its kind, and by late May, 5,336 candidates had registered for the municipal elections.
Turkey reacted strongly to the election announcement, threatening to oppose it by any means, including military intervention. Ankara fears that the elections will grant popular and democratic legitimacy to AANES, potentially leading to an autonomous or federal political entity, which it views as an existential threat. Turkey supports the dissident Syrian province of Idlib, led by the former al-Nusra Front affiliated with Al-Qaida and has established puppet municipal councils in the Kurdish Syrian territories it occupies (Afrin, Serê Kaniyê, Girê Spî). However, free and democratic elections in Kurdish-administered territories are seen as a casus belli. Turkey communicated this stance to Washington, arguing that it would legitimize the "PYD-PKK terrorist entity."
In a region already tense with the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and its risks of extension to Iran and Lebanon, the U.S. is working to avoid new conflicts or tensions with Ankara, especially during an American election year. Following Turkey's green light for Sweden's NATO membership, the U.S. agreed to sell F16 jets to Turkey for $20 billion. The U.S. may ask its Kurdish allies in Syria to postpone their municipal election plans.
On May 7, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the repatriation of eleven Americans from Northeast Syria. Blinken stated that 30,000 people from 60 countries remain in the al-Hol and Roj camps, which house families affiliated with ISIS. He urged countries to "repatriate, rehabilitate, and reintegrate" their citizens, with U.S. support. The Iraqi government has authorized the return of 700 ISIS-associated individuals for rehabilitation with international assistance. Concerns are growing about the resurgence of ISIS ideology among the youth in these camps, especially given the notable increase in terrorist attacks in Syria and Iraq. On May 7, an SDF member was killed in a ISIS ambush in Deir ez-Zor, and an attempted assassination of an SDF commander in Busira was reported.
Meanwhile, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported clashes between the SDF and Assad regime forces near Shahil. In Turkish-occupied Afrin, SOHR documented 22 arbitrary arrests of civilians by Turkish-backed Syrian militias in April.
In early May, AANES released 69 Syrian families (254 people) from the al-Hol camp, allowing them to return to Deir ez-Zor under a 2020 agreement with Arab tribes. This release follows the repatriation of detainees to several countries to ease the pressure on AANES resources and mitigate the risk of an ISIS resurgence. However, on May 10, a ISIS car bomb in al Shahil killed three SDF members.
Turkish forces and their Syrian mercenaries have heavily bombarded Afrin's countryside near Shahba. Kurdish media reported the death of a child due to severe injuries. AANES stated that the bombed area houses people forcibly displaced by Turkey and its mercenaries, blaming the escalation on Erdogan's expansionist policies. This development coincides with increased ISIS attacks in the Syrian desert (Badia), which killed three more soldiers. Dozens of Syrian soldiers have been killed by ISIS in 2024.
Turkish-backed Syrian factions have intensified their attacks on the SDF near Manbij, resulting in the death of a woman and injuries to four civilians, including two children. This escalation follows several attacks by Turkish-backed groups in the Aleppo countryside, particularly al-Shahbaa. The SDF announced the capture of three ISIS commanders in Raqqa and Qamishli during U.S.-led coalition raids.
On May 3, an attack by ISIS on regime military sites in the desert killed 15 Syrian soldiers, according to SOHR.
Diplomatically, normalization of relations between Arab countries and Damascus appears stalled, according to a May 19 Le Monde investigation. Arab countries criticize the Syrian dictator for neglecting crucial issues like refugee return, drug trafficking, and Iranian expansionism in Syria. Damascus also rejects dialogue with Turkey until it withdraws its troops from occupied Syrian territories.
The 74th Deutsche Filmpreis, Germany's prestigious film awards, were presented in Berlin on May 2. Numerous Lolas, the German equivalent of the Oscars, were awarded to filmmakers, including Kurdish directors. Ms Ayşe Polat, born in Malatya, Turkish Kurdistan, who won the Bronze Lola for Best Film for her political thriller "Im Toten Winkel" (In the Blind Spot), which Parisian audiences appreciated at the Kurdish Film Festival in Paris last April. Polat also received awards for Best Director and Best Screenplay, dedicating her prize to "all the women who courageously fight for justice and freedom."
"Im Toten Winkel" depicts the struggles of a German team attempting to shoot a documentary in the Kurdish province of Kars while being closely monitored by Turkish police. Strange incidents occur as the film delves into the role of the military intelligence service JITEM, whose existence was denied by the Turkish state for years, in the abduction and disappearance of thousands of Kurdish dissidents in the 1990s.
In the category of Best Children's Film, "Sieger Sein" by screenwriter and director Soleen Yusef from Duhok was honored. The award went to producers Sonja Schmitt, Christoph Daniel, and Marc Schmidheiny. "Sieger Sein" is a spirited family film about eleven-year-old Mona, who fled Rojava with her family and attends a school in Berlin Wedding. Mona doesn't speak a word of German, but she knows how to play football. Her dedicated teacher, Mr. Chepovich, or Mr. Che for short, recognizes her extraordinary talent and integrates her into the girls' team. Mona is a fighter, but she quickly realizes that only by playing together can she and the other girls win.
Milena Aboyan's film "Elaha" was nominated in the Best Feature Film category but did not win. This graduation film by the Yezidi-Kurdish director from Armenia, a graduate of the Filmakademie Baden-Württemberg, tackles a subject both private and universal: sexual self-determination. With a nuanced script, Aboyan illuminates all facets of the issue, staying very close to her complex and authentic protagonist, Elaha, portrayed by Syrian actress Bayan Layla, who was nominated for Best Leading Actress.
Kurdistan, one of the oldest cradles of human species, has once again become a focal point for archaeologists. In the 1950s, American archaeologists had already unearthed the ancient village of Jarmo, over 7,000 years old, and the Shanidar Cave, which held a dozen Neanderthal skeletons aged between 40,000 and 70,000 years. For over 50 years, the cave was closed and inaccessible to archaeologists due to political reasons, notably the Iraqi-Kurdish wars.
With the emergence of autonomous Kurdistan and its opening to the outside world, Western scientists have flocked to the region to collaborate with their Kurdish counterparts, exploring the area's underground and caves. This major discovery was reported on May 2 by BBC News (see page 5 of the Press Review).
A Neanderthal woman, estimated to be 75,000 years old, has been discovered in Shanidar Cave. This finding adds significant value to our understanding of human evolution and the presence of Neanderthals in the region.
In light of this discovery, the Kurdistan Regional Government is seeking UNESCO's inscription of Shanidar Cave as a World Heritage site to ensure better protection and recognition of this invaluable archaeological site.
