An agreement on the resumption of oil exports from Kurdistan was signed on 4 April in Baghdad in the presence of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohamed Chia al-Soudani and Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. It provides for the resumption of Kurdish oil exports to the Turkish port of Ceyhan "from 4 April", according to an AFP dispatch. According to this agreement - considered to be a "temporary compromise" - Kurdish oil sales will now pass into the hands of the Iraqi oil company (SOMO), but the revenue will be paid into an account managed by Erbil and supervised by Baghdad.
The signing of this agreement is a significant step forward in the dispute that has pitted Baghdad against Erbil and Ankara since 2014. It comes on the heels of an arbitration ruling by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which was referred to it by the Iraqi Oil Ministry in May 2014. In November 2013, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), deprived by Baghdad of its constitutionally-mandated financial endowment, had signed a strategic "energy agreement" with Turkey enabling Kurdish oil to be exported via a pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan and sold on international markets. To this end, the KRG agreed to a discount of $5.77 per barrel compared with the price charged by the Iraqi company SOMO, and to a surcharge on the price of transit and use of the Turkish section of the pipeline.
In its ruling, the ICC acceded to one of Baghdad's requests and fined Turkey $1.471 billion, a relatively modest sum compared with the $30.5 billion claimed by Baghdad for "damages suffered by the Iraqi State as a result of these illegal exports between May 2014 and September 2018". Turkey, for its part, claimed a sum of $1.3 billion from Iraq for unpaid transit costs for Iraqi oil since 1990.
The Tribunal considers that "Turkey is not fully liable for the discounted prices" and that its liability should be calculated on the basis of the difference between the KRG's actual historical oil revenues and what Iraq would have earned if Turkey had fully complied with the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) treaty signed in the 1960s and renewed in 2010. In this scenario, the KRG would still have exported large volumes of oil independently at a reduced price under the budgetary arrangements agreed with Baghdad.
After complicated calculations, the ICC awarded Iraq total compensation of $1.998 billion, of which $1.325 billion was for the overpriced costs of the pipeline compared with the relatively low costs provided for in the ITC treaty, and the remainder for damages suffered. For its part, Turkey was awarded $527 million in compensation for costs incurred in transporting and transiting Iraqi oil since 1990. In total, Iraq was expected to obtain compensation of $1.461 billion.
The ICC's decision is based on the provisions of the ITT Treaty, which defines the Iraqi Ministry of Oil as "the sole authority" that can send oil from Iraq via the pipeline system.
The question is whether Turkey will agree to resume Kurdistan's oil exports without any rebate or transit surcharge on Iraqi terms. Admittedly, the treaty stipulates that "with the exception of force majeure, the Turkish side must guarantee the continuous and safe flow of oil from Iraq through Turkish territory via ITT" and that "the Turkish side guarantees the loading of crude oil from Iraq onto tankers on the instructions of the Iraqi side without delay". However, Turkey can always put forward "technical" pretexts to delay the resumption of exports. How long can this be done without incurring condemnation? At the end of April, the issue had still not been settled. Ankara, Baghdad and Erbil are facing a long and difficult negotiation.
Baghdad and Ankara can also be expected to pass the quid in order to prolong the process of resuming exports for some time, in order to exert maximum pressure on the Kurdistan Region and weaken its economic and political life. The cost of each day during which exports are halted is estimated at $40 million.
In the long term, in the event of a new crisis with Baghdad, there is nothing in the ICC's decision to prevent the Kurdistan Government from exporting its oil to Turkey by tanker lorry or via a pipeline separate from the ITP system covered by the Turkish-Iraqi treaty. The same applies to future gas exports from Kurdistan.
Before the CCI's decision, Kurdistan exported 450,000 barrels of oil a day via Turkey, plus 75,000 barrels from Kirkuk. The cessation of these exports, combined with a reduction of 211,000 barrels a day in Iraq's exports from May 2023, in accordance with a recent OPEC decision, will have a major impact on Kurdistan's budget and that of Iraq, which is over 90% dependent on oil revenues.
Turkey, in the midst of an election campaign in which President Erdogan is playing the anti-terrorism card to the hilt, has relentlessly continued its aerial bombardments of border areas (see the MONDE dossier of 8 April: "La Turquie traque le PKK au-delà de ses frontières" – Turkey hunts down the PKK beyond its borders). On 5 April, it decided to ban aircraft flying to and from the Kurdish town of Suleimanieh from its airspace, claiming, against all evidence, that its airport was under PKK control. On 7 April, a Turkish drone bombed a Kurdish-American convoy passing near this airport, targeting General Mazloum Kobani, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, who was en route for a regional coordination meeting on the war against ISIS. This attack was strongly condemned by the President of the Republic of Iraq, but went unpunished.
Finally, according to the commander of the international anti-jihadist coalition, Major-General Matthew McFarlane, there has been a significant decline in attacks by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In an online press conference held on 24 April, he stated that "from the beginning of this year in Iraq through the first week of April, we have seen a record 68% reduction in attacks compared to the same period last year". During the same period, there was a 55% drop in attacks in Syria, he added. The month of Ramadan was one of the most peaceful in years. The general also reported that "more than 1,300 third-country nationals have been repatriated from the Al-Hol camps" in Rojava, which is still home to around 50,000 people, including family members of suspected jihadists (Kurdistan 24, 24 April).
It should also be noted that the Iraqi Parliament has passed a law making the martyred city of Halabja the fourth province of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Regional Government is responsible for defining the administrative borders of this new province, the creation of which was adopted by the Kurdistan Parliament in 2013.
On 17 April, the Iraqi Parliament held its second reading of a 3-year finance bill. The proposed budget for 2023 is approximately $151 billion. This is the largest budget in Iraq's history, calculated on the basis of a oil barrel at 70 dollars. The Kurdistan Region should receive 12.6% of this budget, which should be put to the vote in May, if all goes well.
The good news from this hectic month of April concerns the weather. To the delight of farmers, it rained a lot in April, to the extent that there was some flooding here and there, particularly in Duhok, Akre and Suleimanieh, and some material damage. On 11 and 12 April, more than 128 mm of rain fell in Barzan, 101 mm in Akre and 90 mm in Suleimanieh. After heavy snow and rain during the winter, the water tables seem to have been replenished and the dams well filled in a region where, due to Turkey's control of the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers upstream, water has become a precious and coveted resource (Kurdistan 24, 13 April).
The campaign for the 14 May parliamentary and presidential elections was marked by a strong mobilisation of supporters of the main candidates throughout April. The incumbent President Erdogan and the candidate of the National Alliance of 6 opposition parties, excluding the pro-Kurdish HDP party, held huge election rallies in practically every town in the country to mobilise their supporters and convince the undecided. This seemingly democratic competition soon turned out to be highly unequal and even unfair. The outgoing president, whose relatives control 90% of the country's media according to an estimate by the British weekly The Economist, was omnipresent on the screens. His speeches were broadcast live by most of his media outlets. His challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu had only a few brief appearances and reports on public and private channels. Commentators, the vast majority pro-Erdogan, hosted talk shows to explain Erdogan's messages to the Islamic and nationalist Turkish electorate. Dewlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right MHP (Nationalist Action Party), an ally of the government, was much more present in the media than the leader of the Iyi parti (Good Party), which is of the same persuasion but a member of the National Alliance. The Kurdish candidates from the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), running under the Green Left Party (YSP) label because the HDP is threatened with a ban, had no access to the screens of the Turkish media.
The campaign themes, developed and serenaded from meeting to meeting by candidate Erdogan, aim to rally the Turkish Islamo-nationalist electorate around him. For him, Turkey is facing an imperialist plot "aimed at preventing it from occupying the place it deserves in the region and on the international stage". Imperialism supports "the terrorists of the Gulen Brotherhood", its former ally accused of the failed coup attempt of July 2016, and arms "the terrorists of the PKK" (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and its Syrian branch the YPG (People's Protection Units), the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (FDS), allies of the international anti-jihadist coalition. The HDP and its avatar the YSP would appear to be no more than political showcases for the PKK. By allying himself with this party, candidate Kılıçdaroglu is playing into the hands of the terrorists, becoming their hostage and jeopardising the very survival of the Turkish state. An ally of the terrorists and the LGBT, Kılıçdaroğlu, if he comes to power, will abolish the gains made by Muslims, the wearing of the hijab in schools, universities and administrations, will call into question traditional fundamental values and, with his coalition of 6 or 7 heads, will quickly sow chaos. These are serious times. Forget the economic difficulties of the moment, think of defending your faith and your Islamic values. With Erdogan, the 21th century will be a Turkish century, with Kılıçdaroğlu Turkey will become a colony of Western imperialism risking losing its independence and territorial integrity.
At the same time as this fear-inducing rhetoric, candidate Erdogan is mobilising all the State's budgetary resources to substantially increase the salaries of various social categories and put nearly 3 million employees into early retirement. To those affected by the terrible earthquake of 6 February, which killed more than 50,000 people, he is promising to rebuild their destroyed homes "within a year", housing allowances for a year to pay their rent, moving expenses, and special quotas at universities for their children. He is stepping up his inaugurations with great fanfare, broadcast live by all the television channels. The highlight of this sequence should have been the inauguration of the Akkuyu nuclear power station, built by the Russian giant Rosatom, on 27 April, in the company of his "dear friend" Putin, even though it is still far from complete. Putin did not make the trip and Erdogan, suffering from gastroenteritis, had to make do with a video-conference inauguration. As luck would have it, it was during this month that he presented voters with the first "Turkish" drone ship (actually designed by the Spanish), the first Turkish Altay tank (with a South Korean engine), the prototype of a Turkish bomber named Kaan, a mythical hero from Turkish prehistory in Central Asia, and the first Turkish TOGG electric car. One miracle never comes alone, and he also announced the discovery of an oil field on the slopes of Mount Gabar, in the Kurdish province of Cizre, "now cleared of terrorists". Finally, the natural gas fields discovered in the Black Sea will soon be available, and Turkish households will be able to use them "free of charge for a year".
These glittering promises to his voters are accompanied by harsh punishments against his intractable Kurdish enemies. The entire police and judicial apparatus has been mobilised to this end. On 12 April, the 24th hearing of the Kobane trial was held before the 22nd Criminal Court in Ankara. 108 Kurdish activists, including the co-presidents and main leaders of the HDP, are prosecuted for their participation in the demonstrations of 6 and 8 October 2014 against Turkey's support for the ISIS forces encircling the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane before the eyes of the Turkish and international television cameras present on the Turkish-Syrian border. The massive intervention of the Turkish repressive forces resulted in clashes that left 37 people dead, almost all of them Kurdish civilians. With unfailing cynicism and aplomb, the government holds the organisers of the demonstrations responsible for these deaths, victims of police violence with the exception of a teenager who fell from a balcony. The 108 leaders of the HDP, including its then co-presidents Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, are being prosecuted for "the murder of 37 people", "undermining the unity and integrity of the state" and "inciting violence". Although no individual acts of violence have been linked to them, the prosecutor, at the end of a three-day hearing, read out a 500-page indictment for 8 hours, calling for 36 defendants, including Dermitas and F. Yuksedag, to be sentenced to life imprisonment.
The lawyers denounced this parody of justice and criticised the judges for rushing to judgment. The president of the court replied: "Life is short". Salahettin Demirtas, a former candidate for the presidency of the Republic, who has been held since 2016 in Edirne prison in Thrace, spoke by video-conference. He stressed that President Erdogan is an authoritarian leader who openly interferes in judicial decisions. He referred to the news that Erdogan had called directly on the judges of the Constitutional Court in the case to close down the HDP. If a threatening politician like Erdogan calls the members of the Constitutional Court directly, what would he not do with the 22nd Ankara Criminal Court (which is judging the Kobani trial), he asked? He accused the Court of making political decisions rather than legal judgements: "Even though you are acting as judges, you are applying Tayip Erdogan's instructions in practice". Candidate Erdogan asked for the conclusions of the prosecution's indictment to be handed down during the election campaign so that he could talk about them at his election rallies. When the judge tried to cut him off, he challenged the judges in the following terms: "You decide like the AKP Electoral Commission and we do not recognise any decision you take. This is not a court and you are not judges either, despite the robes you wear. This is a political campaign and the decision will be made at the ballot box on 14 May (Gerçek News, 12 April; Duwar English, 14 April).
A dozen days after this high-profile trial, on 25 April, the Turkish police launched a vast anti-Kurdish raid in 21 towns. More than 120 people, including lawyers, engineers, journalists and human rights activists, were arrested for their alleged links with the PKK. The raid ended in the Kurdish capital Diyarbakir with the arrest of half the bar's lawyers, part of the Chamber of Mining Engineers, members of human rights associations, representatives of the Free Jurists association, 11 journalists including Abdurahman Gök, editor-in-chief of the Mesopotamya News Agency, as well as three theatre actors and other representatives of the Kurdish political and cultural elite (Le Monde, 26 April). The judicial file was classified as confidential so that the defendants and their lawyers could not have access to it, a violation denounced by the Diyarbakir Bar Association in a press release: "For a trial to be fair, defendants must be informed as soon as possible of the nature of the charges against them. In the present case, access to the case file is prevented and lawyers cannot visit their clients".
On the other hand, the charges, while inaccessible to the people concerned, were set out in detail on TRT, the pro-government public television channel, which revealed them just after the wave of arrests. The disclosure of the judicial proceedings by the pro-government media, even though the accused are not allowed to know about them, has become emblematic of the way of operating of the judicial system in Turkey, as Le Monde has pointed out. With three weeks to go before the elections, these serial arrests are intended to intimidate the Kurdish electorate and further weaken the HDP, hundreds of whose leaders and more than 10,000 members and supporters are being held in Turkish prisons.
For the second year running, the governor of Istanbul has banned commemorations marking the Armenian genocide. A planned gathering in Kadiköy, on the Asian side of the city, described as "inappropriate", was not authorised.
For his part, candidate Kiliçdaroglu, in his meetings and in his videos posted on YouTube, focuses on the themes of purchasing power, inflation, poverty, endemic corruption, nepotism and the manipulation of the justice system. He refers to a "gang of 5" oligarchs close to Erdogan who have amassed a fortune of 418 billion dollars thanks to the lucrative public construction contracts awarded to them. He accused Erdogan of associating the Kurds with terrorism. "Millions of Kurds are currently being treated as terrorists", he denounced in a short video posted on social networks (Le Figaro, 18 April). He has promised a return to parliamentary rule and the restoration of the rule of law. It's a message that appeals to the educated, westernised urban elite, but its effect on the inhabitants of deep, conservative Anatolia, where his extreme right-wing ally Meral Aksemer plays the Turkish nationalist card at his meetings, is uncertain.
The pro-Kurdish HDP party did not field a candidate in the presidential election and gave its support to Kiliçdaroglu in order to defeat Erdogan and "close the gates of hell". But the candidate of the National Alliance, admittedly Alevi and of undeclared Kurdish origin, is the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), founded by Ataturk who, in the 1920s and 1940s, massacred and deported hundreds of thousands of Kurds and banned the Kurdish language and culture. With the exception of the Alevi-majority province of Dersim, this party has only a marginal presence in Kurdistan. Will Kurdish voters, the vast majority of whom are hostile to Erdogan, vote for a Kiliçdaroglu allied with a nationalist, anti-Kurdish far-right party (Bon Parti)? The Kurdish vote, which could be decisive, is being closely scrutinised by observers, who are also wondering about the security of the ballot boxes, where, given the heavy police presence in the region, all kinds of manipulation remain possible.
Iran Human Rights (IHR), a Norwegian NGO, and Ensemble contre la Peine de Mort (Together Against the Death Penalty), based in Paris, denounced on Thursday 13 April the massive increase in judicial executions in Iran. According to a count drawn up by the two NGOs, 582 people were hanged in 2022, compared with 333 executions in 2021, a staggering increase of 75%. More than half of these executions took place after the start of the demonstrations following the death in police custody of the young Kurdish woman Jina Mahsa Amini for wearing a veil "badly". According to the report, 44% of the executions recorded in 2022 would be linked to "drug-related offences", double the figure for 2021 and ten times the figure for 2020.
The Iranian "killing machine" is running amok and aims to "instil fear" against a backdrop of growing protests against the Islamic regime, as the two NGOs point out. They believe that the death penalty has been "used once again as the ultimate tool of intimidation and oppression by the Iranian regime in order to maintain the stability of its power". According to IHR Director Mahmoud Amiry Moghadara, "the Iranian authorities are stepping up executions of non-political prisoners in order to instil fear in the population and among young protesters". Around a hundred prisoners are currently either sentenced to death or facing capital charges under the Islamic Republic's draconian laws. Members of the Baluchi community, which is Sunni, account for 30% of executions, even though they make up only 4 to 6% of the Iranian population. They are followed by Kurds and Arabs from Khuzestan. At least 3 of those hanged were minors and 16 were women.
This massive repression is provoking strong reactions in Western countries with large Iranian communities. In France, several Iranian associations organised a "Women, Life, Freedom" forum on 1st April at the Espace des Blancs Manteaux in Paris to celebrate the six months of the "Jîna revolution". Director and comic book author Marjane Satrapi reminded the audience that revolt is a long-standing tradition in Iran, which is "the country in the world with the most revolutions and regime changes in the 20th and 21st centuries". On 13 April, a group of Parisian lawyers organised an evening of solidarity at the Maison du Barreau (Bar House), featuring numerous testimonies and musical performances. Richard Sédillot, lawyer and spokesman for the association Ensemble contre la Peine de Mort, pointed out that no country in the world kills more people than Iran: 582 in 2022 and at least 170 since the beginning of 2023. Taking in account its population, China is a distant second. The evening's special guest was Me. Henri Leclerc, Honorary President of the Ligue des droits de l’Homme (Human Rights League), recalled the 1970s when he defended Iranian exiles who had fled the Shah's monarchy and returned to Iran in 1979 to build democracy, but were soon disillusioned. One of his clients, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who became a minister in the Islamic Republic, was sentenced to death after a mock trial and shot in 1982 by the regime he had helped to establish (Libération, 14 April). On 17 April, it was the turn of artists to organise an evening of solidarity with the 'Jîna revolution' at the Théâtre du Châtelet.
Meanwhile, the crackdown on "the rebels of the compulsory veil" has continued in Iran, where the regime now uses cameras to identify offenders and punish businesses that let women in without a hijab. In the space of a few weeks, 150 businesses have been ordered to close for "non-compliance with the compulsory veil" (Challenge, 15 April; 20 minutes, 16 April).
To round off the key events of April in Iran, here is a chronology of ordinary repression.
In early April, the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Saqqez sentenced a Kurdish woman named Paria Adnani to four months in prison and 14 lashes for "propaganda". Similarly, the revolutionary court in Sineh sentenced a Kurdish trade unionist named Khabat Shakiba to two years in prison for "belonging" to a Kurdish opposition party. In Shino, four Kurds were sentenced to between two and four years for taking part in demonstrations. A Yarsan Kurd was shot dead in Kermanshah for "failing to stop" at a checkpoint. And a Kurdish porter (kolbar) was killed near Shino by Iranian guards.
On 9 April, unidentified perpetrators attacked a further 12 girls' schools across Iran with poison gas, including schools in the Kurdish towns of Saqqez, Diwandarah, Urmia, Naghadeh and Sineh. The attacks sent more than a hundred schoolchildren to hospital and sparked anti-regime demonstrations in several Kurdish towns. In Saqqez, regime forces opened fire on demonstrators expressing their disapproval of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and removing Iranian flags from schools.
On 10 April, several of the town's shopkeepers staged a general strike to protest against the ongoing attacks on Iranian schoolgirls. These demonstrations coincided with the death of a Kurdish teenager who was poisoned several weeks ago in a gas attack in Kamyaran. At the same time, the regime has installed security cameras to identify Iranian women who defy the country's hijab law. In addition, the regime arrested in Sineh a teacher named Fariba Karimi, bringing to 16 the number of teachers detained in 2023. An Iranian court sentenced an imam from Sineh to two years in prison for "misleading public opinion" after he had supported anti-government demonstrations.
The Iraqi Kurdish news channel Rudaw reported that the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) base at al-Hamza, Mohammad Taghi Osanlu, had recommended the depopulation of 33 Kurdish border villages. Al-Hamza is one of the ten main IRGC bases and is located in Iranian Kurdistan.
In the second week of April, toxic gas attacks targeted dozens of other girls' schools in Iran, including schools in Tehran, Islamshahr, Karaj, Urmia, Qazvin, Babulsar, Harsin, Kermanshah and Shiraz. At least 70 schoolgirls were taken to hospitals following the latest wave of attacks. Pupils in most schools in Mahabad have protested against the attacks by boycotting classes. Although the Iranian regime continues to deny any involvement, several human rights organisations have accused the regime of turning a blind eye to extremists who commit such crimes in order to discourage women's education. In addition, the regime sentenced Kurdish political prisoner Nayeb Askari to death for the second time for "enmity against God". A famous Kurdish rapper, Saman Yasin is also facing execution for his songs supporting anti-government demonstrations. In Sineh, capital of Kurdistan province, a court sentenced a trade union activist named Rafiq Salimi to five months in prison for "undermining national security". In addition, the regime arrested four civilians in Bokan and the father of a demonstrator died in Dewalan. In addition, the bodies of two Kurdish (kolbar) border porters who are believed to have drowned ten days ago were found near Baneh.
In addition, a delegation from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (VAJA) met several Iraqi Kurdish officials in Suleimaniyeh and Erbil. The secretary of the Iraqi Kurdish Socialist Party, Mohammed Haji Mohammed, revealed that the two sides had discussed a number of issues, including "disagreements" between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the status of Iranian opposition parties in exile in Iraq. Several leaked reports claimed that the VAJA delegation had pressured the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to expel and disarm Iranian Kurdish parties taking refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to follow up a recent security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran.
At the end of April, toxic gas attacks hit a further 19 girls' schools in Tehran, Saqqez, Kermanshah, Urmia, Karaj, Ahvaz and Islamshahr. Amnesty International said in a statement that "since November 2022, thousands of schoolgirls have been poisoned and hospitalised. The authorities have failed to adequately investigate the attacks and have described the girls' symptoms as stress, excitement and/or mental contagion". Separately, the regime arrested 12 Kurds, including a doctor in Bokan, at the end of April. The Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights stated that the Iranian authorities had not provided any information about the reasons for the arrests or the charges against them. In Sineh, the authorities have threatened to expel several students from local colleges if they do not comply with hijab laws. A Kurdish teacher at Azad University in Sineh was dismissed for feminist activism.
The Iranian opposition group known as the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy has suffered a setback: one of its leading members, Hamed Esmaelian, resigned at the end of April. Esmaelian is a social activist representing the families of Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752, which the Iranian regime shot down in 2020. According to him, "pressure groups from outside the Alliance have tried to impose their positions using undemocratic methods". At the same time, a report by Iran International noted that members of the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy had been harassed on social networks by supporters of Reza Pahlavi. The Alliance for Freedom and Democracy includes a Kurdish leader, Abdullah Mohtadi, but the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and several other Iranian opposition parties remain reluctant to join.
On 7 April, a Turkish drone strike targeted General Mazloum Abdi Kobani, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), near Suleimaniyeh international airport in Iraqi Kurdistan. His convoy of five vehicles, carrying senior Syrian Kurdish officials and three American soldiers, was targeted by a missile fired from a drone. The missile plunged into the ground before exploding a few seconds after the convoy had passed on its way to the airport. No member of the Kurdish delegation was injured and material damage was minor. General Kobani and his entourage had travelled to Iraqi Kurdistan for a coordination meeting on the war against ISIS and its terrorist networks in Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava.
Immediately after the attack, Turkish drones were detected by US forces. The Turkish Ministry of Defence denied "any involvement" in this bombing, which appears to have been the work of the MIT (Turkish intelligence services), which has its own armed drones and operates autonomously in the region under the sole authority of Turkish President Erdogan.
Shocked by this attack, which endangered the lives of its main allies in the war against ISIS and of three American servicemen, the Pentagon promised to investigate the incident. However, the State Department and the White House have chosen to adopt a low profile during this election period so as not to play into the hands of candidate Erdogan, whose nationalist rhetoric regularly attacks "imperialism's plot against Turkey and its support for the terrorist organisations PKK and its Syrian branch". Turkish-American relations are already at an all-time low, and there are numerous disputes. In its war against ISIS, Washington and the international anti-jihadist coalition have relied since 2014 on the Syrian Democratic Forces (FDS), predominantly Kurdish, which have sacrificed more than 13,000 fighters and suffered 24,000 casualties.
But Ankara, which has allowed tens of thousands of jihadists from all over the world to cross its territory to join ISIS, which, according to the Turkish media, has trained, armed and financed a whole host of Islamist militias and has transformed its areas of occupation in Syrian Kurdistan into a refuge and booty ground for jihadists of all stripes, including recycled ISIS fighters, continues unabashedly to describe as "terrorists" the Kurdish fighters who, with the support of the Allies, are fighting against ISIS. Turkey, which is not applying the Western sanctions against Russia either, continues to buy gas and oil from Russia at knock-down prices and also unashamedly shelters Russian oligarchs banished from Europe, their capital and their yachts, and plays a crucial role in circumventing the Western sanctions against Russia. The Americans are not fooled. After excluding Turkey from their F35 programme under pressure from Congress, they are now imposing conditions on the possible delivery of F16s to the Turkish army. For his part, US President Joe Biden has never yet received his Turkish counterpart at the White House. This distancing from a so-called "strategic" NATO ally is unprecedented, to say the least.
Iraq, through its President, Dr. Latif Rashid, strongly condemned the bombing, stressing that there was "no legal basis for intimidating civilians under the pretext of the presence on Iraqi soil of a force hostile to Turkey". The Iraqi President called on Ankara to "assume its responsibilities and make an official apology". An apology that will probably never come.
In April, Turkish forces continued to bomb certain districts of Rojava, in particular the town of Ain Issa, destroying grain silos (Rudaw 24, 13 April) and other SDF positions (Kurdistan 24, 20 April), as well as the northern region of Aleppo, where two Kurdish fighters were killed (Kurdistan 24, 16 April). Meanwhile, a helicopter raid killed an important ISIS leader, responsible for planning terrorist attacks in the Middle East and Europe, in a village in the Turkish-occupied Jarablous district (K24, 17 April), revealing for the nth time the complicity of the Turks with the ISIS jihadists they harbour in their areas of occupation.
Another pro-Turkish jihadist militia, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, has announced the construction of a huge complex under Turkish occupation to house its members and their families, with the blessing of Ankara, which wants to de-Kurdise this rebellious Kurdish canton (K24, 21 April). For its part, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia, formerly the al-Nosra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda and an ally of the Turks, which governs the province of Idlib, is building a camp to train the "Cubs of the Caliphate" charged with fighting the Kurds. In mid-April, a Turkish-based "charity", Wafaa al-Mohsenin, announced that it had finished building a new settlement in Afrin to house displaced Arabs.
The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) has documented 53 ISIS operations against SDF military targets since 1st January. On 22 April a joint US-Kurdish operation recovered "ISIS's hidden treasures", including a stockpile of gold and weapons from a farm in the southern Raqqa governorate. ISIS retaliated by attacking a SDF unit on 24 April, killing two of its fighters: Mahmoud al-Jamida and Mahmoud al-Hamada. Although the number of skirmishes between ISIS and the FDS declined, they continued throughout April.
The Kurdish Institute of Paris, which opened its doors on 24 February 1983, is celebrating its 40th anniversary this year.
Founded by a dozen Kurdish intellectuals and artists representing all parts of Kurdistan during a particularly dark period in Kurdish history, its ambition was to embody, beyond political and regional divisions, a kind of moral unity of the Kurdish people, to work for the preservation and promotion of Kurdish culture, and to make Western public opinion aware of the fate and aspirations of the Kurdish people. This non-partisan, secular citizens' initiative has had an uncertain future, due in particular to the precariousness of its funding, but despite the ups and downs of Kurdistan's turbulent history and pressure from the region's states, it has been able to hold its own and become part of the French and Kurdish cultural landscape, with an internationally recognised reputation.
Holding out over the long term against a complicated and uncertain backdrop is a fine achievement that deserves to be celebrated. The celebrations will take the form of a series of events throughout the year, including symposia, publications and festive evenings. The first of these evenings was due to take place at the end of February. It was postponed because of the terrible earthquake on 6 February, which killed more than 50,000 people and plunged the Kurdish people into mourning. It was finally held on 4 April from 7 pm to 10.30 pm in the magnificent and historic Salle des Fêtes at Paris City Hall.
Around 250 Kurdish and French personalities attended the event, which was hosted by Anne Hidalgo, Mayor of Paris, and Kendal Nezan, President of the Kurdish Institute. Former French President François Hollande, former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, former Minister of Culture and President of the Institut du Monde Arabe Jack Lang, the Armenian Ambassador and many diplomats were present to express their friendship and solidarity with the Kurdish Institute and the Kurdish people.
In a warm welcome speech, the Mayor of Paris spoke of her city's cooperation programmes with the Kurdish Institute and with Kurdistan, where she plans to make a visit in May. She also highlighted the sacrifices made by the Kurds for our freedom and security in the common fight against ISIS. The President of the Ligue des droits de l'homme, Patrick Baudoin, recalled the battles waged in defence of the Kurdish people since his very first visit to Kurdistan in 1974, and the pivotal role of the Kurdish Institute in informing and raising public awareness of the human rights situation in Kurdistan. For his part, the former President of the National Bar Council, Christian Charrière-Bournazel, spoke of the persecution of Kurdish democrats, including MPs and mayors, in Turkey, where he went on several occasions in the 1990s to defend Leyla Zana and her Kurdish fellow MPs, who spent 10 years in Turkish prisons for expressing their opinions. In his turn, the President of the Institute thanked the Mayor for her welcome and the guests for their presence and solidarity. He briefly reviewed the highlights of the Kurdish Institute's four-decade history. He put the Institute's current activities and future plans into perspective. The evening ended with a musical performance, followed by a cocktail reception for informal and friendly exchanges between the guests.
The Kurdish Institute will conclude this anniversary year with a symposium on the Kurdish diaspora scheduled for 27 October at the Senate, followed by a dinner bringing together volunteer members and friends of the Institute from several European countries.
Pope Francis is very concerned about the fate of Christians in the East, particularly those in Mesopotamia. The latter, targets of attacks first by al-Qaida in Iraq and then by ISIS, have had to seek refuge in Kurdistan or go into exile in Europe. The Kurdistan Government has welcomed them with open arms, providing them with assistance and protection, and funding the construction of new churches and schools. The Pope, who visited Kurdistan in March 2021, is very sensitive to this policy of fraternity and peaceful coexistence advocated and implemented by the Kurdish authorities in a region of the world dominated by religious fanaticism and intolerant nationalism, and is keen to receive Kurdish leaders to exchange views with them, encourage them and express his support.
On 13 April, he received the President of Kurdistan, Nechirvan Barzani, at the Vatican. Their talks focused on "promoting peaceful coexistence in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and in the Middle East". He stressed the importance of "preserving peace and brotherhood among the communities of Iraq". President Barzani "reiterated his government's commitment to continue promoting peace and coexistence in Kurdistan, Iraq and beyond". He presented the Pope with a painting showing members of the different religions of Kurdistan dancing together, with sites of the main religions in the background. He also presented the Pope with a photo album of his visit to Kurdistan, where, after meeting dignitaries of several religions, he celebrated mass in Erbil in front of several thousand Christians, a visit described as "historic" because it was the first by a Pope in the history of Iraq.
The day before his meeting with President Barzani, the Pope had had a private audience with the former mayor of the old city (Sur) of Diyarbakir, Abdullah Demirtas. During his term of office, Demirtas, with the support of the Mayor of Greater Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir, implemented a vast plan to restore the churches in the Kurdish capital, including the Armenian cathedral and several Syriac churches. He also printed tourist guides to the city in Armenian and Syriac, as well as English, French, Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic, out of respect for these languages, which for centuries were spoken by a large part of Diyarbakir's multi-ethnic and multi-faith population. These 'separatist' actions, stigmatised by Ankara, forced him into exile in Europe. In honouring him with an audience, the Pope expressed his esteem and thanks.
Kurds of the Yezidi faith are celebrating their "Red Wednesday" on 19 April, a traditional festival marking the start of spring and the new year.
The festivity is celebrated on the first Wednesday of the Julian calendar, which is 13 days later than the Gregorian calendar currently in use throughout the world. This calendar is still used by the Orthodox churches and those of the East, where, for example, Christmas is celebrated on 7 January instead of 25 December. Until recently, the Julian calendar was quite commonly used in large parts of Kurdistan as the "Kurdish calendar".
This year, the first Wednesday in April falls on 19 April. To mark the occasion, "Red Wednesday" (Çarşema sor) festivities are organised in all the Yezidi communities of Kurdistan and the diaspora (Armenia, Georgia, Germany). The most spectacular takes place around the Temple of Lalesh, located in the province of Dohuk in Iraqi Kurdistan and considered to be the "Mecca" of the Yezidis. On this occasion, young people dressed in traditional festive white clothes, the Yezidi's favourite colour, wear garlands of spring flowers and celebrate with dances. Hard-boiled eggs are also coloured, following the example of their Christian neighbours for Easter, known in Kurdish as the "Festival of the Resurrection" (Cejna vejînê or qiyamê), also popularly known as "Cejna hêkesorê" (the festival of red eggs). Among the Yezidis, eggs dyed red by boiling them with red onions are buried in fields to bring them abundance and fertility.
It is not known whether the name "Red Wednesday" among the Yezidis comes from the colour of the eggs dyed red on this occasion, from the Zoroastrian fire or from the red flowers like poppies that suddenly cover the meadows in this month of April, which they consider to be "the queen of the year".
Among other Kurds and Iranians, "Red Wednesday" is an important day in the calendar, corresponding to the last Wednesday before Newroz, celebrated on 21 March. This year, Red Wednesday fell on 15 March. To mark the occasion, huge bonfires are lit in squares and on hilltops, and people dance around them to celebrate the end of the dark winter season and the coming of spring. The red of this Wednesday is the colour of fire, an object of veneration in Zoroastrianism which, before the arrival of Islam, was the dominant religion of the Kurds, whose ancestors, the Medes, provided the clergy, and of the whole of the Iranian world.
Yezidism, whose sacred book, Mishefa Reş (The Black Bible), prayers and hymns are all in Kurdish, contains many remnants of Zoroastrianism, the cult of the Angels and Mithraism, the ancient religions of the Iranian world. Over the centuries, this eclectic religion has also incorporated elements of Christianity and even Islam, although the fundamentalist followers of the latter stigmatise the Yezidis as "Devil worshippers", i.e. "miscreants" to be converted or eliminated if they refuse. It is in the name of this barbaric ideology that ISIS has waged a veritable genocidal campaign against the Yezidis.
According to recent estimates, there are currently around 600,000 Yezidis in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly in the Sinjar region (Şengal in Kurdish). There are also large Yezidi communities in Syria, Turkey, Georgia and Armenia.
Despite all the demographic upheavals that occurred in the 20th century, during which nationalist regimes (Turkish and Arab) did a great deal of damage, Kurdistan is still an "ethnographic museum" where Sabeans, Zoroastrians, Assyro-Chaldeans and Jews who still speak Aramaic, the language of Christ, the Faithful of Truth (Ehli Heqq) and other Yarsans, Alevis and various Muslim denominations have managed to survive and live together.
Following in the footsteps of the Kurdistan Government, the new Iraqi government has declared its desire to preserve this extraordinary diversity. It has just made a gesture towards the Yezidis by declaring "Red Wednesday" a public holiday.
