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Bulletin N° 472 | July 2024

 

 

IRAQ: TURKISH MILITARY OPERATIONS INTENSIFY IN KURDISTAN

Taking advantage of the summer season, the Turkish army has stepped up its incursions into Kurdistan. Here and there, they are advancing up to 30 km deep into Iraqi Kurdish territory. After Mount Qandil, the Metina and Gareh mountains are now under intensive bombardment, causing forest and crop fires, the death of Kurdish civilians and population displacement.

According to a press release dated July 12 from the US-based NGO Community Peacemakers Team (CPT), Turkish operations have forced 180 families to flee their villages in Duhok province. In addition to the 8 villages already evacuated, 602 other villages in the region are also at risk and could, if Turkish military operations continue, be forced to evacuate. According to the CPT, in the period from June 15 to July 12, there were 285 Turkish strikes in Duhok province and 65,000 donums (around 65 km2) of farmland were burnt. In the Sidekan district, which covers an area of 1,617 km2, 40% is out of the control of the Kurdistan Government.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Kurdistan National Security Council met on July 11. It called on Turkey to halt its operations and respect the sovereignty of Iraq and Kurdistan. On the same day, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Soudani, Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Army, also convened his National Security Council to discuss the situation on the Iraqi-Turkish border. Following the meeting, he issued a statement affirming Iraq's rejection of the legitimacy of Turkish incursions and encroachments on Iraqi territory. Turkey must adhere to the principle of good neighborliness and engage in diplomatic talks with the Iraqi government on all security-related issues," added the soothingly worded communiqué.

Beyond these verbal protests with no practical consequences, Baghdad has not announced any concrete commercial or diplomatic measures, not even a referral to the UN Security Council which, in principle, should meet when the territorial integrity of a state is threatened by a neighboring state. In the case of Kurdistan, there is a tacit or secret agreement between Turkey, Iran and Iraq to weaken, under various pretexts, the autonomous Kurdistan whose existence and relative prosperity serve as an example for the Kurds of Turkey, Iran and Syria. Baghdad has decided to send yet another mission to Kurdistan, headed by the National Security Advisor, to assess the situation on the border and define a common position on the issue with the Kurdish authorities.

On July 15, UN Secretary-General António Guterres appointed Mohamed Al-Hassan as the new Special Representative for Iraq. As UN Representative, Mr. Al-Hassan will lead the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), whose mandate is due to expire in 2025. Created in 2003, UNAMI's mission is to support Iraq's development. On May 8, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani officially requested that UNAMI be terminated by the end of 2025. This decision follows pressure from Iranian-backed factions who resent UNAMI's commitment to the defense of human rights and democracy.

In other news,  the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has closed the submission period for candidates and parties for the Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections. A total of 13 parties, 2 coalitions and 124 individual candidates have registered. In addition to Kurdish candidates, 19 Christians and 20 Turkmen also registered. A special commission is currently examining the candidacies for these parliamentary elections scheduled for October 20.

Meanwhile, the low-key war against ISIS continues both in Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. On July 22, the Kurdish security forces (Asayish) arrested 21 ISIS suspects in Sulaimanieh province, whose secret cells still appear to be active (see Rudaw July 22). Meanwhile, on July 11, a Baghdad court sentenced to death one of the wives of ISIS founder Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi for her role in the detention and enslavement of Yezidi girls and women (see New York Times, July 11). Finally, on July 30, the US army struck the base of a pro-Iranian militia, killing four militiamen who were attempting to launch attack drones that threatened the forces of the international coalition against ISIS, according to a US defense official (AFP, July 31).

 

TURKEY: ANTI-SYRIAN RIOTS

Violent riots against Syrian refugees shook several Turkish cities from June 30 to July 2. They began in the conservative industrial city of Kayseri, the former Roman Caesarea and home to a large Syrian refugee community. They then spread to other cities such as Hatay (formerly Antioch), Adana, Kilis, Bursa, Urfa, Gaziantep, Antalya, Izmir and the outskirts of Istanbul. Cries of "We don't want Syrians", "We're proud to be Turks", "No refugees in Turkey", and even "Allahu Akbar", overexcited Turkish nationalist mobs attacked and set fire to over 400 businesses, homes and cars belonging to Syrian refugees. Although the Turkish police were present, they did not intervene until the evening of the third day of rioting.

It all started with a rumor circulating on social networks that a Syrian refugee had molested a 7-year-old Turkish girl. After checking, it turned out to be a mentally-impaired Syrian who had taken his little Syrian cousin to the public toilets. This pretext was enough to ignite the hatred of Turkish nationalists against Syrian refugees, whom they hold responsible for all the country's ills, from inflation at over 120% to unemployment, poverty and the serious economic crisis the country is going through. Recalling a wild claim by the Turkish president that Turkey has so far spent over 40 billion dollars, the rioters demand that this money be spent on improving the lot of Turks, not refugees. In fact, this figure is far from the reality, as Turkey, apart from building camps for a small number of refugees, does not allocate specific resources to Syrians who, once on Turkish soil, have to fend for themselves, which they have ended up doing by adapting and working for pittance wages for Turkish companies. The $40 billion figure was invoked by the Turkish president in his negotiations with the European Union, in an attempt to extract maximum subsidies. And with more than $6 billion in European donations, he won the day.

Violence against Syrian refugees in Turkey provoked riots against Turkish military bases in Syrian territories under Turkish occupation. Rioters burned Turkish flags and attacked military and police posts. Demonstrators also shouted slogans against Erdogan, accusing him of negotiating the fate of Syrian refugees with the Damascus regime. The repression of these anti-Turkish demonstrations left 7 people dead, including 6 in Afrin.

Reacting on the evening of the 3rd day of rioting, the Turkish president declared that "nothing can be achieved by fuelling xenophobia and hatred of refugees", and the Turkish police intervened, arresting 474 rioters (AFP, July 2). However, no Syrian dares lodge a complaint for fear of being arrested in turn and deported, as is the government's current policy, which "sends ever greater numbers of refugees to Syria in the blink of an eye", notes Le Monde's correspondent in his investigation published on July 16. While President Erdogan blames this wave of xenophobia on the "poisoned discourse of the opposition", according to Le Monde's survey, Syrian refugees claim that, with the exception of the pro-Kurdish DEM party, all Turkish parties are hostile to them. This fear leads refugees to regularly change address, to the point where, according to the Turkish Interior Minister, of the 3.2 million Syrians supposedly living in Turkey, over 730,000 cannot be found or located. It is not known how many of them have already emigrated to Europe.

As for normalization with Damascus, despite Erdogan's repeated overtures and incessant mediation by Moscow and Baghdad, little progress was made in July. The Syrian president is still demanding the withdrawal of Turkish forces from the Syrian territories they occupy, or at least a precise timetable for this withdrawal. The fate of Idlib province, where more than 3 million Syrians opposed to the regime are concentrated, is part of the behind-the-scenes negotiations. Turkey provides a wide range of support, including military, to this breakaway province governed by Islamists from the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. Ankara advocates a joint policy with Damascus to seize Rojava and its autonomous Kurdish administration, an unattainable goal as long as there are US forces in the region. But Turkey is counting on Donald Trump's election to put an end to Rojava, which it claims poses "an existential threat" to it.

As bellicose as ever, the Turkish president, who likes to pose as the "defender of the oppressed" - except, of course, the Kurds and Uighurs - is threatening to intervene against Israel in defense of the Palestinians (New York Times, July 29). His more realistic generals are trying to convince him that intervening against Israel, which has considerable means of defense, is not as easy as bombing the Kurds of Syria and Iraq, who have no means of anti-aircraft defense or modern weaponry. And let's not forget that the United States has always been committed to guaranteeing Israel's defense.

In the meantime, Turkey is waging a little kebab war with Germany. It wants to impose an appellation of geographical origin with specifications for this "Turkish specialty" prepared, both in Turkey and in Europe, in the vast majority of cases by Kurds. Berlin responds that kebab is also part of Germany's culinary heritage, and opposes Turkish claims. Not to mention the fact that this specialty has long been present in many other countries under different names: gyros in Greece, chawarma in Lebanon, etc. (see BFM and Euronews of July 25, pp. 58-59).

The next Turkish claim could concern the appellation of origin for coffee originating in Ethiopia and Yemen, introduced to Europe in the 18th century by Ottoman diplomats. This drink is now more popular in Western countries than in Turkey, where the preferred beverage is still tea, introduced to the country at the end of the 19th century probably by the Russians, as tea is said çay "tchay" in Turkish, as well as in Kurdish and Persian. The Turks, who have invented nothing in their long history, cling to a few culinary specialties borrowed from the Greeks, Armenians, Kurds and Arabs to assert their identity.

 

IRAN: THE "REFORMER" M. PEZESHKIAN ELECTED PRESIDENT

On July 5, more than 61 million Iranians were called upon to choose between the two candidates eligible for the 2nd round of the elections for their future president of the republic: the surgeon Massoud Pezeshkian and the ultra-conservative Saïd Jalali. According to figures published by the Iranian Ministry of the Interior, around 50% of them turned out to vote. This is a much higher turnout than in the 1st round on June 28, when the figure was 40%. There were therefore some 7 million additional voters for this second round, mobilized in the hope of a change, however measured, promised by the "reformist" candidate Mr. Pezeshkian.

Thanks to this relatively high turnout, Massoud Pezeshkian was elected with 53.6% of the votes cast, obtaining 16,384,403 votes. His opponent Saïd Jalali received 13,538,179 votes.

Upon declaring his victory, Mr. Pezeshkian declared "We are reaching out to everyone" and promised to resolve Iran's internal and external problems through dialogue. This choice also seems to be that of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who is attempting, a few months ahead of uncertain US elections, to find a regional compromise with the Biden administration in order to loosen the stranglehold of sanctions that are strangling the Iranian economy and fuelling deep popular discontent. Iranians are asking their leader to fix the economy, says the New York Times in the survey published in its July 4 edition.

During his election campaign, the president-elect also promised appeasement for women and "minorities", i.e. the non-Persian peoples - Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen - who together make up the majority of Iran's population, and who suffer a great deal of linguistic, cultural, economic and political discrimination. "My government will oppose the morality police, and I firmly oppose any form of coercion against a human being. We have no right to coerce women and girls, and I am ashamed of such behavior towards them," he promised (see Le Monde, July 6).

However, his room for maneuver is limited. Parliament is dominated by ultra-conservatives, as are the judiciary and other centers of power. The ultra-conservative camp represented by S. Jalili is preparing its weapons and biding its time, until the death of the ailing ayatollah. This camp wants to anchor Iran in an alliance with Russia and China, and confront the Americans and the West in order to drive them out of the Middle East and ensure Iran's regional domination. In this context of conflict and constraint, the mandate of Iran's new president is likely to be as disappointing as that of his predecessor and inspiration, Mohammed Khatami, whose health minister he was.

On July 28, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei endorsed the election of Massoud Pezeshkian as the ninth president of the Iranian republic. "I approve the election of the wise, honest, popular and erudite Massoud Pezeshkian and appoint him President of the Islamic Republic of Iran," announced the Ayatollah in a message read by his office manager. Following the Supreme Guide's fatwa, the President-elect was sworn in before Parliament on July 30. He will then have a fortnight to present his ministers to a conservative-dominated parliament to obtain a vote of confidence.

Repression in Iranian Kurdistan continued throughout the month. On July 8, a kolbar named Sala Babajan was killed by the Pasdaran near the town of Nowsud. On July 16, the Pasdaran opened fire on a group of kolbars in the Qandil mountains, killing 19-year-old Kian Zini from Sardasht and wounding at least three others. This comes as another Kurd, Rebwar Rashidi, a 37-year-old kolbar from Baneh, died on July 21, 2024 in Senna's Kosar hospital after being attacked by Iranian border guards.

On July 21, 2024, the Iranian authorities secretly executed a Kurd named Daniyal Kazeminejad in Kermanshah Central Prison, without informing his family. Kazeminejad had been convicted of allegedly killing a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during anti-government protests. In addition, Feyzollah Shadi, a 47-year-old Kurd living in Kamyaran, was arrested by Iranian security forces and taken to an unknown location. His arrest, which was accompanied by the sealing of his store, is believed to be linked to the printing of an obituary for his grandmother, Masoumeh Doroudi, who had sought justice after losing a child to Khomeini's anti-Kurdish fatwa in the 1980s.

 

SYRIA: ASSAD'S ELECTORAL PARODY

Even the most bloodthirsty dictatorships insist on holding elections to give themselves a veneer of legitimacy. Such is the case with the tyrant of Damascus, who after 13 years of civil war and more than half a million deaths, lends himself to the game of elections in a country where whole swathes are still controlled by the jihadists of the former Al-Nosra Front, by the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces or even under Turkish military occupation.

Of Syria's 24 million inhabitants at the start of the civil war in 2011, more than six million have left for neighboring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraqi Kurdistan) or Europe; 5 to 6 million are internally displaced. The regime has survived, thanks to massive help from Russia, Iran and the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah. But at what price! It controls more or less 65% of the territory around Damascus, Aleppo and the Mediterranean coast. It is therefore in this "useful Syria", surviving in extreme poverty and precariousness, that it has organized its elections. No one knows whether the electoral registers were up to date, or how many people had registered. At the end of a perfunctory election campaign led by candidates from the Baath Party, in power since the military coup of 1963, and a few "independents", the head of the electoral commission, Jihad Mourad, announced the list of those elected on July 18, without indicating their political affiliation. According to a tally drawn up by AFP comparing the names of the winners and the lists of candidates, the Baath Party and its allies won 185 of the 250 seats in the Syrian National Assembly. The remaining seats were won by so-called "independent" candidates close to the regime but not officially affiliated to the Baath Party. The turnout was 38.16%, according to Jihad Mourad, a rate comparable to that of the 1st round of the Iranian presidential elections and undoubtedly inflated since, according to observers, most polling stations were deserted. During the vote, in the southern province of Soweida, stronghold of the Druze minority, anti-election rallies took place, according to AFP.

The Kurds of Rojava were obviously not concerned by the elections. They have been trying for several months to organize their own municipal elections, but the Turkish government is vehemently opposed, fearing that such elections would give democratic legitimacy to a Kurdish administration it describes as "terrorist". Faced with threats of Turkish military intervention should the elections be held, the Americans are advising their Kurdish allies to postpone the elections until better days. In a region in turmoil, they do not want to face a new crisis with Ankara.

Meanwhile, the war against ISIS continues. According to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), from January to June 2024, ISIS terrorists claimed 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria, indicating an effort to reconstitute themselves after years of diminishing capabilities. In response, CENTCOM and its partners conducted 196 missions, resulting in the deaths of 44 terrorists and the detention of 166 others, including the elimination of eight senior ISIS leaders. CENTCOM said the pursuit of some 2,500 terrorists at large, as well as international efforts to repatriate more than 9,000 detainees and rehabilitate more than 43,000 people in Syrian camps, remained essential to the lasting defeat of ISIS.

On July 10, Kurdish forces captured three ISIS jihadists, including a high-ranking officer, in Hasakkeh province. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, they were disguised as shepherds. On July 26, another jihadist was killed in Markada, east of Deir Ezzor. On the same day, an international coalition base inside the CONECO gas field was targeted from areas controlled by pro-Iranian militias, reports the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (OSDH). No casualties were reported. Kurdish forces were also mobilized to protect crops and prevent fires during the scorching month of July.

 

CULTURE: DISCOVERY OF AN ANCIENT UNDERGROUND CITY IN KURDISTAN

In Midyad, in the Kurdish province of Mardin, archaeologists have just discovered a veritable underground city made up of a vast network of cellars.

At the Maliate site beneath the town of Midyad, famous for its beautiful blond stone houses, archaeologists have already uncovered more than fifty rooms. It is believed to be the largest underground city in the country.

Located in the region of Tour Abdin (Mountain of Believers), home to the country's ancient Syriac community, Midyad has never before seen any real archaeological excavations, even though the region is rich in monasteries and other historical remains (see l'Express p. 52).