The elections for the renewal of the Kurdistan Parliament were held on October 20, conducted peacefully and without significant incidents.
A total of 2,899,578 voters were called to the polls, with a participation rate of 72%, notably higher than in 2018 (58%) and even in 2013 (67%). This turnout defied media predictions of disillusionment or democratic fatigue among the population. For the first time in the history of these elections, all voters, equipped with biometric ID cards, were able to vote electronically. Consequently, the vote counting process, which took nearly a month in 2018, was completed within 24 hours.
The few complaints submitted to the High Electoral Commission involved minor issues, such as campaign activities on the eve or the day of the vote in certain areas, or delayed opening of certain polling stations.
After reviewing these complaints, the High Electoral Commission announced the official election results on October 21. As expected, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), founded in 1946 by Mustafa Barzani, came out on top with 809,172 votes, representing 39% of the total votes cast. This secured 39 seats out of the 100 seats in the Parliament, including 5 seats reserved for minorities. In 2008, the KDP had won 688,070 votes and 45 out of 111 seats. Despite an increase of 121,182 votes, the party experienced a loss of 6 seats due to the reduction in the number of parliamentary seats and the new electoral law dividing autonomous Kurdistan into four electoral provinces instead of a single nationwide constituency. Under the previous system, the KDP would have secured 46 seats, according to an analysis by the Kurdistan 24 television channel.
The KDP was followed by its historical rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), founded in 1975 by Jalal Talabani. With 408,141 votes (22% of the total), the PUK secured 23 seats, up from 21 seats in 2018. This gain of approximately 90,000 votes and 2 seats can be attributed to the collapse of the Goran (Change) Movement, a splinter group of the PUK. Goran had garnered 186,903 votes and 12 seats in 2018 but found itself in 2024 with only 11,621 votes and a single seat.
Most of Goran’s former electorate and other dissatisfied voters shifted their support to the New Generation Movement, a populist and anti-establishment party founded by wealthy businessman Shahswar Abdulwahid, who is close to Baghdad. This party made significant gains, receiving 290,991 votes (16% of the total) and securing 15 seats, up from 8 seats in 2018.
The two religious parties, the Kurdistan Islamic Union and the Justice Group, won 7 seats (up from 5 in 2018) and 3 seats (down from 7 in 2018), respectively. Their overall influence has stagnated or slightly declined, decreasing from 12 seats in 2018 to 10 seats in 2024.
A new party, Halwest (National Position), formed from the remnants of Goran, managed to recover some of its disillusioned voters, obtaining 55,775 votes and 4 seats. The People’s Front, created by Lahur Talabani—former co-president of the PUK, expelled by his cousin Bafel Talabani—secured 33,365 votes (2% of the total) and 2 seats. Lastly, the Kurdistan Regional Alliance, which included the Kurdistan Social Democratic Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, presented 84 candidates but won only 12,929 votes and 1 seat.
A total of 31 women were elected to the Kurdistan Parliament.
Several hundred independent candidates ran in the election, but none received enough votes to be elected.
Of the 5 seats reserved for ethno-religious minorities, 2 Assyro-Chaldean, 2 Turkmen, and 1 Armenian candidate were elected.
On October 22, the People’s Front and the Kurdistan Regional Alliance held a joint press conference to contest the election results. The High Electoral Commission reviewed their grievances and found them baseless.
Discussions for forming a coalition government have already begun. A KDP-PUK coalition would command 62 seats, a sufficient majority that could potentially include other groups. These negotiations are expected to be lengthy and challenging, as seen in the 2018 coalition process.
The Islamic parties have already indicated that they will not join the future coalition government.
Constantly seeking both external and internal enemies to rally support from his conservative Islamic base, secular nationalists, and ultra-nationalist Turks, President Erdogan has recently been sounding alarms about a “redrawing of the Middle Eastern map” orchestrated by “Israel and its Western imperialist allies.” He aims to persuade his audience that after Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, Israel will target Turkey and threaten its unity. Following alarming reports in pro-government media, Erdogan convened a closed-door session of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (the formal name for the Turkish Parliament) at the opposition's request to inform members about these alleged threats and call for national unity in this “turbulent time” when the country’s survival is said to be at stake.
Israel stands accused of wielding the “Kurdish card” to divide the nation, just as Western powers sought to create independent Kurdistan and Armenia states in the eastern provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire after World War I through the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.
Awakening this “Sèvres Syndrome” is intended to unite Turkish nationalists against the perceived Kurdish secessionist threat while extending an olive branch to the Kurds themselves.
In this context, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Erdogan’s ally, made a surprising move in Parliament by shaking hands with several pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (DEM) lawmakers. Bahçeli, who had previously called for the DEM’s and its predecessor Hadep’s bans, justified this unexpected gesture by citing the need to ease political tensions during a period of regional instability that demands the unity of all citizens and their parties for “the supreme interests of the nation.”
This unexpected initiative sparked a lively public debate. Bahçeli even suggested releasing Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned founder and leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), held on Imrali Island since 1999, so that he could announce in Parliament the end of the armed conflict and the PKK’s dissolution. On October 23, the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), established by Atatürk, took the rhetoric further: “I’ll raise the stakes! I promise the Kurds a state!” Amid the ensuing uproar, he clarified that this “state” would be Turkey itself, proposing co-ownership between Turks and Kurds on equal civic footing.
This clever response ignored the historical fact that Mustafa Kemal made similar promises during the Turkish War of Independence, which were shelved after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. By 1924, the National Assembly, with its 75 Kurdish deputies, was dissolved, and the Kurdish language and culture were legally banned until 1992.
However, CHP leader Özgür Özel emphasized, “If Turkey’s 26 million Kurds believe there is a Kurdish issue, then there is a Kurdish issue that must be resolved peacefully through dialogue.” He continued, “Without full social consensus, this problem will not be solved. It must be discussed around a table with all political parties present… Without addressing the Kurds' constitutional grievances, this problem cannot be resolved.”
President Erdogan responded to Bahçeli’s trial balloon by stating that the People’s Alliance, which includes the AKP and MHP, had opened “a door to end terrorism in this country. We do not want this historic window of opportunity created by our alliance to be sacrificed for personal agendas.”
This “opportunity” remains vague, comprising mere statements of intent without detailing specific conditions or partners for a potential peace process. The armed conflict, ongoing for over 40 years with more than 50,000 fatalities, 3,400 villages destroyed, and 2-3 million Kurdish civilians displaced, continues without clear resolution.
Amidst this public debate, on October 23, an armed attack by a man and a woman left seven dead, including the attackers, and 22 injured—seven of whom were police officers—at the headquarters of Turkey’s aerospace defense industries near Ankara. The attack was immediately attributed to the PKK by Turkish authorities, who launched extensive retaliatory operations against PKK targets in Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as military, civilian, and economic infrastructures in Rojava, despite no evidence linking the Syrian Kurds to the incident. Any pretext appears sufficient for Turkey to weaken and destabilize Kurdish administration and spread chaos in Rojava, where, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Turkish bombings have claimed 27 Kurdish civilian lives (AFP, October 25).
On October 30, addressing the AKP parliamentary group, President Erdogan stated, “Dear Kurdish brothers, we await your sincere embrace of this extended hand. But we make a clear distinction between terrorist groups and our Kurdish citizens. This call does not and cannot apply to the terror barons spilling blood from Iraq and Syria. My dear Kurdish brothers, come and let’s build Turkey’s century together” (AFP, October 30).
In summary, beyond the rhetoric of “brotherhood” and vague inclusion promise, no real prospect of peace emerges. By claiming responsibility for the attack on the highly-secured defense industries headquarters—whose drones routinely target Kurds—the PKK signaled that it remains far from eradicated, despite Ankara’s assertions, and capable of executing attacks in Turkey, even in its capital. The PKK’s stance underscores that peace requires a negotiated settlement, not just declarations from Ocalan without a concrete plan.
In this context, Ocalan’s nephew, Omer Ocalan, an DEM deputy, was granted his first visit to the imprisoned leader in years. Following the visit, Omer Ocalan stated that his uncle was willing to participate in a peaceful resolution, but this message was lost amid the political turmoil.
Most Kurds remain skeptical of Turkish leaders’ professions of fraternity. They note that while Turkish Cypriots are honored and their puppet state in Northern Cyprus funded, the federally recognized Kurdistan Region in Iraq is merely called “the Kurdish administration of Northern Iraq” by Ankara, and the Western-allied Kurdish administration in Syria is labeled a terrorist entity and regularly bombed.
Inside Turkey, the space for free expression continues to shrink. One of the last independent radio stations, Açık Radyo (“Open Radio”), cherished by Istanbul’s artists and intellectuals, was banned on October 19 by the Turkish Radio and Television Council for an episode about “the Armenian genocide.” After 30 years, the “radio of all voices” fell silent (Le Monde, October 19).
Worsened by violence and economic struggles, Turkish society is increasingly volatile, with widespread trafficking of various kinds. Women, as always, bear the greatest risk.
According to French Public Radio RFI’s October 11 report, 295 femicides have been recorded so far this year. The healthcare system is shaken by the “newborn trafficking ring” scandal, involving some 20 hospitals and about 40 medical staff accused of exploiting newborns to extort funds from Turkey’s social security system and families (Le Monde, October 22).
Meanwhile, human rights NGOs sound the alarm over the treatment of refugees, criticizing Turkey as an “EU-funded deportation machine” (Le Monde, October 11). Paralyzed by the threat of a new refugee influx, the European Union maintains a deafening silence on the Turkey’s authoritarian regime’s abuses.
Iran's strategy of encircling and weakening Israel through a vast network of pro-Iranian Arab militias, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, has reached its limits. This strategy now appears to be backfiring, compelling Tehran to potentially engage directly with Israel to defend and avenge its allies, who have been battered in recent months by Israel's all-out military operations. Iran’s credibility among its regional allies is at stake.
Following the assassination on July 3 in Tehran of Hamas leader Ismail Hamiyeh, who was invited to attend the inauguration of new Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian, and the subsequent killing of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian General Abbas Nilforoushan, the Supreme Leader of Iran had promised severe retaliation. After extensive deliberations between the civilian wing of the government, which was keen to avoid a potentially devastating military escalation, and the military leaders of the Revolutionary Guards determined to support their regional allies to salvage Iran’s eroded credibility, a decision was made for a proportionate response. On October 1, nearly 200 ballistic missiles were launched at Israel. According to experts cited by Le Monde on October 1, nearly one-third of these missiles failed to reach their target, and most of the others were intercepted and destroyed by Israeli anti-air defense systems (Iron Dome, David's Sling, Arrow), bolstered by American assets from destroyers patrolling the region. French forces stationed in the Middle East also contributed to Israel's defense. The intended targets were military installations, including the Mossad headquarters in northern Tel Aviv. The reported damage was minimal, as the few missiles that were not intercepted landed in uninhabited areas. However, Iranian media claimed “considerable damage,” describing the attack as a “serious blow to the Zionist regime,” according to Tehran.
Reuters reported that Iran had informed Russia of this attack, which the Americans had also announced hours in advance. Responding to this more sophisticated strike compared to the drone attack in April, which took hours to reach Israel’s borders, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated: “Iran has made a grave mistake. And it will pay for it. The regime in Tehran does not understand our determination to defend ourselves and impose severe consequences on our enemies.”
Following this “measured” Iranian response, the UN Secretary-General, France, China, and most other nations called for Israeli “restraint” to prevent escalation. On October 1, the United States and the European Union imposed a new series of limited sanctions on Iran, while Tehran intensified diplomatic visits to Gulf countries seeking support (see Le Monde, October 14 and 15). On the same day, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, called for sanctions against Israel, declaring, “Israel must be boycotted” for its offensive in Gaza and attacks on Lebanon. However, parts of the Turkish opposition and press accused the Turkish government of turning a blind eye to continued trade through indirect routes. The conservative newspaper Karar noted a significant rise in Turkish exports to Palestinian territories, suspecting they were actually destined for Israel. For example, it cited Turkish steel exports to Palestinian territories exceeding $20 million in the first eight months of the year, compared to only $17,000 during the same period last year. “Those who raise these accusations are systematically arrested by Turkish police,” noted RFI journalist Anne Andlauer (RFI, October 15).
Despite threatening Iran with massive, devastating retaliation, the Israeli government ultimately carried out a limited but precise response against certain Iranian military sites. On October 26, Israel publicly announced that it had bombed Iranian missile manufacturing facilities as well as air defense systems of some strategic military and economic targets such as oil refineries. Initially, Iran reported “limited damage” and four military personnel killed. However, acknowledging the significant impact, particularly on missile fuel production facilities, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that the damage should neither be “minimized nor exaggerated,” effectively admitting it was far from minor.
Observers suggest that under relentless pressure from the Biden administration, Israel refrained from targeting Iranian nuclear and oil facilities to avoid sparking a widespread conflict just days before the U.S. elections.
In response, Tehran has threatened “massive and crushing” retaliation for Israel's strikes. This cycle of attacks and reprisals risks escalating into a full-scale regional war with dire consequences for the entire region, particularly for Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan, which may once again become frontlines of conflict as they were during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Before targeting “the head of the octopus,” Israel appears to be systematically dismantling its tentacles, namely the region’s pro-Iranian militias.
As this potential conflagration looms, the Iranian regime continues to suppress any dissenting voice or form of civil, environmental, or feminist opposition, disregarding potential international reactions. On October 26, it executed Jamshid Sharmahi, a 59-year-old German-Iranian dissident abducted in Dubai in 2020 and sentenced to death in 2023 by a Tehran court for his alleged involvement in a 2008 mosque bombing in Shiraz. Berlin had called this sentence “absolutely unacceptable” and expelled two Iranian diplomats. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock had repeatedly warned that “the execution of a German national would have serious consequences” (AFP, October 28). On October 30, Germany decided to close the Iranian consulates in Frankfurt, Munich, and Hamburg. Diplomatic tension between the two countries remains high.
Ordinary repression in Iran continued throughout the month. The regime sentenced Kurdish activist Idris Karsaz to three years in prison for membership in a banned Kurdish party, and Ayhan Alikani, another Kurd, to six years for “membership in opposition groups.” Meanwhile, Siamand Hasanpour, a 37-year-old Kurdish porter (kolbar) from Sardasht, died after falling off a cliff while trying to evade Iranian border guards in the Qandil region. Iranian guards also repeatedly shot a kolbar named Shahwan Moshhouri as he crossed the border into Baneh. Moshhouri was transported to Tabriz hospital for treatment. Finally, Iranian police shot and killed a 22-year-old Kurd named Mehrshad Almasi in Kermanshah. Several witnesses reported that Almasi was shot twice after resisting police attempts to confiscate his motorcycle.
Two Kurdish activists from Iraqi Kurdistan, Aram Bahaddin and Rasul Reza Sharif, were sentenced by Iranian authorities to a combined 22.5 years in prison. Arrested during the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests, they spent three months in solitary confinement without legal representation. Initially sentenced to 15 years each, their sentences were reduced to 11.25 years each. They remain imprisoned in Sanandaj and Baneh. Meanwhile, Solmaz Hassanzadeh, whose brother was killed during protests, was sentenced to one year in prison for “propaganda against the Islamic Republic.” Arrested on her brother’s anniversary, she staged an eight-day hunger strike during her detention. Additionally, Adel Pirouzi, a 29-year-old former political prisoner from Marivan, was sentenced to one year for alleged ties to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. Separately, Kurdish political prisoner Nayeb Askari from Urmia had his death sentence commuted to 15 years in prison and a fine. Arrested in 2021 after returning to Iran, he was initially convicted for his past affiliation with the Kurdish PJAK party. Despite solitary confinement and harsh treatment, he remains imprisoned in Urmia Central Prison, where his health is deteriorating. Meanwhile, several arrests of Kurdish activists occurred, including Keyvan Mohammadi, a 38-year-old arrested near Senna by Iranian intelligence on October 1, 2024, just before his brother’s execution anniversary, raising concerns for his safety. Two other Kurds, Akam Amini and Milad Naseri, were detained by Iranian intelligence in Bokan on October 23, 2024. These arrests, conducted without warrants and involving violence, have left their families uninformed of their status and reasons for detention. Finally, Ebrahim Ahmadnejad, a Kurdish kolbar from Mahabad, was fatally shot by Iranian border guards on October 25, 2024, in Sardasht.
Under the pretext of an attack on the Turkish aerospace industries headquarters near Ankara on October 23, which resulted in 7 deaths, including the two attackers, Turkey launched several waves of “retaliatory” strikes against PKK targets in Iraqi Kurdistan and civilian sites and infrastructure in Rojava.
According to a statement dated October 24 from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), cited by AFP, “In addition to populated areas, Turkish warplanes and drones targeted bakeries, power plants, oil facilities, and Kurdish internal security checkpoints.” The SDF noted that Turkey deployed 129 drones and 15 warplanes and fired 1,024 shells, amounting to a total of 1,168 attacks. By October 23, these attacks had resulted in 14 civilian deaths and 4 military casualties, with 68 civilians injured.
An assessment by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights indicated that “twenty-seven civilians were killed in 45 air and drone strikes in northern and eastern Syria” (AFP, October 25).
The SDF’s general commander, Mazloum Abdi, challenged Ankara to provide any evidence linking the perpetrators of the attack attributed to the PKK to the Kurdish forces in Syria. The Turkish government, which imposed a complete media blackout on the incident to prevent independent investigations and coverage deviating from the official narrative, has not provided any proof of its accusations. It considers the Syrian Kurdish forces as an extension of the “terrorist organization PKK” and therefore “a legitimate target” for Turkish military action, even though these forces are allied with the International Coalition against ISIS. The United States, which trains and arms these forces, has remained silent in response to the Turkish attacks. This tense stalemate has persisted since 2019.
Throughout October, bloody clashes erupted among various pro-Turkish militias in the Turkish-occupied Kurdish canton of Afrin. Amid an economic crisis, Turkey has irregularly paid its Arab Syrian proxies, encouraging them to levy “taxes” in the regions they control. Owners of olive groves who remain on their land are taxed 20% of their production, while the harvests of those forced to leave are outright confiscated, even if they have local relatives or tenant farmers. Disputes over these “spoils” have led to violent conflicts among different Islamist militias under Turkish command.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that 12 people were killed in clashes in the Aleppo province between Turkish-backed factions. The fighting, allegedly ordered by Turkish intelligence services, involved “joint forces” composed of several Turkmen militias and the ‘Liwaa Soqour Al-Shamal’ faction. The dead included four members of the joint forces, six from Liwaa Soqour Al-Shamal, and two civilians, including a woman.
Meanwhile, the fight against ISIS continues unabated. On October 12, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that U.S. forces had conducted airstrikes on multiple ISIS camps in Syria. CENTCOM stated that the strikes were intended to weaken ISIS’s ability to plan and execute attacks against the U.S., its allies, and local civilians. Initial assessments indicated no civilian casualties, but the U.S. expects these strikes to significantly degrade ISIS’s operational capabilities. Concurrently, the SDF, supported by the International Coalition, conducted a security operation in Raqqa targeting an ISIS cell that was planning attacks on SDF positions and was responsible for supplying weapons to cells targeting SDF personnel and civilians. The SDF seized weapons, ammunition, and personal documents during the raid. Earlier in the month, on October 2 and 3, the SDF conducted two raids on ISIS cells in Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa. The first raid captured a terrorist responsible for recruitment and indoctrination, while the second captured two ISIS members, Manhal and Madin Ibrahim al Hamoud, who supplied arms and explosives.
On October 29, SDF military teams conducted an operation in the al-Hol camp, detaining two Iraqi nationals identified as Khaled Mahmoud Ali and Abdullah Jamal Khalaf. Both individuals had previously joined ISIS in Iraq before infiltrating Syria. According to the SDF, the detainees were involved in multiple terrorist activities targeting SDF forces, civilians, and autonomous institutions.
In addition, among the hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians fleeing the war from Lebanon, some have sought refuge in Rojava. The Crisis Cell for Returnees in Lebanon, established by the Kurdish-led Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), announced that 19,754 individuals have entered the region from Lebanon. A recent DAANES report noted that this total includes 7,200 men, 6,109 women, and 6,350 children, with 76 being of Lebanese nationality. The report added that many returnees are heading to their homes or staying with relatives, while those without housing are being accommodated in centers set up by the administration.
It is also noteworthy that on October 10, Iraq repatriated 706 of its citizens from the al-Hol camp in Rojava, which houses family members of ISIS jihadists (AFP, October 10). Over 43,000 people still live in the overcrowded camp under Kurdish administration, including displaced Syrians, Iraqi refugees, and thousands of foreigners from at least 45 countries, many of whom are relatives of ISIS fighters.
Our dear colleague and friend, Joyce Blau, passed away on the evening of Thursday, October 24, at her home in Paris.
Having been hospitalized since early September, she chose to spend her final days at home, surrounded by her loved ones. She passed away peacefully at the age of 92.
The doyenne of Kurdish studies in Europe, professor emeritus of Kurdish language and civilization at INALCO, Joyce was also for several decades a pillar of the Kurdish Institute, serving as its treasurer and director of programs. Through her academic work, numerous publications on the Kurds, and tireless advocacy for the Kurdish cause, she became a well-known and respected figure throughout Kurdistan and among the Kurdish diaspora.
Born on March 18, 1932, in Cairo, Egypt, into a Francophone Jewish family of Polish descent, she completed her primary and secondary education at French and British schools in Cairo. She became involved at an early age in the anti-colonialist movement led by Henri Curiel, founder of the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (MELN). Following Curiel’s expulsion from Egypt in 1951, his close associates faced persecution. Joyce spent a year in prison and was subsequently expelled from Egypt to France in 1955. Other members of their movement, such as engineer Robert Grunspan—who would later become her partner—were sent to labor camps in the desert to serve prison sentences of 6 to 8 years.
Upon arriving in France, Joyce was welcomed by her mentor, Henri Curiel, who was then living clandestinely. At his advice, after a period of adjustment, she enrolled at the École des Langues Orientales (Langues O’) to study Arabic and Persian, followed by Kurdish. During this time, she also had to work to support herself. Fluent in both French and English, she had little difficulty finding odd jobs. For a while, she even worked as a secretary for François Mauriac, from whom she retained fond memories.
While advocating for the release of political prisoners held by Nasser’s regime, Joyce joined Curiel in Francis Jeanson’s network to support the FLN’s struggle for Algerian independence. In 1960, Henri Curiel succeeded Jeanson as head of this support network but was arrested in October and remained in prison until March 1962. Joyce had to go into exile in Germany and then Belgium, where she stayed until 1966. At the Free University of Brussels, she completed her master’s thesis on the Kurds. Her thesis, “The Kurdish Problem: A Sociological and Historical Essay,” an 80-page work, was published by the Center for the Study of Contemporary Muslim World Problems. Upon its release, it was banned from entry and distribution in Turkey by a ministerial decree signed by then-President General Cemal Gürsel, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, and about fifteen ministers.
She regarded this decree as a great honor—an entire government mobilizing against the humble master’s thesis of a young student.
Back in France, she prepared a doctoral thesis on the Kurdish dialect of Amadiya and Mount Sindjar, supervised by Professor Gilbert Lazard and published in 1975 by Klincksieck. In 1970, following the retirement of her professor Kamran Ali Bedir Khan, she took over his position at Langues O’, later known as INALCO.
She transformed this position into a chair for Kurdish language and civilization, facilitating exchanges with Soviet Kurdologists and the Kurdish Academy of Baghdad.
Alongside her academic career, she continued her activism in a new group called Solidarité, led by Curiel, which supported anti-colonialist movements in Africa and the Middle East, including the South African ANC.
This group played a pioneering role in establishing the first Israeli-Palestinian dialogue aimed at a political resolution of the Palestinian issue. The initial meeting took place in Brussels between Israeli General Peled and Palestinian leader Dr. Issam Sartawi. The following meeting was held in Paris, and the day after, on May 4, 1978, Henri Curiel was assassinated outside his home, a tragedy that deeply marked Joyce for the rest of her life.
Since then, Joyce Blau dedicated most of her time to her work on the Kurds and her activities for the Kurdish cause.
Involved in the creation of the Kurdish Institute in 1983, she became a full-time and voluntary member of its team upon her retirement, handling various tasks such as administrative management, secretariat work, student scholarship monitoring, and liaising with Western researchers working on Kurdish topics.
Despite her fragile health in 2023, she insisted on coming to the Institute every day “to be useful” and “to resolve small problems.” Her ability to empathize with people of all ages and backgrounds, her unwavering optimism, kindness, humility, and dedication made her loved and admired by everyone.
Her passing is a great loss for the Kurdish Institute and the Kurdish cause.
She leaves behind an extensive body of pioneering work on the Kurds (see bibliography below) and many fond memories. May she rest in peace.
Her funeral will take place on Wednesday, November 6, 2024, at 10:30 a.m. at the Père Lachaise Crematorium, Salle La Coupole. Following the funeral, a condolence gathering will be held at the Kurdish Institute from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.
Publications |
|
Date |
Titles |
1963 |
Le problème kurde, essai sociologique et historique, publication du Centre pour l’Étude des Problèmes du Monde Musulman Contemporain, Bruxelles, 80 p. + une carte. |
1964 |
« Les relations intercommunautaires en Irak », in : Études, Correspondance d’Orient, n>o> 5-6, publié par le Centre pour l’Étude des Problèmes du Monde Musulman Contemporain, Bruxelles, p. 87-102 |
1965 |
« Trois textes de folklore kurde », in : Études, Correspondance d’Orient, publié par le Centre pour l’Étude des Problèmes du Monde Musulman Contemporain, Bruxelles, p. 29-50. |
1965 |
Dictionnaire kurde/Kurdish Dictionary, Centre pour l’Étude des Problèmes du Monde Musulman Contemporain, Bruxelles |
1966 |
« L’Irak », in : Les Minorités et les dissidences dans les pays musulmans, Acta Orientalia Belgica, Bruxelles, p. 237-240 |
1968 |
Kurdish Kurmandji Modern Texts, Introduction, Selection and Glossary, Iranische Texte, dir. par Georges Redard, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 58 p. |
1975 |
Le Kurde de ‘Amadiya et de Djabal Sindjar, analyse linguistique, textes folkloriques, glossaires, Travaux de l’Institut d’Études iraniennes de l’Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, Klincksieck, 252 p. |
1975 |
Ferheng kurdî û Tirkî, publ. Sivan, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, 109 p. |
1977 |
Traduction du russe de l’ouvrage d’I.O. Oranskij, Les langues iraniennes, préface de Gilbert Lazard, Institut d’Études iraniennes de l’Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, C. Klincksieck, Paris 239 p. + 1 carte |
1980 |
Manuel de kurde, dialecte sorani, C. Klincksieck, 287 p. |
1980 |
« Djassem Djelil », in : Dictionnaire des Auteurs de tous les temps et de tous les pays, Laffont–Bompiani, coll. « Bouquins » 2>e> éd., p. 545 |
1982 |
« Les Kurdes », in : Frontières, problèmes de frontières dans le Tiers-monde, L’Harmattan, Université Paris VII, p. 128-135 |
1983 |
« Les études de linguistique et de lexicographies kurdes : historique et développements actuels », in : Verbum, Revue de linguistique publiée par l’Université de Nancy II, Tome VI, fasc,1/2, p. 2-18. |
1984 |
« Le Mouvement national kurde », in : Les Temps Modernes, n>o> 456-457, Turquie du réformisme autoritaire au libéralisme musclé, p. 447-461 |
1984 |
« Problems in the unification of the Kurdish Language », in : New Pesh Merga, n>o> 18, Nacka (Suède), p. 14-19 |
1984 |
Mémoire du Kurdistan, recueil de la tradition littéraire orale et écrite, préface Maxime Rodinson, éditions Findakly Paris, 221 p. |
1984 |
« Une nouvelle de Hassan Mela Ali Qizilji, Le thé du diwakhane », in : Le Monde Diplomatique, mois de juin |
1985 |
Articles : « Chamilov » (Ereb Semo), Djagarkhwîn (Cegerxwîn), Goran (Abdullah Sulayman), Hawar (l’Appel), Khani (Ahmadê Khanî), Koyî (Hadjî Qadir Koyî), Kurde (Littérature kurde), in : Dictionnaire historique, thématique et technique des LITTERATURES, Larousse, Paris. |
1985 |
« Les Juifs au Kurdistan », in : Mélanges linguistiques offerts à Maxime Rodinson par ses élèves, ses collègues et amis, éd. Christian Robin, Geuthner, Paris p. 123-132 |
1985 |
« Mirîna Hesen Qizilcî (Le décès de Hasan Qizilcî) », in Hêvî, n>o> 4, Institut kurde de Paris, p. 7-10 |
1986 |
Contes kurdes, Conseil International de la Langue française, coll. Fleuve et Flamme, Paris 1986, 167 p. |
1986 |
« Bîranîna Thomas Bois (En mémoire de Thomas Bois) », in : Hêvî, N>o> 4, Institut kurde de Paris, p. 11-13 |
1986 |
« Mirina zanayê mezin Qanatê Kurdo (Décès du grand savant Kanatê Kurdoev) », p. 7 – 15 et « Hêmin jî mir (Hêmin est également décédé)» p. 19-24, in : Hêvî, kovara çandiya gistî, n>o> 5, Institut kurde de Paris |
1986 |
« Qanate Kurdoev, 1908-1985 », in : Studia Iranica, Tome 15 – fasc. 2, publ. de l’Association pour l’avancement des Études Iraniennes, CNRS, Paris, p. 249-256 |
1987 |
« Mes jours, de Goran », « La Douleur du peuple (Janî Gel), d’Ibrahim Ahmed », « Plaie noire (Birîna Res/Kara yara) » de Musa Anter », in : Dictionnaire des Œuvres de tous les temps et de tous les pays, Littérature, philosophie, musique, coll. Bouquins, 5>e> éd. Paris |
1988 |
« Gulchine, un conte kurde », in : Bulletin de l’Association des anciens élèves de l’Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, p. 57-61 |
1988 |
« Bibliographie des ouvrages de kurdologie depuis la fondation de l’Institut kurde de Paris : 1983-1985 », in : Studia Kurdica. |
1989 |
« Kurde », « Gurânî », « Zâzâ », in : Compendium Linguarum Iranicarum, ouvrage collectif dirigé dir. Rüdiger Schmitt, Wiesbaden, p. 326-340. |
1989 |
>« Le kurde lori », in : Études irano-aryennes offertes à Gilbert Lazard, Studia Iranica, Cahier 7, p. 37-58
|
1990 |
« Le rôle des cheikhs naqshbandi dans le mouvement national kurde », in : Naqshbandis, cheminements et situation actuelle d’un ordre mystique musulman, éd. par Marc Gaborieau, Alexandre Popovic et Thierry Zarcone, Editions Isis, Istanbul-Paris, p. 371-377 |
1990 |
« La réforme du kurde », in : La réforme des langues, dir. Claude Hagège et I. Fodor, Cologne |
1990 |
Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan, Bibliographie critique 1977 – 1986, Institut Français de recherche en Iran, Téhéran-Paris, 146 p. |
1990 |
Préface à l’ouvrage I Curdi nella Storia, Mirella Galletti, ed. Vecchio Faggio, Rome. |
1991 |
« La langue et la littérature kurdes », in : Conférence internationale de Paris 14-15 octobre 1989, Les Kurdes : Droits de l’homme et identité culturelle, Institut kurde de Paris, p. 44-50 |
1991 |
Kürtçe/Türkçe, Kürtçe/Fransizca, Kürtçe/Ingilizce Sözlük, Dictionnaire kurde/turc/français/anglais, Sosyal Yayinlar, Istanbul, 342 p. |
1991 |
« The Poetry of Kurdistan, Language embodies Kurdish National Unity », in : The Word and I, a Publication of the Washington Times Corporation, Vol. 6, N>o> 8, Washington, p. 623-637. |
1992 |
« Les Kurdes », in : Historiens et Géographes, n>o> 336, mai-juin, Le Moyen-Orient au XX>e> siècle, Paris, p. 305-320. |
1992 |
« Die Wissenschaft von der kurdischen Sprache », in : Kurden, Azadi Freihheit in de Bergen, Alfred Janata, Karin Kren und Maria Anna Six, Schallaburg, November 1992, Katalog des NÖ Landesmuseums, Neue Folge Nr 294, Wien, p. 180-191 |
1992 |
« Kurdische Literatur », idem, p. 192-205 |
1993 |
« Le cagani : lori ou kurde ?», in : Studia Iranica, Tome 22, fasc. 1, publ. Association pour l’Avancement des études iraniennes, Paris, p. 93-119. |
1994 |
« Goran », « Littérature en gorânî », « Folklore et littérature kurdes », « Mem o Zîn », in : Dictionnaire universel des Littératures, Presses universitaires de France, pub. sous la direction de Béatrice Didier |
1994 |
Kürtler ve Kurdistan, elistirel bir bibliyografya 1977 – 1990, Mezopotamya, Suède, 165 p. |
1994 |
« Deldar Yunes », in : Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. VII, fasc. 3, Mazda, California, p. 238 |
1994 |
« La littérature kurde », in : Les Kurdes et les États, Peuples Méditerranéens, n>o> 68-69, p. 77-94 |
1995 |
« La littérature kurde », in : Les Kurdes et les États, Peuples Méditerranéens, n>o> 68-69, juillet-décembre, p. 77-93. |
1995 |
« Kurdologie als Spiegel der Politischen Situation », in : Kurdologie, Bibliotek Feqiyê Teyran, Berlin, p. 43-56 |
1995 |
« Jiyan û berhemên Ehmedê Xanî (1650-1707) », in : Çira, kovara komeleya nivîskarên kurd le Swêdê, sal 1, hejmar 3, |
1995 |
« Vie et œuvre de Thomas Bois, 1900-1975 », in : Journal of Kurdish Studies, Vol. 1, Peeters Press, Louvain, p. 85-96. |
1996 |
« Kurdish written literature », in : Kurdish Culture and Identity, ed. Philip Kreyenbroek & Christine Allison, Zed Books, Middle Eastern Studies p. 20-28 |
1999 |
Manuel de kurde kurmanji, en collaboration avec Veysi Barak, L’Harmattan, 225 p. |
1999 |
« Les relations entre les juifs et les musulmans au Kurdistan », in : L’Islam des Kurdes, Les Annales de l’Autre Islam, n>o> 5, INALCO, Paris, p. 199-224. |
2000 |
Méthode de kurde sorani, L’Harmattan, 323 p. |
2000 |
« Le développement de la littérature kurde dans la cité », in : The Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. III, 1998-2000, Louvain, Peeters Press, p. 85-91. |
2005 |
« La littérature kurde », in : Passerelles, Kurdistan, Revue d’Études interculturelles, Thionville, p. 287-296. |
2010 |
« Written Kurdish Literature », in : Oral Literature of Iranian Languages, ed. par Philip G. Kreyenbroek & Ulrich Marzolph, A History of Persian Literature XVIII, I.B. Tauris, p. 1-31. |
2012 |
« La littérature kurde », in : Études kurdes, La Littérature kurde, L’Harmattan, p. 5-36 |