The parliamentary and presidential elections of 14 May 2023 took place in a relatively calm atmosphere, with no major violence. The two competing camps and the other parties held numerous meetings and rallies right up to the last day in an attempt to convince and mobilise voters. Turnout was massive, at 87%.
Following the polls on 14 May, the Alliance of the Masses (Cumhur Itifaki), which includes the AKP and the MHP (Nationalist Action Party), obtained an absolute majority of 322 seats (out of 600) in the Turkish National Assembly, a loss of 22 seats compared with the 2018 elections when it had won 344 seats. The decline is fairly marked for the AKP, whose score fell from 42.56% in 2018 to 35.51% and the number of seats from 295 to 267. Its far-right ally, the MHP, recorded a slight decline, with 10.07% of the vote in 2023 compared with 11.10% in 2018, but 50 MPs compared with 49 in 2018. Small Islamist allies won 5 seats. The National Alliance (Millet Itifaki) of opposition parties, excluding the pro-Kurdish HDP, won a total of 213 seats. The main component of this alliance, the old Republican People's Party (CHP) founded by Ataturk, with 25.33% of the vote compared with 22.64% in 2018 and 169 deputies compared with 136 in 2018, made some progress. 32 of these seats are reserved for the CHP's smaller allies: 9 deputies for the Future Party (Gelecek) of Ahmet Davudoglu, Erdogan's former Prime Minister, 14 deputies for the Deva (Remedy) party of Ali Babacan, Erdogan's former minister, and 9 deputies for the Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet); the CHP thus finds itself with a loss of 9 seats compared with 2018. The other major component of the alliance, the Good Party, obtained 9.68% of the vote, compared with 9.96% in 2018, and 43 seats as in 2018.
A few weeks before the election, the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), threatened with a ban and the ostracism of most of its leaders, had decided to present its candidates, most of whom were little known and most of whom were either in prison or in exile, under the label of the Green Left Party (YSP). Virtually banned from television screens and subject to threats and pressure of all kinds, and stigmatised throughout the election campaign by outgoing President Erdogan as "the political showcase of the PKK terrorists", the new party obtained 8.82% of the vote, where it was allied with the TIP (Turkish Workers' Party), which obtained 1.7% of the vote and 4 seats in 2023, and the HDP, which won 61 seats. Their combined votes represent 10.52% of the vote compared with 11.7% in 2018, and 65 MPs compared with 67 in 2018. Despite this underperformance, the many reasons for which will be debated in the coming weeks and months, the HDP remains the second-largest opposition political group and the third-largest parliamentary group in Turkey's National Assembly.
The map resulting from the 14 May general elections is very similar to that of the 2018 elections. Voters on the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, along with those in Thrace (a European region bordering Greece and Bulgaria), voted overwhelmingly for the CHP. In addition to these votes from "white Turks", considered to be westernised and secular, the Alevis of Anatolia also voted for the CHP which, despite a century of existence, thus remains a regional party. In Turkish Kurdistan, where the contest was between the pro-Kurdish YSP and the Turkish President's AKP, the provinces with a large Kurdish majority voted overwhelmingly for the YSP. The YSP won 8 seats in Diyarbakir, the AKP 3 seats and for the first time the CHP 1 seat won by the town's former Kurdish barrister Sezgin Tanrikulu. In Van, the YSP won 6 seats, the AKP 2, in Mardin the YSP 4 seats, the AKP 1, in Batman the YSP 4 seats, the AKP 1, in Sirnak the YSP 3 seats, the AKP 1, in Agri the YSP 3, the AKP 1, in Mus the YSP 2 seats, the AKP 1, in Bitlis the YSP 2 seats, the AKP 1. In CHP leader Kiliçdaroglu's home province of Dersim (Tunceli), which has an Alevi Kurdish majority, the only seat at stake went to the YSP. In the border provinces with mixed Kurdish-Arab populations (Urfa) or Kurdish-Turkish populations (Kars), the seats were shared. In the major Turkish cities with large Kurdish communities, the YSP won 8 seats in Istanbul, 3 in Mersin, 2 in Izmir, 1 in Adana and 1 in Antalya.
For the presidential election, of the 4 candidates in the running, one, Muharem Ince, was the victim of threats and blackmail and had to withdraw a few days before the ballot. Candidate Erdogan used all the resources of the state apparatus to multiply his promises and electoral gifts to the various categories of the population, to organise inaugurations with speeches on the radiant future of the Turkish century broadcast live by 21 television channels in his service, and to threaten and anathematise his opponents, who were described as allies of terrorism. The main opposition candidate, Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, received only minimal media coverage on the two or three television channels that are still independent but have a limited audience because they are underfunded and unattractive. The NGO Reporters Without Borders has calculated that during this campaign, candidate Erdogan had 60 times more screen time than his challenger Kiliçdaroglu. To favour Kiliçdaroglu and defeat Erdogan, the HDP did not put forward a candidate for the presidential election. In 2015, its candidate Selahettin Demirtas had obtained 13.5% of the vote.
At the end of this "free" but very unfair ballot, Erdogan, for the first time, had to go through a second round with 49.52% of the vote against 44.88% for Kiliçdaroglu and 5.17% for an ultra-nationalist secular candidate, Sinan Dogan. After some haggling with Erdogan, Dogan called on his voters to vote for the incumbent in the second round.
In the hope of winning over some of the votes of the nationalist and xenophobic far right, Kiliçdaroglu made his speech much more right-wing, promising to send millions of Syrian refugees back to Syria and pledging "never to sit at the table with terrorists", thus tacitly reproaching Erdogan for the peace process during which negotiations were held between government emissaries and PKK leaders. This speech was badly received by part of the Kurdish electorate as well as by certain Turkish democrats, who despite their hostility to Erdogan, chose not to go and vote. Turnout in the second round was 84.15%, compared with 86.98% in the 1er round. In Kurdistan, turnout was down by more than 5%. Despite this relative disaffection, over 72% of the Kurdish electorate voted for Kiliçdaroglu, but this was not enough to get him elected.
At the end of what was expected to be a close second round, the outgoing president was re-elected with 52.18% of the vote against 47.82% for Kiliçdaroglu for a third 5-year term, despite the fact that the Turkish Constitution limits the number of presidential terms to two. It also requires the President to be a university graduate, who has never produced the degree from the Faculty of Economics that he claims to have obtained. He lives in a palace that was built without planning permission, and therefore completely illegally. For Erdogan, "I am the State" and "I am the law", because "I emerged victorious from the ballot box". Such is the conception of democracy.
A memorial dedicated to General Mustafa Barzani, the emblematic leader of the Kurdish resistance from the 1930s until 1975, was inaugurated on 11 May in his native village of Barzan, near his grave. Set back from his grave, the memorial complex built into the hillside includes a museum retracing Barzani's life, his journey through the century with images and documents evoking his resistance against the Iraqi armies supported by the British Royal Air Force, his participation in the Kurdish Republic of 1946 founded by Qazi Mohammed, of which he was commander-in-chief of the armies, and his long march across the borders of Iraq, Iran and Turkey to reach the Soviet Union in 1947, his Soviet exile which lasted until 1958, his return after the revolution of 14 July 1958 putting an end to the Hashemite monarchy set up by the British, where he was welcomed as a national hero by the Kurds and Iraqis alike, his long armed resistance from 1961 to 1975 against successive Iraqi dictatorships and finally his final exile in Washington where he died in 1979. The museum also includes objects that belonged to him, bearing witness to the great simplicity and sobriety of his life. The museum is flanked by a large auditorium - a conference room where over 300 hand-picked guests were welcomed from all parts of Kurdistan, the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, the United States, the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as representatives of all the political parties in Kurdistan, religious leaders and the main Iraqi leaders. In addition to the President of Iraq, Latif Rashid, the Prime Minister al-Soudani, the President of the Iraqi Parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein, the Shiite leader al-Hakim, made the trip, as did the Mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, and numerous ambassadors and diplomats. The Kurdish Institute was represented by Joyce Blau, Nazand Begikhani and Kendal Nezan.
Addressing this exceptional audience, brought together by the unifying figure of Mustafa Barzani and by solidarity with the Kurdish people and their long struggle for freedom, former President Masoud Barzani spoke of his family's involvement in the Kurdish national liberation struggle since the end of the 19th century. The first outstanding figure in this saga was his uncle Sheikh Abduselam, who was a great reformer, establishing egalitarian relations between the valley's Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities "because we are all brothers in humanity", banning forced or arranged marriages, advocating joint ownership of land and natural resources, and banning hunting and tree felling. Considered a threat to the established order, he was hanged by the Ottoman Empire in 1914 His successor, Sheikh Ahmed, for whom money tainted human relations and who advised against ostentatious displays of religion, including the pilgrimage to Mecca, the cost of which could be better used to help needy neighbours, was the master thinker of the Barzan valley until his death, whose armed wing and political leader was his younger brother Mustafa Barzani.
Barzani stressed that throughout these decades of struggle, the Kurds had done nothing but defend themselves in order to safeguard their identity, their culture, their way of life and their humanist values, which were threatened by nationalist and dictatorial regimes. "Our fight has never been against neighbouring peoples who have also suffered under these bloodthirsty tyrannies", he stressed. In this conciliatory spirit, he affirmed that the contentious differences that remain between Erbil and Baghdad can and must be resolved through dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect. He welcomed the progress made since the new Iraqi government of Mohammed Shia al-Soudani took office. He also called on the Iraqi Kurdish parties to overcome their differences and open a new chapter in their relations by resolving their problems through dialogue, always bearing in mind the higher interests of Kurdistan and respecting the co-existence of all its communities.
In his speech in Kurdish, the Iraqi President, Latif Rashid, also stressed the importance of a sincere dialogue to resolve the outstanding problems and recalled that Iraq will be stronger and at peace if Kurdistan is strong and at peace. He was followed by the Iraqi Prime Minister, who spoke of the "heroic resistance against tyranny" of the Kurdish people, who had thus rendered a great service to all the Iraqi people. He undertook to apply all the clauses of the agreement signed with the Kurds to form his coalition government.
A few days after the inauguration, the KDP and PUK political bureaux met to discuss preparations for the Kurdish parliamentary elections in November. After a 6-month boycott, the PUK ministers decided to take part again in the meetings of the Council of Ministers. Despite the new spirit of understanding, strongly encouraged by the international coalition against ISIS, notably the United States, there are still many disputes to be settled, notably over the electoral law. For its part, Iran is stepping up its threats of intervention against the camps of Iranian Kurdish political parties that have taken refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. It is also manipulating certain Iraqi institutions controlled by its supporters, such as the Federal Supreme Court, to sabotage the rapprochement between Erbil and Baghdad. For example, the Supreme Court ruled that the decision taken in October 2022 by the Kurdistan parliament to extend its mandate by one year was "unconstitutional", thus adding to the recurring political crisis of legal uncertainty. The same Court, set up provisionally in 2005 and whose very legality is in dispute, has so far not seen fit to rule on the non-application of certain articles of the Constitution, in particular article 140, which provides for a referendum to be held in the so-called "disputed" Kurdish territories controlled by the federal government to find out whether its people wish to join the Kurdistan Region.
Furthermore, the resumption of oil exports from Kurdistan to Turkey, announced on several occasions, has still not taken place. Ankara is multiplying the "technical" pretexts and seems to be waiting for the results of the elections before embarking on negotiations with Iraq on the conditions for transporting this oil, negotiations which look set to be very tough. According to Reuters, Iraq has already lost more than 1.5 billion dollars in revenue since the decision to halt these exports on 22 March.
A new crossing point between Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan was inaugurated on 10 May in the Mergasor district of Erbil, on the border with the province of Hakkari. Trade between Turkey and Kurdistan is now worth over 12 billion dollars a year. It benefits major Turkish agri-food and construction companies as well as Kurdish merchants on both sides of the border.
Mired in an ever-worsening economic and social crisis, the Iranian regime is trying to improve its relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf and is also sending some impertinent signs of appeasement towards Europe.
Reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, thanks to the good offices of Chinese diplomacy, is well under way. The resumption of diplomatic relations with the reopening of the respective embassies is announced for June. The other Gulf oil-rich monarchies are also engaged in a process of rapprochement and development of trade relations despite Western sanctions. Security cooperation with Russia and "strategic" relations with China are also developing. All of this provides the regime with enough resources to survive, but does not address the country's deep economic crisis, which is sparking waves of protests from the poorer sections of the population.
In the hope of finally reaching an agreement with the West on the nuclear issue and obtaining a lifting of the sanctions that are hitting its economy hard, the Iranian regime released a number of Western hostages in May, including the Frenchmen Benjamin Brière and Bernard Phellan and a Belgian humanitarian aid worker, in return for the release of an Iranian diplomat sentenced to 20 years in prison in Belgium for an attempted attack on a gathering of Iranian opponents in France. The "deal" was negotiated thanks to mediation by the Sultanate of Oman, and further hostage releases are expected in the coming months.
On the domestic front, the country has been experiencing a wave of strikes since the beginning of May, after more than a dozen trade unions issued a statement expressing their support for the strikes under way in various Iranian industries to protest against low wages, inflation and poor living conditions. The Iranian authorities have warned trade unions, particularly those in Iranian Kurdistan, to refrain from any demonstrations on International Workers' Day, which takes place every 1 May. The regime has also put pressure on the Islamic Consultative Assembly to dismiss the Iranian Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade, Reza Fatemi Amin. Kurdish opposition parties exiled from Iran issued a statement supporting the strikes and detailing the problems facing workers in Iran. The parties blamed the current regime and the Shah for the lack of "infrastructure and industrial projects" in Iranian Kurdistan, which contributes to its exorbitant unemployment rate and its status as the poorest region in Iran, after Baluchistan. Meanwhile, new toxic gas attacks have targeted five girls' schools in Sinneh, Kermanshah and Tehran. In addition, a criminal court in Bokan sentenced two Kurds to two years in prison for "cooperation" with a Kurdish party. Finally, a Kurdish political prisoner named Melad Zahrawand is facing execution in Malayer after being arrested for taking part in anti-government demonstrations last November.
The Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that the Iranian authorities arrested 31 Kurds, including young people, teachers, doctors and religious figures, on charges relating to their activities in April. In addition, a court in Dewalan sentenced a Kurdish imam to seven and a half months in prison and 70 lashes, and a religious figure from Jwanro (Javanrud) to three years in prison for "propaganda against the regime" for supporting anti-government demonstrations. A court in Piranshahr sentenced three Kurds to 11 months in prison on charges related to the demonstrations. In Mahabad, a member of the Red Crescent was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison. In Sinneh, an activist named Muslim Saedpour was sentenced to one year in prison for organising a public ceremony to commemorate Newroz. Finally, the regime executed two people for blasphemy and hanged 25 Baluchis in the first few weeks of May.
In mid-May, a court in Ilam sentenced Kurdish artist Mohammed Abbaszadeh to one year in prison for singing "woman, life, freedom" during anti-government demonstrations. In addition, three young Kurds from Piranshahr were each sentenced to more than eight years in prison on charges related to anti-government demonstrations, and a Kurdish imam from Sewilawa, Jalal Akbara, was sentenced to two years in prison for "spreading propaganda". The regime also arrested several other Kurds, including a 67-year-old mother of a prisoner, a Kurdish athlete in Sinneh, a Kurdish wrestler in Khorram and five others in Saqqez, Mahabad, Dewalan and Diwandarah. At the same time, the regime ignored United Nations (UN) criticism of its massive use of the death penalty and hanged three more people for taking part in demonstrations. Three other demonstrators in Isfahan are due to be executed any day now.
May was also marked by an internal crisis in one of the components of the Iranian opposition, the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy. In addition to the leader of the Kurdish party Abdullah Mohtadi, leading figures such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, Nazanin Boniad and Masih Alinejad announced their resignation from this alliance, which was formed during the popular protests of the "Jîna Mahsa Amini revolution". In their letter of resignation, these leading figures state that the situation "makes it difficult to continue our solidarity". They stated that "the Mahsa Charter is at the heart of the revolution for women, life and freedom, and it will not lose its meaning until victory is achieved". Their resignation is said to be due to dissatisfaction with the dominant role of Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi in the coalition and his support for Iranian ultra-nationalists in exile.
In addition, Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji travelled to Tehran on an official visit to discuss the recent security agreement between Iraq and Iran on "border security" aimed at disarming and eliminating Iranian Kurdish opposition parties from Iraqi Kurdistan. Al Araji met with Mohammad Pakpour, the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ground forces, who told a state media outlet that they are "waiting for the Iraqi government to fulfil its obligations under the security policy agreement." Pakpour has vowed to continue attacks on the Kurdish opposition if Iraq fails to comply with the agreement. The IRGC has already carried out several missile and drone strikes on Kurdish opposition headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraq-Iran security agreement was officially signed on 19 March.
Finally, the United States announced its intention to deploy additional forces in the Persian Gulf in response to the seizure by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of several merchant tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.
In a sign of the gradual normalisation of his relations with Arab countries, for the first time since 2010, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad attended the Arab League summit held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 19 May at the invitation of King Salman bin Abdel Aziz. This return to the fold with great pomp and ceremony after more than 12 years of ostracism for reasons of civil war, marks a political and diplomatic turning point, confirming the "victory" of the Syrian regime which, thanks to the unfailing support of its Iranian and Russian allies, has been able to survive a civil war that has left nearly 500,000 people dead and more than 11 million displaced. The regime now controls "useful Syria", including Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and the Mediterranean coast, i.e. more than two-thirds of the territory. The 6 northern and eastern provinces are under the control of the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the support of the international coalition against ISIS. The province of Idlib, on the Turkish border, is the last bastion of the Syrian opposition controlled by the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, renamed Haya Tahrir al-Sham, or under Turkish protection. The Turks also occupy the Kurdish border cantons of Afrin, Serê Kaniyê (Ain al-Arab), Girê Spî (Tell Abyad) and the predominantly Arab canton of Azaz where, with Qatari capital, they are building tens of thousands of homes to accommodate displaced Arabs and continue the Arabisation of the region.
In his speech to his Arab peers gathered for the summit, Assad underlined Syria's commitment to Arabism, saying that "its past, present and future are rooted in Arab identity". He saw the summit as an important opportunity to address the internal affairs of the Arab world with "minimal foreign interference". The Emir of Qatar boycotted the session, but his counterpart from the United Arab Emirates has invited Assad to the climate conference to be held from 30 November to 12 December in Dubai, an initiative designed to facilitate the Syrian dictator's return to the international stage.
The summit's closing declaration stressed the importance of creating favourable conditions for the return of Syrian refugees and safeguarding "the unity and territorial integrity of Syria". The return of Syrian refugees is also central to Turkey's new policy of normalisation with Syria. Turkey is aiming to return to Syria a large proportion of the more than 3 million Syrian refugees now in Turkey. Lebanon, which is on the brink of collapse and is home to over a million Syrian refugees, and poor Jordan, which is hosting just as many, would also like to send them home as quickly as possible. The Syrian regime intends to negotiate their return in return for massive investment from the Gulf oil-monarchies, which also hope to counterbalance Iran's overwhelming influence over Damascus. They also want to force Syria to stop manufacturing and exporting synthetic drugs such as Captagon, which, according to the French weekly L'OBS on 18 May, is "wreaking havoc in the Middle East". Syria used to be a hub for trafficking drugs such as heroin and opium to Europe via the Lebanese militias in its service. Now cash-strapped Syria has become a factory for the industrial-scale manufacture of amphetamines such as Captagon, the trafficking of which is said to earn the regime between 3 and 4 billion dollars a year.
The United States, France and a number of Western states are hostile to the rehabilitation of the Syrian regime, but have few means at their disposal to oppose it.
Prior to his participation in the Jeddah summit, Assad received the Iranian President in Damascus on May 3 to discuss "strategic cooperation between the two countries". Despite the major economic crisis it is going through, Iran is continuing to invest in its relations with Syria and Lebanon in order to gain access to Mediterranean ports and to have substantial means of intervention on the borders of Israel, the Iranian regime's main enemy, with which a major conflict remains increasingly likely.
In addition, throughout May, clashes between the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) and roving ISIS commandos and intermittent bombardments of Kurdish positions by Turkish drones and artillery continued. ISIS carried out an improvised explosive device (IED) attack against an SDF vehicle on 27 April, a second IED attack against an SDF military vehicle south of al-Raqqa that killed two SDF members and wounded three others on 28 April and an assault against the head of the Deir Ez Zor Military Council, Tayesir al Sarhid, on 29 April.
On 30 April, Turkish border guards killed one Syrian and injured five others who were trying to cross the Turkish border illegally west of Idlib. A day later, Turkish border guards assaulted 12 Syrians crossing the border into occupied Afrin. On 26 April, Human Rights Watch published a non-exhaustive list of Turkish violence against refugees on the Syrian border, which showed that the Turkish authorities had attacked refugees crossing the Turkish-Syrian border 277 times between October 2015 and April 2023. Meanwhile, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that the Turkish authorities had killed at least 11 refugees and injured at least 20 others for attempting to cross the Turkish border since 1 January 2023.
The Arab League ended its 12-year suspension of the Syrian government for repressing demonstrators and readmitted it on 7 May. The United States criticised the decision, but many states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, encouraged the "Arab nation" to welcome back the Syrian president. Bashar al-Assad's returning regime moved quickly to restore relations and reopen embassies. At the same time, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) welcomed "any international and Arab interest in the Syrian question if such efforts could consider the tragedy of the Syrians, which cannot end without an integrated political process". In addition, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his election opponent Kemal Kilicdaroglu have both announced their intention to normalise relations with the Assad regime. Finally, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met Assad in Damascus to discuss ongoing strategic cooperation between the two nations.
The SDF reported the arrest of three ISIS terrorists and a suspect in two separate operations, with support from the US-led coalition. It also announced the death of two of its members due to a Turkish drone strike near Tel Hamis on 5 May.
In Afrin, under Turkish occupation since 2018, a new settlement of 500 houses, built on Kurdish land with Qatari and Palestinian funds, has opened its doors. Meanwhile, Turkish-backed armed groups continue to arrest Kurds and demand ransoms.
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Turkish-backed factions in the occupied regions of Afrin and Azaz have freed five Kurdish civilians after receiving ransoms. The report states that each civilian had to pay USD 4,000 to these Islamist militias acting as auxiliaries to the Turkish army.
Qubad Talabani, Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, took part in a programme on Rûdaw TV on 26 May, where he answered questions from students at the University of Kurdistan on the internal situation in the Kurdistan Region, relations between Erbil and Baghdad, and regional issues concerning the Kurdistan Region.
Extracts :
In response to a question from a young person about Kurdistan's oil and gas law, Talabani stressed that a fundamental change had taken place following the decision of the Iraqi Federal Court on 15 February 2022.
Talabani said that according to the decision of the Paris-based International Court of Arbitration in March 2023 and the subsequent agreement between Erbil and Baghdad, the Iraqi Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) was responsible for the sale of oil from Kurdistan. He said, "This agreement can help completely resolve the oil issue between Iraq and the Kurdistan region."
Talabani pointed out that the issue of the resumption of oil exports was now a problem between Iraq and Turkey, and stressed that Iraq was awaiting a response from Ankara regarding the resumption of exports.
In response to Bestoon Khalid's question: "Is the reason why Ankara has not yet responded linked to the recent earthquake and the elections in Turkey, or are there other reasons?", Talabani said: "As the Kurdistan Region, we did our part after the agreement. As you know, the situation in our region is complex. There are elections in Turkey and there has been an earthquake. This issue is now beyond our control, awaiting a resolution between Baghdad and Ankara. We are in favour of resuming exports tomorrow.
When reminded of his remarks at the "MERI Forum" that "it doesn't matter who sells Kurdistan's oil", Talabani commented: "If SOMO can sell Kurdistan's oil at a higher price that will benefit Iraq and the Kurdistan region, let it do so. It makes no economic sense. Why sell something you can sell for two dollars for only one dollar?"
Talabani also stated that Turkey would accept SOMO's price conditions.
Answering a young person's question about the drone attacks carried out by Turkey and Iran on the territory of Kurdistan, Talabani said that the Kurdistan region was powerless against Iraq, Iran and Turkey in this area.
"Our airspace is not under our control. One way or another, we control our territory. Do we have the power to prevent a country from bombing one of our villages with its drones, or from targeting the Kurds of Rojava and the North? Apart from condemnations, do we have anything else? Honestly, I'm tired of condemning. We condemn again and again. This is part of Iraq's sovereignty. We are part of Iraq, and that should be to our advantage. If it hurts us, where is Iraq's sovereignty? Suleimaniyeh airport was bombed and nobody said anything. Those who are talking would have been better off saying nothing. I went to Baghdad and they invented a thousand excuses. The conclusion I draw is that everyone, except the Kurds, has the right to violate Iraq's sovereignty. Iran does it according to its own rules and nobody says anything. Turkey does it and nobody talks about it. Sometimes even our respectable allies do it, and again, nobody says anything. But as soon as the Kurds start to question Iraq's sovereignty a little, we say it's separatism. They haven't understood that yet."
Talabani's comments were greeted with applause from the audience.
When asked whether Mazlum Kobani (Commander General of the Syrian Democratic Forces) had come to Suleimaniyeh at the invitation of the Americans, Talabani replied: "He did not come at the invitation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. We are allied with the Kurds of Rojava in the fight against the Islamic State, and we are not hiding this from anyone. We've told everyone. The international coalition and Turkey know it too. We're not ashamed of it, we're not hiding it; on the contrary, we're proud of it. As part of the fight against the Islamic State."
Talabani added: "The Kurdistan Parliament has taken a decision to help our brothers in Rojava with all our means."
On relations between the KDP and the PUK, Qubad Talabani said that after deciding to take part again in the meetings of the KRG Council of Ministers, he had held talks with Prime Minister Mesrur Barzani and that they had managed to resolve most of the problems between the two parties.
Talabani said, "We have reached an agreement with the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers on how to deal with the threats that the Kurdistan Region may face in the future."
Talabani expressed his conviction that, thanks to the agreement between the parties and the oil and budget agreement reached with Iraq, Kurdistan's financial problems would be resolved.
In an interview with the Turkish website Gerçek News, published on 31 May, the imprisoned Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtaş comments on the results of the recent elections in Turkey. He urges the party leadership to undertake strategic reforms while addressing the multidimensional challenges facing both the party and the people.
The former co-chair of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), stresses the need for a careful examination of the current situation and the development of effective measures to address the challenges facing the party. Instead of giving in to complacency, he stresses that the election results should serve as a clear wake-up call for the HDP.
Extracts published by the Gerçek News website
Demirtaş said the ruling bloc had taken control of the state and used all its resources without ethical consideration, launched a massive smear campaign and used manipulative tactics. However, it would be simplistic to attribute the HDP's lack of success in the parliamentary elections solely to these factors, he said, criticising the party's election campaign as too little, too late.
"Given the general situation, if you declare: 'We will exceed 15% in the parliamentary elections and we will ensure that the opposition candidate exceeds 50% in the presidential elections', in a country of 63 million voters, and if you launch your election campaign a month before election day with an unprofessional and amateurish approach resembling a local association campaign, you cannot hope to succeed," he added.
Demirtaş also drew attention to the internal dynamics within the HDP, revealing the challenges it has faced in trying to bridge the gap with various segments of society.
"For the past five years, I have tried to convey this reality through letters, messages and articles to HDP headquarters, but each time, my voice echoes back to me," Demirtaş said.
He added: "There are many incidents, but I refrain from exposing them to the public because I believe in the functioning of institutions. Unfortunately, institutions often fail to function. There was a big vacuum, and nobody else was trying to fill it, and even if they tried, they couldn't succeed.
"However, some friends in our neighbourhood, instead of trying to understand these efforts, focused on me, thinking I was trying to put myself forward. If there are shortcomings or deficiencies, they can only be corrected by criticism and suggestions, not by unfaithful attacks.
Demirtaş also highlighted the disillusionment and decline experienced by the Kurdish middle class due to a lack of clear political direction and fears of losing their livelihoods. He criticised the emergence of individuals who, in the absence of substantive political approaches, indulged in trivial matters, dominating political and social spaces without making any meaningful contributions.
"No one can make progress with mere slogans. If we cannot explain democratic modernity to a people who have been so exposed to capitalist modernity, and if we cannot present alternative, beautiful and honourable ways of life with our institutions, the collapse of society becomes inevitable", he declared.
In conclusion, Demirtaș identified the "coup d'état of the self" of 20 July 2016 as a defining moment when the government shut down and usurped political, cultural, media, women's, youth and local institutions, establishing a degrading system.
He highlighted the socio-economic difficulties faced by the people, including unemployment and poverty, as well as the alarming increase in drug addiction and forced prostitution, particularly among vulnerable young people.
"Despite everything, there is still an uphill battle being fought with great effort, sacrifice and cost. I believe that by avoiding approaches that would undermine this fight and instead undertaking a major renewal effort, we can respond effectively to this process," he said.
