After the summer break, the campaign for the October 20 parliamentary elections began in early September in the main Kurdish cities and towns. A total of 1,191 candidates, including 368 women, are running for the 100 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament. Among them are many independent candidates and 39 candidates competing for the 5 seats reserved for ethno-religious minorities. Since the first free elections in Kurdistan in May 1992, these minorities had been allocated a quota of 11 seats. However, in February, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, for purely political reasons and exceeding its constitutional powers, decided to abolish this quota. After months of protests, tensions, and tense negotiations, a painful compromise was reached, granting a quota of 5 seats. This agreement allowed the electoral process, stalled for two years, to finally move forward.
The new electoral law divides the autonomous Kurdistan region into four provinces:
Erbil: 34 seats, of which 10 are for women, 2 for minorities;Sulaymaniyah: 38 seats, of which 11 are for women, 2 for minorities;Duhok: 25 seats, of which 8 are for women, 1 for minorities;Halabja: 3 seats, of which 1 is for women.
This ensures that women will hold 30% of the seats in the Kurdistan Parliament.
The autonomous Kurdistan region has 3,789,000 voters, each holding a biometric identity card. For the first time, voting will be conducted electronically, meaning the election results should be known fairly quickly. However, this electronic system, controlled by the Iraqi High Electoral Commission and thus by Baghdad, is controversial. Concerns about potential result manipulation, with Iranian expertise in such practices, are widespread, raising the possibility of future disputes. However, Kurdish authorities have ensured that the results will first be tallied and counted in the polling stations in Kurdistan before being centralized and certified in Baghdad.
The electoral campaign is unfolding in a very tense regional context. The conflict between Israel and various Iranian-allied militias is affecting Kurdistan's security and its connections to the outside world. Many flights to the Middle East are frequently canceled. Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines had suspended all their flights to Erbil from July 29 to August 27, and more suspensions are expected. Turkey continues its military operations in the border areas of Kurdistan, causing insecurity and destruction, leading to the displacement of local populations.
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), in a statement, welcomed the start of the electoral campaign for the upcoming legislative elections in Kurdistan and emphasized "the need for political parties to engage in healthy competition of ideas free from any intimidation or threats." It also called on "all candidates, political parties, and media to foster an atmosphere of inclusion and dialogue and to ensure that women, who often face unique challenges during elections, can fully participate." The previous electoral system had ensured that women held more than 30% of the seats in the last legislature, where the Kurdistan Parliament was presided over by a woman.
Many observers also fear Iranian interference, as Iran has a long history of exploiting Kurdish political divisions to its advantage, supporting parties or groups aligned with its interests. Iran also has significant influence in Baghdad, where the election results will be finalized and certified, as well as with the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court.
The new Iranian president, Massoud Pezeshkian, chose Iraq for his first foreign visit, arriving on September 11. He was received by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The agenda included security and economic cooperation and the implementation of over a hundred agreements signed so far between post-Saddam Iraq and the Islamic Republic. Iraq committed to preventing "any aggression, armed action, or criminal activity against the Islamic Republic of Iran from its territory." To avoid further Iranian military incursions into Kurdistan, Kurdish Iranian political parties, which had self-defense Peshmerga units, have been relocated from border areas to camps inside the country. The Iranian president also met with his Iraqi counterpart, Latif Rashid, who, unlike most Iraqi leaders who spent time in exile in Iran, does not speak Persian but speaks Arabic, English, and Kurdish. The Iranian president, born in the Kurdish city of Mahabad, speaks fluent Kurdish but not Arabic or English. Their tête-à-tête reportedly took place in Kurdish, marking a diplomatic first.
After his visit to Baghdad, the Iranian president traveled to Erbil, where, according to AFP, he was greeted with great pomp at the airport by Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani. Their conversation began in Kurdish, but to allow the rest of the Iranian delegation to follow, they switched to Persian, which President Barzani speaks well, having grown up and been educated up to the baccalaureate level in Iran. The exchange of niceties and declarations of goodwill will likely help ease tensions for a while. While Kurdistan-Iran economic relations are flourishing, Kurdistan's pro-Western stance and the presence of U.S. military forces in Erbil irritate Iran, which aims to transform Iraq into an exclusive Iranian sphere of influence, akin to a dominion or satrapy, where a façade of Kurdish autonomy might be tolerated. The Iranian president also visited Sulaymaniyah, the cultural capital of Iraqi Kurdistan and stronghold of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), where he paid his respects at the tomb of Jalal Talabani, the PUK founder, former president of Iraq, and a "long-time friend" of Iran.
Under Iranian pressure, the Iraqi government has accelerated negotiations to establish a timetable for the withdrawal of the International Coalition forces fighting against ISIS. The coalition's mission will end "no later than the end of September 2025," Washington and Baghdad announced in a joint statement on September 27. The two parties agreed on "a two-phase transition plan," according to a U.S. official cited by AFP (September 28). The first phase will last until the end of September 2025 and will involve "the withdrawal of Coalition forces from certain parts of Iraq." The second phase, between September 2025 and September 2026, concerns Kurdistan, according to Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al-Abbassi. The Coalition will continue its operations in Syria.
To justify the withdrawal of the International Coalition, which includes 2,500 U.S. soldiers and personnel from several countries, including France and the United Kingdom, Baghdad claims that its security forces are now capable of independently combating ISIS. It is worth recalling that in 2011, under Iranian pressure, Iraq claimed it could now fight al-Qaeda on its own and secured President Obama's premature withdrawal of U.S. forces, with disastrous consequences. Taking advantage of the security vacuum, former al-Qaeda members, reorganized as ISIS, occupied one-third of Iraq's territory in 2014, including the city of Mosul. Baghdad was then forced to call for American assistance.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Parliament has once again postponed the vote on the law to "restore properties to their rightful owners in Kirkuk." A final session dedicated to the draft law is expected later. A Kurdish MP explained that the postponement was due to several unresolved issues requiring further discussion before the law could be put to a vote. Turkmen MP Arashad al-Salihi, backed by Turkey, confirmed an agreement with Kurdish blocs to delay the vote on the cancellation of the Revolutionary Command Council decisions regarding confiscated lands until the end of the week. The Ba'ath regime's Revolutionary Command Council had confiscated hundreds of thousands of acres of agricultural land belonging to Kurds and some Turkmen and handed them over to Arab settlers and security service members. The Iraqi government has failed to implement several constitutional provisions calling for the reversal of the demographic changes imposed by the Ba'ath regime. Meanwhile, Shiite lawmakers are now seeking Kurdish and Turkmen support for several controversial amendments to a civil code bill in exchange for their backing on the law to "restore properties to their rightful owners."
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in New York on September 23 and discussed the importance of reopening the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to promote foreign investment in the Iraqi economy. The pipeline, which transports oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey, has been closed since Iraq successfully sued Turkey to stop allowing Iraqi Kurdistan to independently export oil in March 2023. Despite Baghdad's claims that it would reopen "soon," the pipeline remains closed, costing Iraq approximately $20 billion. Blinken and al-Sudani also highlighted the strategic partnership between the United States and Iraq and the two countries' shared commitment to achieving regional stability and the lasting defeat of ISIS.
It is also worth noting that a Turkish airstrike killed a Kurdish shepherd and damaged several houses in a village in the Sidakan subdistrict of Erbil governorate. The Sidakan subdistrict has recently been the scene of numerous clashes between Turkish forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). According to the NGO Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), 12 civilians, including 5 from Sidakan, have been killed or injured by Turkish attacks in the Kurdistan region this year. Turkish and Iranian attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan have killed 425 civilians and injured 420 since 1991.
Additionally, Iraq will conduct a population census on November 20 and 21. "A two-day curfew will be imposed in all provinces to carry out the population census," the Prime Minister announced in a statement on September 1. The last census was conducted in 1997 in 15 provinces, excluding the three provinces of autonomous Kurdistan (AFP, September 1). To organize the upcoming census, Iraqi authorities have signed a partnership with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).
The second anniversary of the death of Kurdish student Jîna Mahsa Amini while in custody in Tehran was commemorated in Kurdistan and Iran through numerous protests and strikes, despite intense repression.
On September 15, a major public strike began in Iranian Kurdistan to honor the second anniversary of Amini, who was killed by the Iranian morality police on September 16, 2022. In Saqqez, Amini's hometown, Iranian authorities placed her parents under house arrest and prevented her family from visiting her grave in Aichi Cemetery. The regime also released water from a dam to block others from accessing the cemetery. The Hengaw Organization for Human Rights reported that strikes in several cities, including Mahabad, Saqqez, and Sanandaj, were organized by civilians and Kurdish political parties. In many areas, authorities threatened shopkeepers who refused to open their stores and even broke into some closed shops. A strong military presence, including special forces and helicopters, was observed in several cities. Amini's death in 2022 sparked protests that led to the deaths of at least 120 Kurdish citizens and 400 Iranians. Meanwhile, authorities in Bokan arrested Ahmad Hassanzadeh, the father of Mohammad Hassanzadeh, who was killed during the "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests. The regime also detained eight Kurds in Diwandarah, two in Piranshahr, two in Marivan, and a teenager in Dehghani. The regime further cracked down on activists and civilians for their social media posts commemorating Amini’s death.
Protests were also held in several Western capitals with the participation of Kurdish and Iranian diasporas, as well as feminist activists and human rights defenders. In Paris, on September 25, several hundred protesters, 700 according to the Police Prefecture, took part in a march from Place de la Bastille to the Hôtel de Ville (Le Monde, September 15, 2024). About twenty human rights organizations supported this peaceful march. Louis Armand, released from Iranian prisons in June along with another French prisoner, Benjamin Brière, supported the march and said, "What irony to find myself here with you today, having spent nearly two years in Evin Prison for my supposed participation in the September 2022 protests. Yes, I was in prison, but it is an immense honor to have lived among you, freedom fighters, who shared my pain." Present at the march, Sylvie Brigot, General Director of Amnesty International, denounced the ongoing repression, stating, "The death penalty is still used massively as a tool to instill fear." She added, "There are still thousands and thousands of people unjustly detained without trial."
Among these prisoners of conscience is the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who, from her prison cell, called on September 16 for the International Community to "break its silence and inaction" against the devastating oppression and discrimination carried out by autocratic and authoritarian governments against women, criminalizing "gender apartheid." Reflecting on "these two terrible years" and "the road still to be traveled," she affirmed that "nothing will be the same as before" and that "change is shaking the foundations of religious tyranny (...) On this second anniversary of Woman, Life, Freedom, we reaffirm our commitment to achieving democracy, freedom, equality, and to defeating theocratic despotism." On her initiative, 34 political prisoners announced on September 15 that they were beginning a "symbolic" hunger strike to "commemorate" the two-year-long protests and the "murder" of Jîna Mahsa Amini (AFP, September 16).
This protest continues quietly in all layers of society, in an underground manner, as emphasized by the many reports published on this occasion in Western media (see notably pp. 30, 39, and 49 of our press review).
The new Iranian president, Massoud Pezeshkian, elected in July, promised on September 16 to prevent the morality police from "bothering" women. He stated that his government would oppose the morality police and "any form of coercion against a human being. We do not have the right to force women and girls, and I am ashamed of such behavior towards them" (AFP, 16/09). He also pledged to ease the draconian restrictions on the internet, particularly on social media.
However, the hardline faction of the regime, led by his unsuccessful presidential rival Jalili, who controls Parliament and most of the regime’s key levers of power, seems to disregard the elected President's promises. On September 25, the Iranian Guardian Council approved the controversial "Hijab and Chastity bill." The law legitimizes the use of violence to enforce mandatory hijab laws, extends gender segregation in public spaces, and gives intelligence agencies significant enforcement powers. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (VAJA), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Intelligence Organization of the Iranian Police (SAFA) now have much more authority to enforce laws that were once primarily the responsibility of the "morality police." Penalties for violations of moral codes now range from fines and imprisonment to 74 lashes for mocking the hijab, and even the death penalty for certain hijab-related offenses.
The power struggle at the top of the Iranian regime appears to be intensifying. Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon, which included the decapitation of the political and military leadership of the Lebanese Shia movement, including the assassination of its charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was very close to Ayatollah Khamenei, has exacerbated these tensions. The "moderate" faction represented by the Iranian president advocates for a diplomatic solution and a process of normalization with Western countries, as he declared at the UN General Assembly. According to him, a military response by Iran to the repeated provocations of Benjamin Netanyahu risks triggering a generalized conflict that would be devastating for both Iran and the Middle East. The hardline faction, on the other hand, seeks military confrontation to aid Iran’s regional allies, Hezbollah and Hamas, who have been severely weakened by Israel, restore Iran's credibility—its deterrence capability—and "avenge the martyrs" from Iran and its allies, a list that continues to grow.
The Iranian dilemma, highlighted by many international press commentators, has become a cornelian one: not responding risks losing influence and credibility with the vast network of militias armed and financed by Tehran, including Hezbollah and Hamas; engaging in military confrontation with an Israel supported by the United States risks a massive and devastating Israeli response that could further destabilize the regime. The middle path of symbolic reprisals announced in advance, as seen last April, seems even more difficult now that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu appears determined to make the most of the "window of opportunity" he has long sought to "punish Iran" with impunity, just one month before the U.S. elections, where Washington seems to have no choice but to support Israel no matter what. Privately, most Arab states in the region, with the exception of Syria and Iraq, are unlikely to lament Iran or Hezbollah’s fate. Turkish President Erdogan’s bluster remains verbal, while Russia and China have other pressing concerns.
Meanwhile, in Kurdistan, the Iranian regime sentenced the father, sister, and brother-in-law of Kurdish political prisoner Pakshan Azizi—Aziz Azizi, Pershang Azizi, and Hossein Abbasi—to one year in prison. Pakshan Azizi faces the death penalty, and another Kurd, Ayoub Anisi Yengjeh, has been sentenced to two years in prison in connection with the Azizi case. On September 22, the Tehran Court of Appeal upheld the four prison sentences. Hengaw reported that Pakshan Azizi’s relatives were convicted of "complicity with a criminal" and that Yengjeh was accused of "conspiracy against international security." Pakshan Azizi was sentenced to death for rebellion after participating in the anti-government protests following the death of Jina Amini in September 2022. Meanwhile, the regime handed down heavy sentences against three other Kurds, including a 64-month prison sentence for Kurdish journalist Mostafa Nemati in 2022. The regime also sentenced a 52-year-old Kurd from Shinno to two years in prison, and Iran's Supreme Court upheld the death penalty of a Kurdish political prisoner from the Turkish Kurdistan region named Hatem Ozdemir. At the same time, at least five people were arrested in Bokan and Diwandara, and Iranian authorities killed two Kurdish cross-border couriers (kolbars) near Baneh on September 23.
Turkish President Erdogan sees himself as a "global leader" and is seeking alliances where his country can play a leading role.
Although Turkey is already a member of NATO, the most important political-military alliance, which gives it, among other benefits, near-unrestricted access to Western military equipment and, if necessary, the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, its relations with other NATO members, including the United States, have severely deteriorated in recent years. Its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system, its stubborn obstruction of Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership, its war against the Kurds in Syria—who are Western allies in the fight against ISIS—and its refusal to apply Western sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine have infuriated key NATO members, including France and the U.S. Turkey’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has further strained relations. While Western countries declare their "unwavering" support for Israel’s security, the Turkish president views Hamas as a legitimate "national resistance" movement, receives its leaders, accuses Israel of committing "genocide in Gaza," and compares Prime Minister Netanyahu to being "worse than Hitler." He also denounces Western countries that support Israel and provide it with weapons as "complicit in the ongoing genocide."
At the Arab League summit on September 10, Turkey proposed an "Islamic alliance" to support the Palestinians, confront Israel, and end the war in Gaza. This marked the first time in 13 years that Ankara, which supported the Arab Spring, especially the Islamic governments that emerged from these movements, including those in Egypt and Tunisia, had been invited to an Arab League summit. This return was highlighted by Turkey’s call for a holy Islamic alliance against the Jewish state. However, the appeal found little resonance, as most Arab states view Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah as political-military instruments serving Iran, and they are content with the weakening of these militias, even as they lament and condemn the devastation in Gaza and the suffering of its people.
On September 24, President Erdogan addressed the UN General Assembly, solemnly denouncing the "ongoing genocide in Gaza," the "complicity" of Western countries, and the silence of the international community. He reiterated that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a legitimate national resistance movement. This argument was repeated in an interview with CBS, during which the American journalist failed to ask Erdogan why Hamas, responsible for the October 7 civilian massacre and the kidnapping of more than 200 civilians, is not considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, while the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which fights for the recognition of the rights of Turkey's 20 million Kurds and does not carry out attacks on civilians or take hostages, is labeled a terrorist organization.
During his speech at the UN, Erdogan also called for UN reform, particularly of the Security Council, whose composition, he argued, no longer reflects current geopolitical realities. He repeated his mantra: "the world is bigger than five," meaning that besides the five permanent Security Council members, there are other powers, including Turkey, that should have a seat at the table.
President Erdogan found as little support in New York as his foreign minister did at the Arab League. Reflecting this lack of engagement, during his four-day stay, the Turkish leader managed to meet only a handful of third-world leaders (from Sudan, Guinea, and Iraq) and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. President Biden did not find it necessary to meet with Erdogan, not even for a brief hallway conversation, and certainly not at the White House, where the Turkish president has never been received under Biden’s administration.
Distanced from its NATO allies and "shunned" by the European Union, which has postponed negotiations on Turkey’s potential EU membership indefinitely, Turkey is now turning to the BRICS—an emerging group of countries that includes China and Russia and aims to provide an alternative to the G7, which comprises the six richest Western countries and Japan. Turkey participated as an observer at the 2018 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, and since late 2023, its accession process appears to be accelerating. According to *Le Monde* on September 3, Turkey would be "the first NATO member to apply for membership in this informal club, much to the annoyance of the West." During his visit to Beijing on June 3, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was asked about this and responded, "Of course, we would be interested." The prospect of seeing President Erdogan alongside "global leaders" such as Putin, Modi, and Xi Jinping is likely to thrill his supporters and the Turkish Islamist-nationalist public.
As Turkey courts the BRICS, it continues to challenge its "traditional allies" such as France and Germany. Turkey now demands reciprocity for French and German schools in Ankara and Istanbul, some of which have existed for more than a century and have educated generations of Turkish elites. Turkey is now requesting the opening of schools in France and Germany that would teach in Turkish and follow a Turkish curriculum. This demand has been deemed "unacceptable" by Paris and Berlin. Meanwhile, by order of the Turkish government, French and German schools in Turkey will no longer be allowed to admit new Turkish students (*Le Monde*, September 2).
Another point of contention between Ankara and Berlin concerns the fate of undocumented Turkish migrants in Germany. On September 27, the German government announced its intention, with Ankara’s consent, to accelerate the deportation of migrants without residency permits to Turkey. According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Berlin and Turkey had agreed to accept up to 500 Turkish nationals per week. However, after a meeting between Erdogan and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in New York on September 23, Ankara quickly denied the existence of such an agreement. The controversy surrounding this issue undermines and weakens the authority of the German chancellor (AFP, September 27).
Anti-Western, particularly anti-American, sentiment is also manifesting on the streets. On September 2, two off-duty American Marines walking in the Turkish port city of Izmir, during a stopover of their ship, were violently attacked by a group of young Turkish nationalists who tried to place sacks over their heads. The youths, claiming affiliation with the ultranationalist Patriotic Party (Vatan), beat the two Americans while shouting "Yankee Go Home." After a brief hospitalization, the two Marines were able to rejoin their unit. The governor of Izmir later announced the arrest of 15 Turks involved in the incident (*New York Times*, September 2).
Public and private hostility toward the Kurds continues unabated.
On September 24, Turkish police raided the Mesopotamian Research Association for Language and Culture (MED-DER), the Payîz Pirtûk bookstore, and the Anka Cooperative for Linguistic and Artistic Education in Diyarbakir (Amed) as part of an ongoing investigation by the prosecutor’s office. Authorities seized publications and electronic devices. The raids led to the arrest of 23 people, who were denied access to a lawyer for 24 hours. The operation, which included searches of employees' homes, was immediately condemned by Kurdish leaders and organizations, accusing the state of repressing Kurdish language and culture. "Kurds have the right to use their own language in public and in education and to receive information in their mother tongue. Our linguistic richness should be celebrated, not destroyed," said Burhan Sonmez, president of PEN International. Simultaneously, the police arrested members of the Kurdish Koma Hevra band for singing Kurdish songs at a public concert. In recent months, the Turkish government has intensified its crackdown on the Kurdish language, including raiding weddings where Kurdish songs were played, labeling the music as "terrorist propaganda." Additionally, an office of the People’s Democratic Party for Equality and Democracy (DEM) in the Sultangazi district of Istanbul was the target of an armed attack, marking another hate crime against the Kurdish community in Turkey.
Moreover, over 1,500 lawyers from 35 countries have signed a petition demanding an end to the isolation of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been in total isolation for over 42 months. Despite repeated requests, Öcalan has not been allowed to see his lawyers or family. International legal organizations held a press conference in Brussels to discuss the situation and call for action. The petition highlights human rights violations and Öcalan's right to defense, demanding that Turkey allow him and his co-detainees to meet with their lawyers and communicate with the outside world. The People’s Democratic Party for Equality and Democracy (DEM), a pro-Kurdish party, has criticized Turkey’s policies, especially those of the ruling parties, emphasizing Öcalan's isolation since 1999 and his complete isolation since 2015.
After several delays due to heavy external pressure and threats, the municipal elections announced last spring by the authorities of Rojava now seem to be indefinitely postponed.
Indeed, the U.S. State Department issued a statement opposing recent efforts by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to hold municipal elections, citing what the U.S. perceives as a lack of necessary conditions for free and fair elections in northeastern Syria. "The United States has always stated that any elections held in Syria should be free, fair, transparent, and inclusive, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254," the State Department's statement read. This follows the AANES decision to postpone elections initially scheduled for June, in response to pressure from the U.S., Russia, and Turkey.
Given the volatile context, where the conflict between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah risks spreading throughout the region, the U.S. administration, just weeks before the November 5 presidential elections, is keen to avoid another potential hotspot of tension. U.S.-Turkish relations are already at their lowest point. During his four-day trip to New York for the UN General Assembly, Turkish President Erdogan failed to secure even a brief meeting with President Biden. Turkey has also been implicated in the corruption charges against New York City Mayor Eric Adams (*New York Times*, September 23).
Rojava continues its fight against ISIS.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the arrest and elimination of several ISIS jihadists in separate operations with direct support from the U.S.-led coalition. On September 14, the SDF’s anti-terrorism units (YAT) raided an ISIS hideout east of Raqqa, killing four members of a terrorist cell and seizing several weapons. The SDF also arrested two ISIS members in simultaneous operations in the countryside of Al-Hasakah. On September 6, the SDF revealed that they had captured 34 ISIS terrorists and killed five in northeastern Syria in July and August. Additionally, U.S. air defense shot down several drones targeting a military base in Hasakah on September 15. These drones were launched by Iranian-backed militias, which have attacked U.S. interests in Iraq and Syria hundreds of times since October 2023.
On September 3, a senior Kurdish security official was killed, and another person was injured in an explosion near the Oum Forsan prison, close to Qamishli. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, this leader played a key role in directing operations against ISIS in the Raqqa region, the former "capital" of the Islamic State. The attack on his vehicle is attributed to Turkish intelligence and their Arab proxies. On the same day, the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly the al-Nusra Front and the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, carried out an infiltration operation in northern Latakia province, killing 12 regime soldiers, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. This was the deadliest attack on regime forces since the beginning of the year. HTS, which controls much of the rebel-held Idlib province, is supported and armed by Turkey.
Meanwhile, the Turkish-backed Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade violently suppressed a women-led protest against heavy taxes imposed by Turkish-backed militias in the occupied Afrin canton. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that members of this brigade, made up of Turkmens, opened fire on protesters in the village of Kashira, injuring at least eight women, some seriously. Several local reports indicate that one woman died from her injuries. Following the attack, the brigade imposed a curfew, cut off communications, and began arresting civilians. The protests were initially sparked by ongoing human rights violations, crime, and excessive taxation of olive farmers by Turkish-backed militias. The Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade demanded a ransom of eight dollars per olive tree from displaced villagers, and other pro-Turkish factions imposed similar taxes in neighboring areas.
On September 29, the United States announced (AFP) that it had carried out two targeted strikes in Syria, killing at least 37 terrorists from ISIS and Hurras ad Din, an al-Qaeda affiliate. The first strike, on September 16, targeted an ISIS training camp in central Syria, killing at least 28 ISIS fighters, including four senior leaders. The second strike, on September 24, targeted a site in northwestern Syria and killed nine Hurras ad Din terrorists, including Marwan Bassam Abd al-Ra'uf, a leader responsible for military operations in Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) conducted several raids targeting ISIS cells in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. On September 17, the SDF captured two ISIS members in Raqqa, Muhammed al-Rukhus and Ahmad al-Rukhus, who were transporting weapons and facilitating attacks on military and civilian targets. On September 24, in Raqqa, the SDF captured ISIS terrorist Muhammad al Jojah, alias Abu Abboud. Al Jojah was responsible for smuggling ISIS child soldiers, known as "Cubs of the Caliphate," out of detention camps in northeastern Syria. Finally, on September 29, the SDF, supported by the U.S.-led coalition, arrested two ISIS members in Deir ez-Zor, Mohammed Hassan Saleh and Bashar Jaan al Hamid, who were supplying weapons and ammunition to the organization.
The Social Justice Council of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) announced that 1,520 prisoners convicted of links to ISIS will benefit from the AANES General Amnesty Law No. 10 of 2024. The decision to implement this amnesty law was motivated by efforts to reduce overcrowding in prisons and detention camps administered by AANES and to honor a 2020 agreement with local Arab tribes. A total of 1,120 convicts have already been released in batches, and the remaining 400 will also be released once they have served half of their sentences. Some non-combatant ISIS affiliates have also benefited from the amnesty, but those who fought against the SDF, leaders of terrorist organizations, and individuals convicted of serious crimes such as treason or bombings are excluded.
Additionally, on September 30, a meeting focused on combating the Islamic State was held in Washington to maintain pressure. At this meeting, the United States announced it would provide $168 million to the Iraq and Syria Stabilization Fund. This meeting followed the announcement on September 27 by Washington and Baghdad that the coalition's mission in Iraq will end within a year, in September 2025. However, the international coalition will continue its operations in Syria, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized (AFP, September 30).
It is also worth noting a series of remarkable reports on "the slow implosion of Syria and the disappearing Christian community," published in *Le Monde*, which we reproduce later in our press review.
