SYRIA: A « PEACE AGREEMENT » BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND THE KURDISH AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION

The new regime is seeking to expand its authority by reducing pockets of dissent and establishing a “peace agreement” with the main political-military force outside its control: the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).

On March 6, a group of supporters of the former deposed president launched an attack on pro-government militias in Jableh, near Latakia—the heartland of the Alawite minority. The new government dispatched reinforcements, including allied Islamist militias composed of former Daesh jihadists, now repurposed but still fiercely hostile to “Alawite heretics.” Clashes with pro-Assad supporters reportedly left at least 481 dead on both sides, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). The Islamist militias then unleashed brutal violence on the Alawite civilian population, massacring women and children with cruelty reminiscent of Daesh. According to the SOHR, “the total number of civilians slaughtered stands at 973, including women and children.” The UN referred to “murders, summary executions, and ethnic cleansing operations” carried out “by security forces and allied groups” (Le Monde, March 10).

In response to the massacre, interim president Ahmad Al-Charaa announced on March 10 the formation of an independent investigative commission on “crimes against civilians,” tasked with identifying those responsible and bringing them to justice. “We will hold everyone accountable (...) with no leniency for anyone involved in the shedding of civilian blood,” he said in a video released by the official news agency SANA. However, such promises may prove hollow in Syria’s current state of chaotic security.

During a sermon on March 9, the Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, John X, stated that the “massacres also killed many innocent Christians.” “Most of the victims were innocent civilians, including women and children,” he affirmed.

For its part, the Kurdish Autonomous Administration in Syria condemned the “practices that take us back to a dark era the Syrian people do not wish to relive.” Likely to avoid further clashes, the Kurds signed a “peace agreement” with the new authorities on March 10, providing for the gradual integration of their administration, and its civil and military institutions, into the structures of the Syrian state. This agreement was signed by interim President Al-Charaa and the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), General Mazloum Abdi, who traveled to Damascus aboard a US Air Force helicopter, with American encouragement and mediation.

The agreement was welcomed by the international community, including the United States, which stated it “reaffirms its support for a political transition that ensures credible and non-sectarian governance as the best path to prevent further conflict.”

 

 

The agreement has been welcomed by the Kurdish population, who hope that Western allies will ensure its enforcement and become more actively involved in preventing Turkish incursions. In a phone call with Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani on March 11, General Mazloum Abdi emphasized the importance of Kurdish unity during this critical period. Barzani reiterated “his support for any step that promotes peace and stability in Syria and the recognition of the Kurdish people’s legitimate rights.” Meanwhile, Turkish President Erdogan, during a Ramadan iftar on March 11, stated: “The full implementation of the agreement concluded yesterday will serve the security and peace of Syria. All our Syrian brothers will benefit” (AFP, March 11). Despite this declaration of goodwill, Turkish-backed Syrian militias continued their attacks around the Tishrin Dam.

A Turkish drone strike targeted civilian homes in the village of Jarraf, south of Kobani, killing a 13-year-old child and injuring two others. Near the Tishrin Dam, Turkish fighter jets bombed the village of Khirbet al-Zamala, while heavy artillery targeted nearby villages. Meanwhile, Turkish-backed forces attempted an assault using suicide drones, four of which were intercepted by defense units.

On March 17, a Turkish drone struck an area between the villages of Qomji and Barkh Botan, south of Kobani, killing nine civilians from the same family—including several children—and injuring two others. The victims were working on their farmland when the attack occurred (Le Figaro, March 18).

According to the SDF, Turkey continues to escalate its military activity in northern and eastern Syria, despite ongoing international efforts to negotiate a nationwide ceasefire. In addition to launching repeated attacks, Turkey is secretly expanding its military presence by building new bases under the cover of night, particularly in areas south and east of Manbij and around Kobani. Key sites include Qara Qwzaq hill, the western bank of the Euphrates, and the village of Hassan Agha.

On March 17, the European Union held its ninth international conference on supporting Syria in Brussels. In addition to Europeans states, several Arab countries participated. The EU will release around €2.5 billion in humanitarian aid and assistance to restore essential services. In total, the international community hopes to mobilize close to €6 billion. The United States, which does not recognize Syria’s new regime, will not participate in this solidarity effort. European donors will condition their aid on progress in the political process, especially its inclusivity, respect for minority rights, and the status of women.

In an interview with Kurdish outlet Rudaw, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock reaffirmed Germany’s strong stance in support of Kurdish rights, particularly in the context of Syria’s future. She praised the Kurds’ role in defeating Daesh and emphasized that their identity, language, and security must be recognized in any future Syrian constitution. Ms. Baerbock also underscored the importance of Kurdish unity in political decision-making. At the same time, she made clear that Germany would not fund Islamist groups in Syria and that continued German support for reconstruction and aid depends on an inclusive and democratic political process. She warned Syria’s new interim leaders that words are not enough and that Germany will only support real actions promoting stability, rights, and inclusion.

European Aid and Refugee Return

European aid also aims to support the return of Syrian refugees. According to figures from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1.2 million Syrians have returned to their region of origin since last December, including 885,000 internally displaced persons and 302,000 refugees. The UNHCR expects up to 3.5 million refugees and IDPs to return home this year, which “highlights the urgent need for investment in recovery and reintegration support,” said Adam Abdelmoula, the UN’s resident and humanitarian coordinator for Syria (Euronews, March 24).

Speaking at the Brussels Conference on Syria on March 17, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi emphasized the need for comprehensive and sustainable reforms that ensure the rights of all Syrian citizens. “How can we ensure that when people return to their communities, they have the basics: shelter, electricity, water, sanitation, education, jobs—in short, how do we ensure their safety and the protection of their rights? Because without security, there are no opportunities,” he added.

Ensuring safety and stability requires, above all, a stable legal framework—a constitution and laws that guarantee equal rights and public freedoms, and a legitimate government elected through free elections. This is a colossal challenge in a country fragmented and in ruins. Yet, the new Syrian regime does not appear to be taking the time needed to consult political forces and civil society representatives to build consensus and define a realistic electoral timetable.

Constitutional Declaration

On March 13, interim President Al-Charaa signed a “constitutional declaration” serving as a provisional constitution. It grants the interim president full powers, including executive authority and the power to declare a state of emergency. He will appoint one-third of the members of the interim parliament, with the remaining two-thirds proposed by electoral commissions supervised by a committee appointed by the president.

In short, the interim president and his loyalists will hold both executive and legislative power. The judiciary will be “independent” under a constitutional court whose members are appointed solely by the interim president, without the approval of any other institution. According to this temporary “constitution,” the Syrian president must be Muslim, and Islamic law (Sharia and Sunni jurisprudence) will be the primary source of legislation, while “guaranteeing freedom of belief.”

However, all rights—including freedom of worship—may be restricted if deemed a threat to national security or public order. The country’s name remains the “Syrian Arab Republic”—an autocratic Islamic republic that discriminates against its non-Muslim and non-Arab citizens. This “interim” regime is expected to last at least five years, to allow time to draft a new constitution and organize elections (New York Times, March 14).

This temporary “constitution,” paired with an election timetable reminiscent of a military junta, has disappointed many Syrians and angered other political forces. In a statement, the Kurdish Autonomous Administration rejected the “constitutional declaration,” saying it merely “reproduces authoritarianism in a new form” and undermines checks and balances. It stated that it would not comply with the provisions of a “constitution” proclaimed without consultation or popular consent.

Ignoring these criticisms and backed by its Turkish sponsor, the interim Syrian president announced on March 29 the formation of a new government—without a prime minister—where his loyalists occupy key posts, but which is presented as “inclusive” and includes a Christian woman. The 23 ministers were sworn in before Al-Charaa during a televised ceremony. In addition to Ms. Hind Khabawat, a Christian named Minister of Social Affairs and Labor, the cabinet includes a Druze, a Kurd, and an Alawite—all of whom represent no political force.

On March 30, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) firmly rejected the new government formed in Damascus, stating that it does not reflect Syria’s diversity and continues the same exclusionary and centralized policies as the previous regime. In a statement, the Syrian Kurds stressed that any government lacking fair and meaningful representation of all Syria’s ethnic, religious, and political components would only worsen the crisis rather than solve it. They stated that they would neither recognize nor implement decisions made by a government that marginalizes communities like theirs. Reaffirming their commitment to a democratic and decentralized Syria, the AANES called for an inclusive political process that respects citizenship, equal participation, and the end of single-faction rule.

Responding to these criticisms, the interim president told Syrian television: “We cannot please everyone. Every decision we make won’t be met with consensus—and that’s normal—but we must seek consensus as much as possible” (AFP, March 31).

In this context, the chances that the Syrian-Kurdish peace agreement will be respected appear slim at best.

TURKEY: THE ARREST OF ISTANBUL'S MAYOR SPARKS TENSIONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY

Weakened by the strain of long-term power and an escalating economic and social crisis, the Turkish president is clinging on and preparing to seek a third term. To do so, he plans to amend the Constitution, which currently limits presidents to two terms, and eliminate all those who might hinder his increasingly autocratic and repressive grip on power.

After having removed 11 democratically elected Kurdish mayors within a year under accusations of "links with a terrorist organization," he has now targeted his main political rival, the popular mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, who was nominated by his party in February 2023 as the candidate for the next presidential election. The Turkish president, who controls the judiciary and uses it freely against opponents, has launched the political elimination process of Imamoglu. Facing five legal cases based on flimsy charges like "undermining judicial independence" or "insulting the High Electoral Council" (which he had criticized for bias), Imamoglu has now had his university degree—earned 30 years ago—invalidated by Istanbul University’s board of directors.

This absurd decision, if upheld on appeal, would bar him from running for president, as the Turkish Constitution requires presidential candidates to hold a university degree. Imamoglu earned his undergraduate degree in administrative management from a private university in Northern Cyprus (under Turkish occupation), before being admitted via diploma equivalency to Istanbul University, where he completed his studies. The university board has now, three decades later, declared this equivalency "irregular."

This administrative scandal echoes earlier disputes over President Erdogan’s own university diploma, which some claim is a forgery. During the 2014 presidential elections, a man named Ömer Basoglu told the press he graduated in 1981 from the same faculty at Marmara University in Istanbul as Erdogan, yet said he never encountered him there. In a five-minute video, he accused Erdogan of being a fraud (Le Monde, March 19, 2021). This troublesome witness died seven months later under unexplained circumstances.

The day after the attempt to invalidate his diploma, on March 19, Ekrem Imamoglu’s home was surrounded by about twenty police vehicles. He live-streamed the heavy-handed police operation on social media and accused the authorities of using the police for political ends. Detained at 7:30 a.m., he was taken for questioning at the police headquarters. Several of his colleagues were also arrested, including press advisor Murat Ongün, Sisli district mayor Resul Emrah Sahan, and deputy secretary-general of the municipality Mahir Polat.

In its first statement, the general prosecutor’s office, in the context of a corruption investigation, accused Imamoglu of being "at the head of a profit-driven criminal organization," of aggravated fraud and bid rigging. Then in a second statement, the prosecutor alleged that "Mr. Imamoglu, along with other suspects, committed the crime of aiding the PKK-KCK terrorist organization." This accusation allows authorities to replace an elected mayor with an appointed administrator. Fearing public backlash, the government, through the Istanbul prefect, banned all public demonstrations for four days, shut down several metro stations in central Istanbul, blocked roads leading to city hall, and restricted access to social media.

Reactions to this authoritarian move—unthinkable in any proper democracy—were swift, both in Turkey and abroad. The leader of the CHP (Republican People's Party), who was traveling at the time, immediately returned to Istanbul and denounced what he called a "coup d’état," just three days before a party primary to nominate Imamoglu as their presidential candidate. At CHP’s call, the founding party of the Turkish Republic and main opposition force, large crowds gathered in Istanbul outside city hall and in about fifty major cities across the country. On March 21, Kurdish New Year, more than one million Kurds celebrated Newroz in Istanbul’s Kumkapi district, and another million demonstrators in a separate district protested Imamoglu’s arrest and Erdogan’s authoritarian drift. These were the largest public protests since the Gezi Park protests in 2013. Young people, who have known only Erdogan as president and are deeply worried about their future, turned out in force.

Despite extensive use of tear gas and water cannons, the protests were not dispersed. On March 23, a duty judge ordered Imamoglu's pretrial detention on corruption charges, while dismissing the terrorism charge. Imamoglu and his associates were taken in a secure convoy to Silivri’s massive prison complex, where they were held in pretrial detention. Their lawyers appealed the summary judicial decision. The Turkish Interior Minister immediately suspended Imamoglu from office. The municipal council convened on March 26 to elect a deputy mayor in his place.

The CHP primary vote went ahead as planned on March 23 but turned into a landslide referendum, with 15 million votes for Imamoglu, including 13.2 million from non-CHP members, according to the official count (Le Monde, March 24). CHP had called on all citizens to participate. Commenting on the results, CHP leader Özgür Özel said: “Ekrem Imamoglu is headed to prison, but he is also headed toward the presidency.” Imamoglu responded: “Tens of millions of people in this country, suffering under this government’s oppression, economic collapse, incompetence, and chaos, rushed to the polls to say: ‘Enough, Erdoğan!’ The ballot boxes will come, and the nation will deliver an unforgettable slap to this government.”

On March 29, in Maltepe, on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, the largest protest rally in Turkey in decades took place. According to the press, nearly 2.2 million people turned out. The massive show of opposition was peaceful and without incident. Protesters denounced Erdogan’s political coup, judicial manipulation, and police violence. Several speakers declared that the march toward power would continue. Multiple journalists covering the demonstrations were arrested, including Swedish newspaper Dagens ETC’s correspondent Joakim Medin. The BBC’s correspondent, Mark Lowen, was expelled (New York Times, March 27). According to a tally cited by Le Monde on March 31, “more than 2,000 people have been arrested since the movement began.” The scale of the protest and crackdown is destabilizing Erdogan’s party. International media headlines read: “Turkey Slips into Autocracy” (The New York Times, March 22), “Erdogan Increases Authoritarian Turn” (Le Figaro, March 26), “Government Muzzles the Media” (Le Monde, March 27).

In its March 28 edition, The New York Times noted that for some autocrats, even rigged elections can pose too great a threat. That same issue published an op-ed by the jailed mayor titled: I am Erdogan’s Main Challenger in Turkey. I was arrested.

International reactions to Imamoglu’s arrest have been mostly muted, with no state willing to confront Erdogan publicly. Germany did protest through its foreign minister. “The jailing of Istanbul’s mayor and many others is a serious blow to democracy,” lamented the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 23, reminding that Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and a candidate for EU membership. The European Union, however, merely expressed its “concern.” Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo strongly condemned the arrest of her friend and counterpart. Several other European mayors followed her lead.

Amid the turmoil sparked by Imamoglu’s arrest and detention, the March 21 dissolution of Istanbul’s Bar Council for “terrorist propaganda” went largely unnoticed. Istanbul’s bar president and council members, prosecuted for “terrorist propaganda” and “publicly spreading false information,” were dismissed by Turkish judicial decree. Their offense: calling for an investigation into the death of a Kurdish journalist in Syria in late December, reportedly killed by a Turkish drone in an area where Turkish-backed factions were fighting Kurdish forces. “Today is a dark day. We may have witnessed the collapse of Turkey’s future in this courthouse,” said Istanbul bar president Ibrahim Kaboglu. “No one has the power to silence the bar associations,” said Union of Turkish Bar Associations president Erinc Sagkan, calling it a “shameful decision” (AFP, March 21).

A bar president ousted for demanding an investigation into a Kurdish journalist’s murder, and Istanbul’s mayor arrested at dawn, detained, and jailed for corruption without a proper adversarial trial. These two images, two days apart, sum up the spirit and operation of so-called independent justice in Turkey.

In this politically charged and turbulent month, the "peace process" saw no significant development. Although, in response to the call of its imprisoned founder Öcalan, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) declared a unilateral "ceasefire" on March 1 to gradually prepare for a congress that would consider its possible dissolution, the Turkish army ignored the ceasefire and continued military operations against Kurdish guerrilla positions along the Iraqi Kurdistan border (New York Times, March 12).

Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Erdogan’s ally, said on March 9: "The terrorist organization PKK and affiliated groups must immediately and unconditionally lay down their arms" (AFP, March 9). In response, PKK senior leader Cemil Bayik told Kurdish TV channel Sterk TV: “Every day, Turkish reconnaissance planes fly, bombings occur, attacks happen. Holding a congress under these conditions is impossible and dangerous. But the congress will happen if the conditions are met” (Le Figaro, March 14).

Those conditions will likely be the subject of talks between the pro-Kurdish DEM party delegation and President Erdogan in April, after the Ramadan Islamic holidays. In the meantime, the delegation is meeting with major Turkish parties and civil society organizations to brief them and lay the groundwork for the promised and hoped-for political solution.

IRAN: NEGOTIATIONS UNDER PRESSURE OR MILITARY CONFRONTATION?

Iranian leaders are faced with a harsh ultimatum from U.S. President Donald Trump. In a letter addressed to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, received in Tehran on March 12, the American president reportedly demanded that Iran enter negotiations within two months, failing which "the likelihood of American or Israeli military action against Iranian military installations would increase significantly."

Faced with this dilemma, Iranian officials appear divided. In his Iranian New Year speech on March 21, Ayatollah Khamenei reaffirmed his opposition to any negotiations with the United States, despite the country’s critical situation. "The Americans must understand they will gain nothing by threatening Iran," he added. The Ayatollah stated that negotiating with the U.S. is "neither reasonable, nor intelligent, nor honorable." However, he acknowledged that the growing threat of war since the return of Donald Trump—whose "maximum pressure" policy aligns with Israel’s—has become a heavy burden. "If anyone acts maliciously and starts a conflict, they should know they will receive harsh slaps," he warned before a crowd of supporters in Tehran.

For the Supreme Leader, the U.S.—which withdrew from a previous nuclear agreement—cannot be trusted. The recent treatment of Ukrainian President Zelensky at the White House illustrates, in his view, the unreliability of the Americans, even towards their allies.

Other Iranian leaders, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, former President Hassan Rouhani, and former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, openly advocate for negotiations to avoid a very real risk of military confrontation with U.S.-backed Israel and to obtain even partial sanctions relief to address the country's dire economic situation. The American withdrawal from the 2015 deal and the subsequent "maximum pressure" sanctions are said to have cost Iran over $800 billion. The country faces shortages across all sectors. In one year, the price of rice has multiplied by 100, vegetables by 200, and the national currency has lost 60% of its value. The "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement has significantly eroded the regime’s social base. Israeli strikes have severely weakened Iran’s air defense systems, including those intended to protect nuclear sites. According to experts, a new military confrontation could destroy these facilities completely. The proxy defense system using pro-Iranian militias in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq is also largely dismantled.

A "deal" favored by the American president would offer a reprieve, help refill state coffers at the cost of concessions on the nuclear program, argue Tehran’s pragmatists who are eager to preserve the regime.

In this subtle power struggle, the aging Ayatollah, after staking out a hardline stance and issuing warnings, may allow moderate pragmatists to engage in indirect or even direct talks with the U.S.—later blaming them for the negotiations' adverse outcomes or their failure.

Ayatollah Khamenei is not alone in condemning the unreliability and unpredictability of the U.S. administration. Le Monde reported on March 19 that the February 3 shutdown of USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) had a massive impact on journalists and dozens of NGOs working for democracy, the environment, or equality in Iran. State media praised the move: “The removal of funding and closure of anti-Iranian media, whose sole aim was to blacken Iran’s image, spread lies, and false information, shows that the Trump administration does not want to waste money on useless causes.” An unexpected point of agreement between Tehran and Washington!

Meanwhile, repression of opponents and dissidents has continued throughout March. Here is a brief account of the crackdown in Kurdistan, as reported by the human rights organization Hengaw.

On March 1, authorities in Mashhad arrested Kurdish lawyer Javad Alikordi, who had defended several political prisoners. He was arrested after refusing an informal summons by intelligence services to begin his sentence. He had been sentenced to 16 months in prison, a two-year disbarment, and a travel ban for “forming and leading a group to overthrow the regime.”

In Kermanshah, Kurdish activist and Yarsan faith follower Mojtaba Vaisi was violently arrested by IRGC forces on March 5 while preparing Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations. His young daughter was reportedly left alone at the scene, highlighting the brutality of the arrest.

Political prisoner Motalleb Ahmadian from Baneh entered his 15th year of a 30-year sentence. In a letter to the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, Ahmadian described his health deterioration due to denial of medical care. Arrested in 2010, he was convicted for alleged membership in the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and endured torture and prolonged solitary confinement.

On March 4, Iranian intelligence forces arrested Kurdish tailor Behrouz Farhang in his Bukan workshop. He was transferred to an IRGC detention center in Urmia, with no known charges. Similarly, Mahmoud Naderi from the Kalatrazan district of Sanandaj was arrested after repeated summons due to symbolic use of traditional Kurdish garments “Jamaneh” and “Khaki clothing” at his son’s wedding—attire linked to Kurdish cultural identity and resistance. Kurdish teacher Arazu Jalilzadeh was also arrested on March 3 in Sardasht, reportedly taken violently from her father’s home.

On March 8, security forces arrested young Kurd Fakhraddin Taheri from Piranshahr during a violent raid at his family home. Intelligence ministry forces allegedly stormed the house without a warrant, breaking doors and windows before taking him to an unknown location.

On March 10, 2025, at least four Kurdish women’s rights activists were arrested in Sanandaj and Dehgolan for participating in International Women’s Day events. Among them was Sohaila Motaei, a prominent figure in the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom) movement. Motaei, previously jailed for her activism, was arrested in Dehgolan by the intelligence ministry.

Others arrested that day included Baran Saeidi, abducted from her home, Soma Mohammadrezaei, detained at her workplace in the Almas Mall, and Leila Pashaei, apprehended at her family home. All four were transferred to unknown locations, and their current status remains unknown.

On March 12, security forces in Saqqez arrested Abdollah Ahmadzadeh, a member of the “Halabja” cultural association. He had played a key role in organizing commemorations for victims of the Halabja chemical attack. His arrest is part of broader repression targeting Kurdish cultural expression by Iranian authorities.

Iranian forces also continued attacks on Kurdish border porters (kolbars). On March 7, Ahmad Karimzadeh, a kolbar from Baneh, was seriously wounded by border guards. The targeting of kolbars—who transport goods across Iran’s western borders for survival—is a longstanding issue, with authorities regularly using lethal force.

In a sweeping crackdown across Iranian Kurdistan, regime security forces arrested, harassed, and intimidated many Kurds simply for celebrating Newroz. According to data compiled by the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, at least 41 people—including six children and several women—had been arrested by March 21, with many more detentions in the days that followed, as repression intensified through March 30. (hengaw.net)

Arrests occurred in several Kurdish-majority cities including Marivan, Sardasht, Urmia, Sanandaj, Saqqez, Piranshahr, Shino, and Kermanshah. In addition to arrests, thousands were reportedly summoned for interrogation or threatened by intelligence agencies to suppress participation in the annual celebration—a deeply symbolic expression of Kurdish culture, identity, and resistance.

Among the detainees were young children and teenagers, such as a 10-year-old and a 14-year-old from Sardasht, and 17-year-old Keyhan Tadberi, who was reportedly severely beaten before being taken to a Sanandaj detention center. In Urmia, two teenage sisters, Avin Ahmadi (16) and Sariya Ahmadi (17), were arrested after wearing traditional Kurdish dresses adorned with the Kurdistan flag. Their cousin, Rojbin Afsoon (22), was also detained and remains missing.

A 78-year-old poet and cultural elder, Saifollah Khan Ghafari Bashbolagh, was arrested in Saqqez after reciting a poem about freedom at a Newroz ceremony. He was later charged with "disturbing public order."

Civil activists, including married couple Shno Mohammadi and Sahab (Ariwan) Shakeri, were arrested at their home in Sanandaj during a police raid without a warrant. Their whereabouts remain unknown, and authorities have refused to inform their family (hengaw.net).

Religious activist Sheikh Zahid Shahabi was detained after delivering a speech and lighting the symbolic Newroz fire at a peaceful ceremony in Saqqez. His Sufi lodge, called “Path to Freedom,” was raided by intelligence agents, and religious books were thrown into the street. Zahid’s arrest came just months after the assassination of his brother, Azad Shahabi, in what civil society members described as a politically motivated killing.

Artist and playwright Karwan Dafei (25) was arrested on the streets of Marivan, apparently for organizing cultural events during Newroz.

Former political prisoner Tahsin Dadras from Marivan was among those arrested, along with several others from the region. In many villages, including Ney and Doleh-Garm, dozens of residents were summoned and several detained, despite authorities' efforts to block gatherings.

Detainees included at least six children and several women, highlighting the indiscriminate nature of the repression—targeting people of all ages, genders, and societal roles.

IRAQ: OVER 84% OF KURDISTAN'S POPULATION NOW URBAN

Last November, Iraq conducted a nationwide population census, the first in 37 years. Approximately 30,000 trained surveyors equipped with iPads asked each resident no fewer than 70 questions to establish a demographic, economic, social, and educational overview of the country. To facilitate the process, the population was required to stay at home from November 20 to 22, 2024. Analysis of the collected data has begun to be published. It reveals that in the Kurdistan Region, 84.57% of the population now lives in cities and 15.43% in villages. Nationwide, 70.17% of Iraq’s population is urban, while 29.83% is rural. Kurdistan is therefore significantly more urbanized, largely due to Saddam Hussein's regime, which systematically destroyed 4,500 of the 5,000 Kurdish villages. Despite the emergence of an autonomous Kurdistan since 1991 and the gradual reconstruction of many villages, Kurdish rural life has not regained its former vitality.

Kurdistan's population is young: 31.68% are under the age of 15, and only 4.4% are over 65. The illiteracy rate for those over 10 is 16.23% in Kurdistan, compared to 15.31% in Iraq. In primary and secondary education, boys make up 51.5% of students, while girls account for 48.5%. The primary school graduation rate is 93% in Kurdistan versus 88% in Iraq. 82% of Kurdistan residents have running water at home, compared to 87% in Iraq.

Almost all households (93% in Kurdistan, 98% in Iraq) are connected to the power grid, with frequent outages supplemented by generators. Another key lifestyle indicator: 70.16% of Kurdistan’s residents own their homes (72.15% in Iraq).

We also learn that 41% of Kurdistan’s population is single, 55.83% are married, 0.66% are divorced, 0.33% are separated, and 2.18% are widowed. The average age of marriage is 23 for men and 20 for women. 46.06% of men and women over 15 hold paid jobs, and 38.18% of employees work in the public or municipal sector (compared to 38.25% in Iraq).

Finally, the population growth rate is 3.5% in Kurdistan, versus 3.7% for Iraq overall. Iraq’s population was 6.5 million in 1957, 9 million in 1965, 12 million in 1977, 16 million in 1987. In 2024, it reached 46,118,793—seven times more than in 1957!

In March, talks to form a new coalition government in Kurdistan made some progress, but the promised agreement before Newroz was not fulfilled.

Discussions to resume Kurdistan’s oil exports, suspended since March 2023, have not yet borne fruit, despite U.S. pressure, including a call from U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Walz to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani.

A major topic was appointing an independent consultant to assess production and transport costs. APIKUR urged Baghdad to clearly define this consultant’s role, responsibilities, and timeline. The petroleum industry association also stressed the importance of financial transparency, especially concerning unpaid invoices—$1 billion remains outstanding.

On March 19, Haibat Halbousi, head of the Iraqi Parliament’s oil and gas committee, announced that Kurdistan’s oil exports should "officially resume next week." He noted progress on amending the budget law and agreements on export routes through Turkey’s Ceyhan port.

The Kurdistan Oil Industry Association (APIKUR) responded to Halbousi’s remarks by clarifying that no agreement has been finalized to resume exports. The group emphasized that no official timetable has been set, and key technical, legal, and political issues remain unresolved.

Washington is growing impatient and threatening sanctions. On March 9, the U.S. ended a waiver allowing Iraq to purchase electricity from Iran. Baghdad had benefited from these exemptions since 2018. The decision "ensures that Iran receives no economic or financial assistance," according to the U.S. embassy in Baghdad (AFP, March 9).

Facing difficulties, Iraq may turn to independent electricity suppliers in Kurdistan or import electricity from Turkey, which would require new investments while awaiting increased domestic production.

PARIS: NEWROZ CELEBRATION AT CITY HALL

The Kurdish New Year, Newroz, was celebrated across all regions of Kurdistan as well as within the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

This year, in a truly exceptional gesture, the celebration organized by the Kurdish Institute took place on March 24 in the magnificent Salle des Fêtes at Paris City Hall.

Ms. Anne HIDALGO, Mayor of Paris, warmly welcomed several hundred Kurds and friends of the Kurdish people with a cordial and heartfelt speech.

A Kurdish Member of the European Parliament, Evin Incir, came specially for the occasion and also delivered a speech, followed by Paris Senator Rémi Féraud. The president of the Kurdish Institute then explained the meaning of Newroz and its message of unity and resistance against injustice in Kurdish tradition.

The evening continued with a rich musical program featuring the group led by Semir Yewsîp, singer Aysel Borak, and singer Dler Garmiyani, who had come specially from Erbil.

In this historic ballroom, illuminated in Kurdish colors, Kurds—many dressed in traditional clothing—danced with their guests late into the evening.

Another celebration had already taken place on March 21, organized by the KRG Representation, at a private Parisian venue, La Palmeraie. That same evening, the Kurdish community in Rouen also hosted a celebration. More celebrations are set to take place in other provinces. Among the diaspora events, the one held on March 23 in Cologne drew several thousand Kurds—more than 40,000 according to organizers.

In Kurdistan, the traditional torchlight march in Akrê on the night of March 20 opened the festivities. On March 21, nearly one million Kurds passionately celebrated the New Year in Diyarbakir (Amed), and nearly as many in Istanbul. The festivities in Van, Hakkari, Batman, and Cizre also made a strong impression. But it was especially in Iranian Kurdistan that the fervor and popular enthusiasm stood out, with massive celebrations in Urmia, Mahabad, Sanandaj, Bokan, and in Jina Amini’s hometown, Saghez.

Newroz, which symbolizes renewal and resistance in Kurdish culture, has often coincided with uprisings and acts of defiance throughout history. One of the most significant moments of this year’s Newroz celebrations occurred in Urmia, where tens of thousands of Kurds gathered in an unprecedented event, singing Kurdish songs and organizing concerts in a powerful display of cultural pride. In response, the Iranian regime mobilized thousands of ultra-nationalist Azeris, mostly Shia supporters of the Islamic Republic, to protest the Kurdish festivities. Some of these groups even called for violence and massacres against the Kurdish population, turning a peaceful cultural celebration into incitement to ethnic hostility.

In Rojava too, Newroz was celebrated with great enthusiasm and joy across the region.

A national holiday in Iraq and Iran, Newroz could also become the holiday of spring and brotherhood in Turkey, according to a promise made by President Erdogan. After banning and repressing this celebration until 1992, Turkey now seeks to co-opt it and strip it of its spirit of resistance.