After long months of negotiations and haggling between parties and factions, the Iraqi Parliament adopted a draft law on the 2023, 2024 and 2025 budgets on 12 June. The 69-article text was bitterly debated. Under pressure from the pro-Iranian Shiite parties, a number of articles were adopted that undermine the federal status of the Kurdistan Region and are therefore contrary to the Constitution and the government agreement signed between the Kurdish parties and those of the Shiite and Sunni blocs, much to the displeasure of the Kurdistan government. The Kurdistan Region's share of the federal budget, which was theoretically 17% in 2013-2014, has been reduced to 12.7%. Its payment, including the part devoted to paying the salaries of civil servants and public service employees, is subject to conditions including the daily delivery of 400,000 barrels of Kurdish oil to the national Iraqi company SOMO. The 2005 Iraqi Constitution, approved in a referendum by more than 80% of Iraqis, provided for the country's budget to be shared on a pro rata basis according to population, with no conditions attached. The Kurdistan Region, which enjoys broad financial autonomy, is responsible for using its allocation to pay the salaries of its civil servants, employees, police and peshmerga, and for financing its own infrastructure and development projects.
In 2014, in the midst of the war against ISIS, Kurdistan was deprived of its budget by the Shiite government of Nouri al-Maliki, and had to build an oil pipeline to send its oil via Turkey in order to ensure its economic survival. Baghdad's decision to deprive part of the country and its population of its budget was totally unconstitutional, illegal and contrary to the most elementary morality. In the absence of a recognised arbitration body for the conflicts between Erbil and Baghdad, the Kurds could do nothing and the Western allies were content to advise them on how to reach a compromise with an intractable Iraqi government still dreaming of Saddam Hussein-style centralism. This is one of the reasons, along with the non-application of Article 140 of the Constitution stipulating the holding of a referendum on the status of Kurdish-majority territories outside the Kurdistan Region, why the Kurdish leaders decided to hold their own referendum on self-determination in September 2017. The population voted 92.7% in favour of Kurdish independence. But even the Western countries that constantly invoke International Law, and which forcibly created an independent Kosovo for 1.7 million Albanians from Serbia, have remained deaf to the aspirations of their Kurdish allies in the war against ISIS.
Bitter but realistic, the Kurds have set about finding a new compromise with Baghdad. To get the country out of the political impasse that followed the 2021 elections, they negotiated an agreement with Shiite and Sunni blocs to form a majority coalition government under the leadership of a new Prime minister, al-Sudani, who knows Kurdistan well, having spent several years there. It was this written agreement that put an end to a year of political vacuum in Iraq, with no legitimate government and no legal budget, which has just been blithely violated by the Shiite parties, manoeuvred by Iran, which wants, if not to destroy, at least to weaken the federated Kurdistan that is beyond its control.
Tensions are once again high between Baghdad and Erbil. Former President Massoud Barzani, the main architect of the government agreement, is angry and speaks of betrayal and the status of Kurdistan being called into question. A delegation has been sent to Baghdad to try to remedy the situation. How can the payment of salaries to civil servants in Kurdistan be linked to the daily delivery or export of 400,000 barrels of oil, when since 25 March all exports via Turkey have been halted following a complaint by Baghdad to the International Arbitration Chamber, as Iraq does not have the necessary infrastructure to enable oil from Kurdistan to be transported to the port of Basra?
This came a few days after the de facto Supreme Federal Court, which lacks any constitutional or legal basis, ruled on 30 May that the 9 October 2022 decision by the Kurdistan Parliament to extend his term of office by one year was "unconstitutional". This decision was taken following disagreements between the three parties in the ruling coalition, the PDK, the UPK and the Goran movement, over changes to the electoral law. Kurdistan therefore finds itself without a parliament between now and the parliamentary elections scheduled in principle for 18 November 2023. Shocked, the Kurdish parliamentarians have been asked to return their 2023 allowances and vacate the official residences they occupy.
Economically weakened and the victim of incessant Turkish bombing on its borders, Kurdistan is facing a serious political crisis with unforeseeable consequences.
The Iraqi budget for 2023 is $153 billion. It is calculated on the basis of a barrel of oil at $70. More than 80% of the country's budgetary resources come from oil export revenues (3.2 million barrels per day). This controversial budget is therefore dependent on the ups and downs of the oil market, and any significant fall in the price per barrel will have a direct impact on the daily lives of the citizens of a country where the State remains by far the largest employer. The Iraqi budget does not take into account the salaries of the thousands of Kurdish teachers serving in the so-called disputed territories under the control of the Iraqi government who have been paid since 2014 by the Kurdistan government, nor the cuts in the salaries of Kurdistan's civil servants during the so-called austerity period from 2016 to 2021 when Kurdistan had to survive on its own resources because it did not receive its share of the federal budget. This same Iraqi budget generously provides for the maintenance and arming of the Shiite militias known as Hachd al-Shaabi under Iranian control.
Besides, on 4 June, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) reopened the Fish Khabour border crossing with Syria, which had been closed on 11 May. The Fish Khabour crossing remains a key economic link between Iraqi Kurdistan and the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES) and a major access route for humanitarian aid. On another note, the Iraqi Oil Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs, Hayyan Abdul Ghani, announced that he had informed Turkey that the Iraqi government was ready to resume oil exports on 3 June. Exports were halted in March when the Chamber of Arbitration for International Trade ordered Turkey to pay $1.5 billion in damages for facilitating unauthorised KRG exports. Abdul Ghani said his ministry was reviewing current contracts and developing an alternative plan with the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources to maintain petrol prices in the event that an agreement was not reached to resume exports.
On 19 June, Iraqi and Turkish delegations discussed the resumption of oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan via the Turkish Ceyhan pipeline. The current freeze on oil exports is costing Iraqi Kurdistan 80% of its revenue and threatens to create a major economic crisis in the region.
Although the two parties appear to have resolved all outstanding technical issues, many political problems remain. Rudaw reported that Turkey had asked Iraq to pay for the maintenance of the Kirkuk pipeline, but Iraq had refused because Turkey had stopped exports. In addition, Turkey has asked Iraq to withdraw its complaint to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and has requested that it be allowed to pay the $1.3 billion that the ICC has found it owes Iraq in instalments. However, Iraq has asked Turkey to agree in good faith to the resumption of oil exports prior to negotiations on these issues. Meanwhile, Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzini met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 20 June to discuss various regional developments and bilateral relations between the KRG and Turkey.
Meanwhile, the bodies of 39 Yezidis murdered by the Islamic State (ISIS) have finally been returned to Mosul after being identified two years ago. The Iraqi government offered no official ceremony and sent no senior official to oversee the return of the victims to Mosul or to greet their relatives. The families of the victims also had to buy their own coffins and Iraqi flags.
Tensions remain high between the Iraqi government and the Turkmen and Kurds in Iraq's so-called disputed territories over the seizure of Turkmen and Kurdish farmland by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. On 18 June, the Article 140 High Committee sent a letter to the Ministry of Agriculture which, citing a 2012 Iraqi government decision, demanded that it return the seized land to Kurdish and Turkmen farmers. The Iraqi Council of Ministers accepted the decision of the Supreme Committee for the Implementation of Article 140 and asked the committee to coordinate the land return process with Kurdish factions in the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives. However, it is still unclear whether this will lead to a resolution of the problem. Around 500 Kurdish and Turkmen farmers continued to strike during the Eid al Adha celebrations and gathered under a tent to ask the Iraqi government to pass on their demands.
On 21 June, the US House Armed Services Committee passed an amendment to the National Defence Authorisation Act of 2024 (NDAA) that supported the provision of air defence systems to the Kurdish peshmerga. Representative Don Bacon (R-NE-02) sponsored the amendment and said the systems will help the peshmerga defend against Iranian drones and missiles. Iran's Revolutionary Guards have attacked Iraqi Kurdistan dozens of times since 2018, killing and injuring dozens of civilians. Iran reacted negatively to the amendment and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasir Kenani asked the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for further clarification on what the provision of the air defence systems entails while accusing the US of trying to disrupt the stability of regional states and their relations with their neighbours.
On 3 June, the newly re-elected President of Turkey treated himself to a grandiose investiture ceremony broadcast live on all the country's television channels, worthy of the enthronement of a new sultan. Heads of state and government from a number of friendly countries (Azerbaijan, Hungary, Qatar, Northern Cyprus and Venezuela), as well as the Turkish autocrat's supporters and elected representatives from his side, attended the ceremony and the gala dinner that followed. The Europeans and Americans were represented by their ambassadors.
After his inauguration, the Turkish President quickly formed his government, which unsurprisingly won the confidence of the Turkish National Assembly, where the ruling coalition of the Islamo-nationalist AKP and the far-right MHP party have a fairly comfortable majority. The new cabinet, which is supposed to relaunch "the Turkish century" through spectacular initiatives, is made up of Erdogan's loyal collaborators who, as in a game of musical chairs, change their post. The Secretary General of the Presidency, Ibrahim Kalin, became the new head of the intelligence services (MIT), whose incumbent Hakan Fidan "Erdogan's black box", was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. A former prefect of Kurdish origin and Kurdish-speaking, Cevdet Yilmaz, a doctor in political science, becomes vice-president, a sort of executive assistant to his boss. The most high-profile appointment was that of Mehmet Simsek to the post of Minister of Finance and Treasury, a position he had already held in the past. Of claimed Kurdish origin and Kurdish-speaking, with an Anglo-Saxon education, this former Merrill Lynch banker seems to be very popular with the financial markets in Turkey and abroad. He accepted the post on the condition that he would have autonomy over the monetary policies to be implemented. Given the alarming state of the Turkish economy, the Turkish President had to agree in the hope that he would restore order to the economy and attract new foreign investors. Regarded as the architect of the "Turkish economic miracle" of the last decade, Mr Simsek has also secured the appointment of his candidate Hafize Gaye Erkan, formerly of Goldman Sachs, to the post of Director General of the Central Bank. Together, they intend to return to monetary orthodoxy in order to reassure the markets. As soon as he was appointed, he went on a mission to Qatar in the company of the Turkish vice-president, no doubt to obtain emergency aid to replenish the reserves of the Central Bank, which no longer has the means to support the Turkish currency, which is depreciating by the day. The outgoing Interior Minister, Suleyman Soylu, known for his virulent and racist speeches, has been replaced by a more moderate former governor of Istanbul. At Defence ministry, a general replaces another: Yasar Guler takes the place of Hulusi Akar.
The economic situation will undoubtedly force the Turkish President to reconcile himself with the countries of the West and the Middle East, at best monetising his veto on Sweden's accession to NATO. His "friend" Putin is not in a position to save the Turkish economy, and the Gulf petro-monarchies have not forgotten his insults and misdemeanours of the past. They are in no hurry to come to his aid. Many Arab countries are calling for Turkish troops to be withdrawn from Syria as part of a gradual normalisation of relations.
Despite the political and economic challenges he faces, the Turkish President promises to continue his "war against PKK terrorism" in Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava. By appointing a vice-president and three ministers of Kurdish origin, he wants to show that he is not anti-Kurdish but anti-terrorist, including in this category imprisoned Kurdish mayors and deputies and the former co-president of the pro-Kurdish HDP party Selahettin Demirtas. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights to call again for his release or the decision of 7 June condemning Turkey in the case of Osman Baydemir, prosecuted and sentenced in Turkey for expressing an opinion, have no effect on his bellicose policy, which also enables him to consolidate around himself his Islamo-nationalist base ready to sacrifice everything in the name of the Turkish homeland threatened by "terrorism and global imperialism", which their champion Erdogan promises to fight.
The re-election of the Turkish President has done nothing to change his policy towards the Kurds of Rojava. Turkey is continuing its targeted aerial bombardments of the civilian and military infrastructure of Rojava and is using drone attacks to assassinate the leaders of the local authorities, who have no means of air defence. The terror thus methodically sown by the Turkish forces comes on top of calamities such as drought and water shortages, making it very difficult for a population already hard hit by years of war and deprivation to survive.
Here are some of the highlights of the month.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have announced the successful capture of an EI (ISIS) terrorist in Deir Ez Zor. The operation was carried out with the support of the US-led coalition. The SDF also seized weapons during the raid, further strengthening their efforts in the fight against the Islamic State. In addition, the SDF detained two individuals accused of acting as "agents" of Turkey. These individuals are said to have collected sensitive information regarding the locations of security and military forces, as well as autonomous administration centres. The SDF said the detainees were involved in identifying SDF leaders and received financial compensation for their activities.
On 5 June, the Syrian agency North Press reported that the number of Turkish housing projects in occupied Afrin had risen from 19 in 2022 to 28 in 2023. These projects are often built in Yezidi and Kurdish neighbourhoods earmarked for Arabisation.
On 10 June, the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES) announced that it would undertake the trial of foreign EI (ISIS) fighters in accordance with the laws of North-eastern Syria and relevant international laws. The detention of nearly 5,000 foreign jihadists since the fall of the Islamic caliphate poses a significant security risk to the local population. ISIS terrorists have made several attempts to free jihadists imprisoned in al-Sina prison, killing more than 140 people. Despite the urgency of the situation, the countries of origin of these foreign jihadists have been reluctant to repatriate them, leaving AANES with the responsibility of managing their trials. Moreover, the international community has not taken responsibility for establishing a tribunal to deal with this pressing issue.
In June, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that Turkish drones had killed 24 people and injured 28 others in AANES-controlled territory since 1st June. One of the strikes targeted the Tal Rifaat hospital on 18 June and put thousands of lives at risk by interrupting vital medical operations and other essential procedures.
On 17 June, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that 40 Iraqi families affiliated to the Islamic State (ISIS) would be repatriated to Iraq from Turkish-occupied northern Syria. Corrupt officers of the Syrian National Army, an auxiliary militia of the Turkish army, helped 37 ISIS prisoners escape from a Turkish-controlled prison in Ras al Ain. Nearly half of the escapees may have been ISIS commanders, and several local sources said they had been sent to SDF-controlled areas to organise attacks. Turkish forces reportedly arrested five escapees and six prison guards following the breakout, but several commentators questioned the Turkish claims and accused Turkey of using the episode as a pretext to continue its campaign of arbitrary arrests.
On 20 June, a Turkish drone targeted a vehicle carrying several AANES officials, killing the co-chair of the Qamishli Regional Council, Yusra Darwish; the deputy co-chair, Leyman Shouish; and their driver Farat Toma. The attack, which also wounded the other deputy co-chair of the Qamishli Regional Council, Gabi Shamoun, came just days after the AANES announced that it would begin trying ISIS fighters held in its detention centres, a move opposed by Turkey. Shamoun later said that the repeated Turkish attacks were aimed at destabilising the region and stressed that the attacks had forced the region's civilian population to live in a state of fear and terror. At the same time, Raqqa residents, Arab tribal leaders, elders and members of the Raqqa Civic Council publicly protested against the ongoing Turkish attacks.
Turkey has continued its efforts to "Arabise" the areas it occupies in Syria by destroying local economies and terrorising the indigenous population. In the last three months, 256 indigenous families, mostly Kurds, have fled Turkish-occupied areas to areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) because Turkey's policies and the predatory behaviour of its Turkish-backed mercenaries have made their homes uninhabitable. Turkey plans to repopulate these areas with repatriated Arab refugees. On 25 June, the Turkish authorities deported 130 people from Turkey to areas north of Aleppo. At the same time, the Syrian North Press Agency reported that Turkey's resettlement policy had reduced the percentage of Kurds in Afrin from 90-95% to around 33%. Turkish forces killed a member of the Afrin Liberation Forces and the Turkish gendarmerie killed a civilian for crossing the Syrian-Turkish border.
On 25 June, the SDF arrested three men in Qamishli and accused them of recruiting young men on behalf of Iran-affiliated militias. The suspects claimed that the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Assad regime were recruiting, arming and training young men from Hasakah and Deir Ez Zor to overthrow the AANES.
On the diplomatic front, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad met several senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad, including President Latif Rashid, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein. Sudani's office then announced that he had accepted a formal invitation to Damascus. For his part, Hussein welcomed Syria's return to the Arab League at a press conference, saying: "Syria is going through a very difficult situation and it needs action at regional and international level. The issue of Syrian refugees is an essential part of this situation". Hussein went on to say that Iraq is hosting 250,000 Syrian refugees, mainly in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Kazakhstan hosted the 20th round of the Astana talks on 20 and 21 June. Syria, Russia, Iran, Turkey and members of the Syrian opposition took part. Observers from the United Nations (UN), Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq were also invited. The aim of these talks was to rebuild relations between Turkey and Syria and to facilitate the reintegration of the Assad regime into the regional order. A spokesman for the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES), Bedran Chiya Kurd, said that the anti-terrorism element of the talks was framed in Turkey's interests and portrayed the Kurdish people and AANES as part of the terror problem. Despite a plethora of unresolved issues, Kazakhstan unexpectedly proposed the conclusion of the talks, claiming that their objective had been achieved with Syria's gradual re-emergence from isolation. Russia expressed its wish to continue the talks and proposed organising alternating rounds in Turkey and Russia.
The Iranian authorities have continued their crackdown on the demonstrations that have taken place in recent months. Reports indicate that at least 10 Kurds have been arrested in various cities, including Tehran, Senna, Ahwaz, Bandar Abbas, Karaj and Sahna. Although anti-government protests have subsided, the regime's courts are still actively handing down convictions against both organisers and participants. The Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Mahabad recently handed down a verdict sentencing a father and son to three years and seven months in prison. This follows a series of other sentences handed down to various individuals. Among them, a Kurdish imam in Senna was sentenced to seven and a half months, the son of a deceased political victim in Shinno was sentenced to three years in prison, a Kurdish trade unionist in Baneh was sentenced to fifteen months and an activist in Ilam was sentenced to three months in prison. Iranian border guards injured at least ten cross-border porters (kolbar) in the Kurdish region in the first two weeks of June.
The Iranian authorities have arrested a Kurdish football star named Voria Ghafouri in Tehran after he announced his retirement and sent a farewell message to fans. Ghafouri had supported several anti-government demonstrations, including the Jîna Amini uprising, and was accused of "incitement against the regime". The Iranian regime has also stepped up its campaign of repression against Iranian Kurdistan, detaining Shoresh Mohammedpour, Melad Nasri, Saman Aslani, Mokhtar Minbari in Senna, a French-Iranian Kurd named Amen Haidari in Kermanshah, an 18-year-old named Kawian Mawlodi in Mahabad and Arash Younis in Ilam. In addition, the Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights reported that the Iranian regime had arrested more than 100 civilians in May, including 54 Kurds. Besides, the US Treasury Department has sanctioned an Iranian technology company called Arvan Cloud and its subsidiary based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for censoring the Internet in Iran.
Alongside an intense crackdown on Kurdish activists and civilians in the Kurdistan region of Iran, the regime has stepped up its presence on the Kurdish borders. Security forces arrested at least 30 civilians on their return from visiting the graves of fallen demonstrators in Senna, Dewalan and Diwandara, including members of their families. Two Kurdish activists, Farzad Karimi and Hemin Ahmadzadeh, were sentenced to five years and 18 months in prison on charges related to the recent anti-government protests. In addition, regime forces made arrests in various towns, including Marivan, Ilam, Saqqez, Piranshahr, Senna and Kamyaran. Those detained include teachers, writers, athletes and students.
Hengaw reported that Iranian security forces had arrested 168 Iranians, including 77 Kurds and 50 Baluchis, in June. The Iranian authorities arrested a further nine Kurds in Saqqez, including a woman named Shahla Chopani, bringing the total number of Kurds arrested in the last two weeks of June to 14. The Iranian regime has detained several other Kurds in Senna, Mahabad and Naghadeh. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Ilam sentenced a Kurd to nine years in prison for "disrespecting the leader of the Islamic Republic" and taking part in anti-government demonstrations. In addition, a Kurdish demonstrator named Mehdi Sadiqi took his own life two weeks after spending six months in Iranian prisons. Several human rights organisations have claimed that Sadiqi was tortured during his imprisonment. Finally, Iranian forces continued to attack several villages along the Iranian-Turkish border near Urmia with indirect fire and seized at least 700 head of cattle belonging to local Kurds.
The Iranian regime has sentenced two Kurdish imams, Ibrahim Karimi and Loqman Amini, to prison terms for "propaganda against the regime" for supporting anti-government protests in Senna last year. Karimi was sentenced to 12 years in prison and Amini to 11 years. Hengaw reports that the Iranian regime has dismissed 16 Kurdish imams since the protests began in September 2022. Twelve of the dismissed imams have been sentenced to long prison terms and the other four are awaiting sentencing. At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Mahabad sentenced four Kurdish demonstrators from Piranshahr to prison terms ranging from three to four years. The Iranian authorities have also arrested several Kurds in Saqqez, Mahabad, Urmia, Piranshahr and Shabad. Armed clashes between the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) broke out near Marivan and Swalawa. The IRGC confirmed that one of its members had been killed during the fighting, but the PJAK issued no official statement about the incident. In addition, Iranian security forces arrested three activists and a teenager in Saqqez, an activist named Wahid Chawaran in Ilam, a journalist named Jabar Azizi in Jwanro and three environmental activists in Kamyaran. At the same time, the Tehran courts added 91 days to the three-year and eight-month prison sentence of activist Ahmed Deraza for his support for anti-government demonstrations, and sentenced another activist, Parham Parwari, to 15 years in prison for "endangering national security". Finally, Iranian border guards killed a Kurdish porter near Baneh on Saturday. Hengaw said the regime had killed five porters and injured at least 32 since 20 March.
On the diplomatic front, the Council of the European Union (EU) sanctioned seven Iranian officials for "serious human rights violations". Among those sanctioned are the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the province of Isfahan and the governor of the province of Gilan. The Council said it had now sanctioned 223 Iranian individuals and 37 entities, frozen their assets and banned them from travelling to the EU.
US Secretary of State Tony Blinken refuted the claims of several Iranian officials and denied that the US had reached an agreement with Iran over its nuclear programme. Meanwhile, Russia has expressed its intention to finalise the creation of a "free trade zone" with Iran and several other nations by the end of the year. It should be noted that Russia and Iran have already reduced tariffs on hundreds of goods traded between them. Iran also supported Russia's war in Ukraine and helped it escape Western sanctions.
As we approach the centenary of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, which established the foundation of Turkey within its current borders and ratified the partition of Kurdistan between four states in the region, numerous commemoration initiatives are taking place in the diaspora and in Kurdistan.
Kurdish associations and political parties are organising or planning conferences, symposiums and events throughout June and July.
Against this backdrop, on 10 June 2023 the Kurdish Institute, in partnership with two Swiss associations (Suisse-Arménie and AFKIV) and the City of Lausanne, organised an international colloquium in the historic Council Chamber of Lausanne City Hall. The conference opened with a welcome address by the Mayor of Lausanne, Grégoire Junod, who recalled that the city had been chosen by the Allies because of its neutrality and excellent hotel infrastructure, and because it was also on the line of the famous Orient Express linking Constantinople to Paris. As host of the conference, Lausanne and Switzerland in general are not responsible for the dramatic consequences of this Treaty for the excluded peoples: Kurds, Armenians, Assyro-Chaldeans... He expressed his city's deepest sympathy for the Kurdish people, a city which, after having welcomed and trained eminent Kurdish intellectuals such as Noureddine Zaza and Ismet Cheriff Vanly in its universities, is now home to a large, well-integrated Kurdish community from all regions of Kurdistan.
The symposium brought together Armenian, Assyro-Chaldean, Kurdish, Turkish and Western academics, as well as Swiss, French and Kurdish elected representatives, for four round tables to take stock of the consequences of this Treaty for the excluded peoples of the region and to outline prospects for the future.
In the first round table, chaired by Joyce Blau and devoted to the historical context, Professor Hamit Bozarslan (EHESS) spoke about the political situation of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, It was defeated and forced by the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920 to agree to the creation of an independent Armenia and Kurdistan and to give up its Arab provinces (Syria, Mesopotamia, Transjordan), which were now under British and French control or had become de facto independent (Arabia, Egypt). The Turkish resistance led by Mustafa Kemal, supported by some of the traditional Kurdish elites and financed and armed by Lenin's Bolshevik Russia, eventually won the war of independence against the British-backed Greek expeditionary force. It was this victory that enabled the Turkish nationalists, most of whom came from the ranks of the Union and Progress Committee, which in 1915 had perpetrated a veritable genocide against the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire and forcibly expelled almost a million Greeks from Anatolia, to create a religiously homogenous Turkey in which non-Turkish Muslims, mainly the Kurds, were to be assimilated and Turkified by force.
These new realities on the ground forced the Allies to convene a new peace conference to negotiate a new treaty, effectively ratifying the Treaty of Sèvres. Swiss academic and researcher Hans-Lukas Kieser, author of the seminal book on Lausanne "When Democracy Died. The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne" (Cambridge University Press 2023) described the negotiation process and the main provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. He also spoke of the Darwinist and profoundly racist ideology and worldview of certain Turkish negotiators, including the No. 2 in the Government Delegation to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Dr Riza Nur, who was hateful and contemptuous of Armenians and Kurds and obsessed by the fear of creating an autonomous or independent Kurdistan in the British-controlled vilayet of Mosul (now Iraqi Kurdistan). Lastly, Hitler's admiration for Mustefa Kemal, who used his weapons to force a revision of the Versailles treaty system. We also know that before undertaking the Shoah, Hitler told his supporters: "Who still remembers the extermination of the Armenians? The lawyer Derya Bayir presented an in-depth analysis of minorities and nationalism in Turkish law, while the American researcher from Oberlin University, Ohio, Leonard Smith dealt with the exchange of Greek-Turkish and Greek-Bulgarian populations in a period dominated by the nationalist obsession to form ethnically and religiously homogenous states, uprooting hundreds of thousands of people from their native lands. The main victims were the Greeks of Anatolia, a land where every town and village had been founded by their ancestors, who had developed a brilliant civilisation there, and from which they were plucked like weeds.
In the 2nd round table, chaired by Mrs Nazand Begikhani, Professor Emeritus Raymond Kévorkian (Sorbonne) and Professor Emeritus Joseph Yacoub (Catholic University of Lyon) respectively spoke about the tragic fate of the Armenians and the Assyro-Chaldeans after the Treaty of Lausanne. As Turkish Professor Baskin Oran (University of Ankara) pointed out, Articles 38, 39 and 40 of the Treaty recognised the rights of minorities to worship freely, to have schools, churches and publications in their own language, and to equal political and civil rights. Although "guaranteed" by the League of Nations, these rights were not respected by the Turkish authorities. In any case, these non-Muslim minorities became numerically residual. Thus the Greeks, who after the massive pogroms of 1922 and the exchange of populations in 1923 still represented 2.7% of the population in the 1927 census, are now less than one thousandth, barely 2,500-3,000 people. The Armenians number around 50,000. Professor Oran pointed out that as a Muslim population, the Kurds were not considered a protected minority under the Treaty of Lausanne. Even the provisions guaranteeing every citizen of the country the free oral use of his or her language, including before the courts, the right to freely use his or her language in economic and social life, in the press and in publications, were denied to the Kurds, whose language and culture were banned until 1992. He cited numerous recent examples of restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language in the public arena.
This subject was addressed in greater detail in the presentation by Professor Mesut Yegen (University of Ankara) during the 3rd round table chaired by Hamit Bozarslan. Referring to the deportations of Kurdish populations, massacres bordering on genocide such as in Dersim in 1937-1938, the banning of the Kurdish language, culture and history, and the Turkification of Kurdish geographical names, Professor Yegen stressed that the Kurds had suffered a veritable cultural genocide under the Turkish Republic. In the same round table, Professor Jordi Tejel Gorgas (University of Neuchâtel) spoke of the fate of the Kurds in Syria under the French mandate and then under the Arab nationalist regimes. Professor Sherko Kirmanj (University of Ulster) spoke about the impact of the Treaty of Lausanne on the fate of the vilayet of Mosul and the Kurdish question in Iraq under the British mandate and in the decades that followed. Nazand Begikhani (visiting professor at Sciences-Po Paris) gave a presentation entitled "Rethinking Kurdish history from a feminist perspective".
In the final round table of this rich and busy day, chaired by Kendal Nezan, the Kurdish-Swiss parliamentarian Sibel Arslan and her colleague Laurence Fehlman-Rielle called on Switzerland to offer a benevolent welcome to Kurdish refugees fleeing the repressive policies of the states that signed the Treaty of Lausanne, to advocate respect for Kurdish human rights in national and international bodies, and to provide humanitarian aid to Kurdish populations in distress, such as those in Rojava and displaced Yezidis in Iraqi Kurdistan. The senator of Paris Rémi Féraud, spoke of the duty of solidarity towards the Kurdish people fighting for their freedom, who are also fighting the jihadists of ISIS for our freedom and security. As France is no longer a major power, it can act within the European Union in favour of a policy of welcoming Kurdish refugees, of multiform aid for Iraqi Kurdistan and for Rojava. Europe must use all its influence to ensure that the rights of the Kurds of Turkey and Iran are recognised and that they can live in the land of their ancestors with respect for their dignity and identity," he declared. For his part, Oman Baydemir, a former member of parliament and former mayor of Diyarbakir who lives in exile, called on the Kurdish diaspora in Europe to get better organised in order to raise awareness in Western public opinion of the fate and struggle of the Kurdish people, recalling the moral and political responsibility of Western countries for the fate of the Kurds, victims of the injustices of history.
Speaking by videoconference from the United States, former US ambassador Peter Galbraith, a long-time supporter of the Kurdish cause, called on the Kurds to acknowledge their share of responsibility for their fate. If they were united, they could have had an impact in Lausanne. In today's world, Western pressure on Turkey and Iran alone can only produce results if the Kurds are united and strong on the ground. He did not rule out the possibility that the newly re-elected Turkish President Erdogan might in future seek a compromise not only with the West to bail out his economy, but also with the Kurds.
The conference was attended by representatives of Kurdish associations from Norway, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kurdistan, the Netherlands and the United States, as well as, of course, Switzerland. Many people on the waiting list were unable to attend due to lack of space.
To meet these expectations, all the papers presented at the conference have been put online in their French version on the Institut kurde website. They will later be published in book form.
In addition, the City of Lausanne organised a very fine exhibition on the Lausanne Conference, devoting significant space to the grievances of the Kurds, Armenians, Greeks and Assyro-Chaldeans and to works of art by Kurdish artists.
Hoshyar Zebari is a well-known and respected political figure in Kurdistan, Iraq and the Middle East. He served for many years as Foreign Minister of post-Saddam Iraq and for a time as Finance Minister. The bête noire of the pro-Iranian Shiite factions for having allowed the return of American forces in 2014 to counter the onslaught of ISIS, which, after the capture of Mosul, was threatening to march on Baghdad, his candidacy for the presidency of the Iraqi republic was ruled out in 2021 by the manoeuvres of these factions and the Iraqi Supreme Court, which they control. Since then, he has been living in Kurdistan, where he remains active in the KDP's Political Bureau and in public debate.
On 22 June, he was the guest on a popular programme on the Kurdish channel RUDAW, where he answered questions from journalists and the public on the situation in Kurdistan and Iraq.
Extracts.
Rûdaw: There have been efforts for some time in Iraq to weaken the position of the Kurdistan region. What do you think?
Hoshyar Zebari: There is such an effort and it is intensifying. In fact, there are many reasons. Of course, the main reason is that those in power in the name of the State Governance Alliance or the Shiite Coordination Framework have not respected the written political agreement signed for the government formed under the presidency of al-Sudani. Secondly, they did not respect the agreement between the two governments (Erbil and Baghdad) and did not keep the promises made to our leadership. As a result, when the budget went to parliament and was voted on, it unfortunately appeared that they had not kept the commitments they had made. This is a strong sign that we need to reassess our own situation.
The question of the budget is very important and I have a lot to say about the budget, but the part reserved for the Kurdistan region is full of landmines. So we don't see it as simply because they have done it in a very planned and programmed way. How did they do it? As you said, these efforts have been going on all along. They are attacking the constitutional rights of the Kurdistan region. The Kurdistan region was founded with a lot of struggle and bloodshed and, in the end, our rights were defined by this constitution. The legitimacy of federalism, the question of partnership and the definition of the Kurdistan Region. Now their only aim is to change this constitution. Because they maintain that Iraq should not be governed by a federal system, but by a central power. In other words, we have fought in the past to ensure that Iraq does not return to the era of dictatorship, authoritarianism, the one man, the one party and the one nation, but now opinion in Baghdad is turning in that direction again.
What's more, this pressure won't stop there. They are discriminating against essential things like the budget, oil, medicines and farmers' financial rights. If you ask the Ministry of Health, they discriminate on the supply of medicines. They all have a common objective: to eliminate or weaken this status. Of course, this is not the opinion of everyone, but of some. "Power is now in our hands, the Sunnis are weak and scattered, only the Kurdistan region can oppose us", they think.
Another reason is the contradictions among the Kurds. Of course, they take advantage of this vacuum and use part of the interior to weaken the Kurdistan region. Unfortunately, when we look at it, we see that there is an effort to dismantle this structure of the Kurdistan region and break up its unity, and part of it accepts this. Unfortunately, it is unfortunate to say this as a Kurd.
Another point is that we used to be strong in Baghdad, we had a voice, we had a colour, we had decisions, we were decision-makers. Now that position has weakened, the issue is not the positions but the role played in Baghdad was stronger. At the time, it was nobody's business to talk about the financial rights of the Kurdistan region in the budget. It was a red line, but now they're getting down to the details. Before, there was only one item in the budget, now they've filled two pages and it's full of landmines, full of problems. So what's the way out of this situation? Of course, the clearest truth is that we have to reorganise internally.
Another issue is to legitimise the institutions and organisations of the Kurdistan region. This can only be achieved through transparent elections. But I think that these attacks will continue and will not be limited to that.
Rûdaw: What other stages are you planning from Baghdad?
Hoshyar Zebari: Yes, I foresee other things, tomorrow they could say that border crossings must also obey us. They consider border posts, border crossings and even airports to be border crossing points.
Tomorrow, they could say that the army must control all the borders. Because it's a question of sovereignty and they can say a lot of things one after the other. Of course, they are using the courts against the Kurdistan region. We have problems, so our situation could be under more pressure but there is a solution as I mentioned, let's try to reorganise the Kurdish house, let's get closer and let's go to the elections. They are attacking the Kurdistan region and its existence. We have seen that they have taken very unjust and unconstitutional decisions against the Kurdistan region. They can use the court as a tool to their liking and we have problems with that. (...)
Rûdaw: Isn't the most dangerous opposition within Kurdistan, in particular between the KDP and the PUK?
Hoshyar Zebari: Of course, this creates tensions. But unfortunately, our brothers in the PUK seem to support the idea of reducing the powers of the Kurdistan region to Baghdad.
Rûdaw: Does the PUK want this?
Hoshyar Zebari: It seems so. Their actions suggest it, but I don't know the details. As I said, we have had differences and debates in the past, but there were certain red lines that neither the KDP nor the PUK crossed. It was in the best interests of the Kurdistan Region. It was the united federal status of the Kurdistan Region. There are now efforts to eliminate that too. This does not mean that we can no longer conclude agreements with our brothers in the PUK. After these events, the PUK leadership recently asked the KDP for a meeting.
Rûdaw: Did they send you this request?
Hoshyar Zebari: Yes, we will be meeting soon to discuss all the problems and put them on the table. What's more, our people are sensitive. They know what the problem is. (...)
Rûdaw: You said that they were using an internal party to weaken the Kurdistan region. Is that party the PUK?
Hoshyar Zebari: Yes, very clearly. In other words, they (Baghdad) want the KDP and the PUK to be at odds. That's why we shouldn't give them this opportunity.
Rûdaw: You were Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs for a long time and for a time Minister of Finance. Do you think that the finance law was unfair to the Kurdistan region?
Hoshyar Zebari: I spoke about this topic at our meeting with experts from the Ministry of Finance two days ago. When I went to the Iraqi parliament in 2015, I presented the finance bill. In it I noted that the Iraqi government owed $15 billion to the Kurdistan Region. Imagine how much we have lost since then.
Rûdaw: What was the reason for this debt?
Hoshyar Zebari: They were arrears. It was the Kurdistan region's financial rights, it was its accumulated share. All our agreements had been taken into account. They were official documents presented to Parliament before the eyes of the whole world in the name of the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. A lot of injustice has been done to us.
Rûdaw: What mine are you talking about in the Finance Act?
Hoshyar Zebari: All the punitive powers, all the preconditions, are like landmines. If you don't obey, I do this, if you don't apply, I take this measure against you.
Rûdaw: Why was it accepted?
Hoshyar Zebari: You should ask those who negotiated this with Baghdad. Our leaders in Parliament too.
Rûdaw: Didn't your representatives in Parliament consult their party's opinion?
Hoshyar Zebari: In some cases they did, but of course they were deceived. Until the finance bill was approved, they tried to fool them by saying that the MPs were free to make their own decisions.
Rûdaw: Did the Shiite Coordination Framework do it?
Hoshyar Zebari: One hundred per cent.
Rûdaw: Do you regret the agreement you made with them (the Shiite Coordination Framework)?
Hoshyar Zebari: Of course, but the agreement is not verbal, it's written and signed.
Rûdaw: Every time they need the Kurds, they sign an agreement but then they back out. Why don't the Kurds learn a lesson every time?
Hoshyar Zebari: We've learned our lesson. But it also depends on the individual. At what point do you have to say "I cannot accept this"? Now, look, in the Kurdistan region, the KDP is saying no to this.
Rûdaw: The PUK won't say no?
Hoshyar Zebari: I haven't heard anything so far. They have not said no. They have also confirmed that they are openly against the Kurdistan region.
Rûdaw: However, they maintain that what they are doing is in the interests of the Kurdistan region?
Hoshyar Zebari: If you ask a truly impartial person, they will tell you that dividing the Kurdistan region is in nobody's interest.
Rûdaw: Can't the President of Iraq prevent these pressures on the Kurdistan region?
Hoshyar Zebari: We underestimate the position of President, even though it is very important under the Constitution. He is a partner of the executive and a protector of the Constitution. Of course, if tomorrow Parliament or the Federal Court takes a decision that is contrary to the constitutional rights of the Kurdistan region, the President has the right to prevent it. He has the right to say "This is contrary to the Constitution".
Rûdaw: Does the law also give this power over the budget?
Hoshyar Zebari: Of course. In the past, when Jalal Talabani was in Baghdad, we did it, no decision for which we did not vote could pass. Unfortunately, that has not been the case in recent years.
Rûdaw: What can the President do now?
Hoshyar Zebari: He can take a stand against that.
Rûdaw: Would Baghdad take this position on board?
Hoshyar Zebari: He is the President and of course he is taken into account. The Iraqi press and the foreign press take it into account, so it's not a position without power.
Rûdaw: Previously, foreign delegations coming to Baghdad also visited the Kurdistan Region. Why has the number of these visits decreased now?
Hoshyar Zebari: Yesterday, a large US trade delegation was in Erbil and then went on to Suleimanieh. Delegations are coming. Of course, the situation has changed a little because of the coronavirus pandemic and then the war in Ukraine. With the balance of power shifting between the United States, China and Russia, the foreign policies of these countries have also changed. This is not just an issue for us. In general, new alliances are being formed, there is a new situation throughout the world. It's a new situation, it's not the same as before. There are of course reasons why the number of visits by delegations to Iraq and the Kurdistan Region has fallen, but this is a global situation and the world's focus has changed.
Rûdaw: So there's a reduction?
Hoshyar Zebari: Of course, during the war against the EI, there were more visits, the Kurdistan Region was indeed stronger, it was at the centre of attention and there was more interest. The internal situation of the Kurdistan Region is of course perceived with sadness from the outside, but the truth has to be told.
Rûdaw: Is the situation in the Kurdistan Region causing a lack of attention from outside?
Hoshyar Zebari: Not so far. Our friends on the international scene support a strong Kurdistan Region within a strong Iraq. But if the problems are not resolved, if there is no production, no economic interest, then the world shows less interest.
Rûdaw: Is it true that you were unfair to Suleimanieh?
Hoshyar Zebari: We have a joint government. The PUK and the Movement for Change (Goran) are also present in this government. The Prime Minister and government officials have said that such a situation does not exist. But if there is an injustice as they say, they come and sit down and a solution is found with a budget.
Rûdaw: The Kurdistan Parliament is currently unable to sit. Can a budget be provided under these conditions?
Hoshyar Zebari: Parliament will meet on time, and elections will also be held. Let's draw up a budget for the Kurdistan Region, so that Zaho, Halabja, Suleimanieh and Erbil don't complain, so that it's fair.
Rûdaw: Why did the KDP oppose the article in the budget law which provides for the provinces to have direct relations with Baghdad?
Hoshyar Zebari: Because it would divide the Kurdistan Region. It establishes relations with the Kurdistan Region in Iraq as a federal structure. If you do that, this status will not remain.
Rûdaw: Does this pose a threat to the status of the Kurdistan Region?
Hoshyar Zebari: Indeed, this article is very cleverly drafted. It has to be fair, if Suleimanieh's right is not granted, then it goes back to the Prime Minister and Parliament.
Rûdaw: Would that open the door to other things?
Hoshyar Zebari: That would obviously open the door to other decisions. It would weaken your position. For example, if changes are made to the constitution, they can do so despite your opposition, whereas previously, if three provinces objected, no changes could be made to the constitution. They can also take away your right to object.
Rûdaw: Do you think the elections for the Kurdistan Parliament will take place this year?
Hoshyar Zebari: According to our information, they will take place. In truth, it is also a political game. According to the United Nations experts, they can take place. More importance could be attached to the elections for the Kurdistan Parliament than to the elections for the governorate councils throughout Iraq.
Rûdaw: Is it certain that the elections for the Kurdistan Parliament will be organised by Iraq's Supreme Independent Electoral Commission?
Hoshyar Zebari: So far, yes.
Rûdaw: Will the elections be held under the old electoral law?
Hoshyar Zebari: If no new legislation comes out of Parliament, then yes.
Rûdaw: The PUK has lodged a complaint with the Federal Court concerning the old law...
Hoshyar Zebari: Complaints to the Federal Court have increased. (Laughter) The doors of the Federal Court have been opened wide for the New Generation (Newey Nwê, Kurdish opposition party).
Rûdaw: Why did you laugh when you said that?
Hoshyar Zebari: Come on, it's obvious.
Rûdaw: If the Federal Court examines the UPK's complaint, won't it create a new problem concerning the electoral law?
Hoshyar Zebari: No, that won't be a problem. In my opinion, it is simply a challenge. The truth is, I also have opinions about the structure of the Federal Court, which was created neither by law nor by the Constitution. There's a lot to be said for it.
Rûdaw: Then why did they dissolve the Kurdistan Parliament with a single decision?
Hoshyar Zebari: My brother, they are not doing the right thing, they are interpreting the laws as they see fit. They say it is illegal to extend the term of parliament by a year. But why don't you say it's illegal not to be able to form your government in a year and postpone it? It's not logical to ignore our apologies and not have a say in the matter, but that's the current situation.
Rûdaw: The Kurdistan Region has not taken a position against the Federal Court's decision. Isn't this silence tantamount to acceptance?
Hoshyar Zebari: If we insisted on elections, we would be rejected.
Rûdaw: Do you think Iraq wants Kurdistan's oil to be exported to the world market again?
Hoshyar Zebari: They are playing a big game, they are harming themselves and the Kurdistan region. But as long as they make the Kurdistan region lose, they don't mind. According to their calculations, they have lost 2.2 billion dollars. There are now talks with the Turkish government. A delegation from Ankara has come to Baghdad. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani went to Ankara to discuss this issue and was well received. There are certain technical problems, the technical problems concerning compensation and the export of oil from Turkey will be overcome. But I think these problems can be solved, I think this postponement is due to political reasons, so a political decision is needed.
Rûdaw: Is it on the Turkish or Iraqi side?
Hoshyar Zebari: Mainly in Iraq, but I hope that the losers will feel this, because even the budget they are proposing is not very realistic. In my opinion, there are imaginary things in the finance law and that doesn't seem acceptable. But they have shared the cake among themselves, everyone has taken their share. However, there are more important problems. There are big differences between oil prices and employment rates, which will cause a deficit in this budget. There has been an injustice to the Kurdistan region in every respect. This includes loans obtained from foreign aid. We insisted that the Kurdistan Region's share should be 17%, but now they have set a very, very low rate. In reality, this is oppression in every respect.
Rûdaw: A few days ago, we had an economist as a guest and he commented: "It's Iraq's biggest budget, but it's also the worst". What are your thoughts on this?
Hoshyar Zebari: Yes, it's true, it's very bad and illogical. As I have already explained, they have calculated the price of oil at 70 dollars. They are still selling Iraqi oil for 5-6 dollars less than the world price of oil, which is 75 dollars. If the price of oil falls to 50 or 60 dollars tomorrow, they won't even be able to pay salaries. The budget deficit will be higher. This is the most basic error in the budget, despite the fact that the entire budget is fictitious and imaginary, they have really put in illogical items and shared them among themselves; those in power in Baghdad. Everyone took their share.
Rûdaw: Did a small part of the cake go to the Kurdistan region?
Hoshyar Zebari: Unfortunately, only a small proportion went there.
Rûdaw: The problem is that the budget is for 3 years.
Hoshyar Zebari: That's another problem. All over the world, the budget is annual, here it is for 3 years. But it will be revised next year.
Rûdaw: You were part of the State Governance Alliance, why has the alliance acted in this way now?
Hoshyar Zebari: As I said at the beginning, they have not kept their word. They have not respected the agreement.
Rûdaw: You were very optimistic at first!
Hoshyar Zebari: We were very optimistic at the beginning, we also had a role to play, the President played a big role in the formation of this government, we supported, we participated. But they were not honest about the budget issue, which is very sensitive in the eyes of the public.
