My primary aim in this paper is to suggest
what the main features of Kurdish nation-formation were in Anatolia (Turkey) between the end of the nineteenth
century and the 1930s by placing it within the broad framework of the ongoing
scholarly debate about the modern nation. I want to gauge how well the Kurdish
case fits one or another of the general theories about the origin and nature of
nations and see what it can tell us about the process by which modern nations
came into being. My approach to these matters is comparative. I wish,
therefore, to examine Kurdish nation-formation from the perspective of a
similar process taking place among the Romanians of Transylvania between the
end of the eighteenth century and 1914 and the Jadids, the Muslim reformers of
Central Asia, in the first three decades of the twentieth century.
Two questions come immediately to mind:
First, are these three cases, in fact, comparable, and, second, if they are,
will the exercise yield results sufficient to illumine the general process of
nation-formation? My answer to both questions is a tentative “yes.” Despite
differences of historical development, political environment, and sources of
culture, the Kurds of Anatolia, the Romanians of Transylvania, and the Jadids
of Central Asia shared, it seems to me, certain key characteristics: 1) Each
was a minority in a multi-ethnic and, in greater or lesser degree, centralized
or centralizing empire: the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire (after the First World
War the Turkish Republic), the Romanians in the Habsburg Monarchy (after 1867
Austria-Hungary), and the Jadids in the Russian Empire (after the First World
War the Soviet Union); 2) Religion, especially in the Romanian and Jadid cases
was a defining marker of community, and it played a significant role in the
Kurdish case; 3) Intellectuals, a term I use to describe a small, well-educated
elite, took the lead in nation-formation in all three cases; 4) The majority of
the population of all three peoples were either peasants or nomads and were
dependent mainly on some form of agriculture or animal-raising for a livelihood,
whereas modern industry and commerce and associated occupations were still modest
in scope; 5) The majority of these peoples were culturally rural and were
deeply attached to tradition, usually reinforced by religion, and were thus
resistant to change; 6) The intellectual elites, by contrast, were open to
currents of ideas and other influences from the outside, especially those
coming from Europe, including in the Jadid case, Russia; 7) The process of
nation-formation of all three peoples evolved within a broad international
context that revealed not only the porousness of political and cultural
boundaries but also the contagiousness of the idea of nation; and 8) All three
cases of nation-formation were, in the final analysis, the responses of largely
traditional societies to the challenge of modernity.
As I examine the three cases I shall keep a
number of questions in mind about nation: 1) Are nations constructs based upon
modern, that is, nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic and social
conditions? More precisely, are they products of modern capitalist, industrial
society? 2) Are nations essentially the creations of elites, “nationalist,” who
were anxious to provide order in the unstable conditions brought on by the
rapid growth of capitalism? 3) Or, were nations in existence for many centuries
before the nineteenth century? 4) What, if anything, do modern nations owe to
historical and cultural links to the past? 5) When exactly can we say that a
nation has come into being? Can it be simply an idea entertained by a
relatively small number of well-educated persons or must it also encompass the
mass of the population who will have some consciousness of their common
identity?
My paper is divided into five parts. The
first is a discussion of the main theories about the origins and nature of
nations, and the second, third, and fourth parts describe and analyze Romanian,
Jadid, and Kurdish nation-formation. The fifth and final part consists of
suggestions as to what the three cases may tell us about the origins and nature
of nations and how well they fit in with general theories on the subject.
II
First of all, then, I want to discuss the
theories of nation. As we are all aware, the origins of nations and the
emergence of nationalism and national movements have been the subject of
scholarly, and sometimes unscholarly, attention since the nineteenth century.
At the theoretical level the debate about the nature and role of nations became
especially sharp in the second half of the twentieth century, as modernists
boldly challenged traditional conceptions. New explanations for the appearance
of nations and their character and new estimates of their longevity held that
they were constructs founded upon economic and social realities specific to the
modern age. Such arguments clashed with the certainties of the so-called
primordialisys and perennialists about the age-old existence, even the
permanence, of nations in human society. Still another body of scholars –the
historical ethnosymbolists—proposed what might be called a third way of
approaching the matter. They emphasized historical and cultural connections to
the past, but at the same time they accepted the essential modernity of
nations.
Since the middle of the twentieth century
modernism has been the most influential paradigm explaining the emergence of
nations. Its representatives generally agree on the approaches to the central
issues of the debate: they oppose the theory of the existence of an essence of
nation and insist on its constructed nature; they reject the antiquity of
nations and agree on their relatively recent appearance; and they dismiss the
historical and cultural, in favor of the economic and political foundations of
nation. Modernists reject the idea, then, that nations are intrinsic to human
society, that they are “natural phenomena.” They claim, instead, that nations
and nationalism are products of the modern world and that they were formed in
order to satisfy the peculiar needs of that world, and then, they predict, as
times change nations will disappear, to be replaced by other forms of community
organization appropriate to new ages. In this whole process they emphasize the
key role of elites as the constructors of nations.
Ernest Gellner set forth the premises of
modernism in radical form, first, in Thought and Change (1964)
and, then, at greater length, in his well-known and controversial Nations
and Nationalism (1983). He insisted that the rise of the nation cannot
be explained satisfactorily either as an exercise of human will or by adherence
to culture; such factors simply did not differentiate the origins of nations
from those of other kinds of communities and movements. The crucial elements,
in his view, were the economic and social circumstances of the modern age.
Thus, nations and nationalism, for him, could only be products of modern,
capitalist society. Nations, he reasoned, were, in fact, indispensable to
modern society –a complex, mobile, and mass entity—if it was to function
properly.
III
I shall begin the investigation of the
three cases of nation-formation with the Romanians of Transylvania. It is safe
to say that during the entire period from the latter part of the eighteenth
century to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 they were the least
favored of the main ethnic communities in Transylvania. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Hungarian
nobility and gentry and the Hungarian and Saxon (German) middle classes
dominated political and economic life. Romanians during this long period were
represented, first, by their Greek Catholic and Orthodox clergies, then by a
lay intellectual elite, and, finally, in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, by a small middle class.
Violence by Romanians in the form of a
massive peasant uprising in 1784-1785 led by Horea and the national and liberal
revolution of 1848-1849, the work mainly of intellectuals, brought little
improvement in their status. Nor did reliance on the central authorities in Vienna ever since the end of the
seventeenth century, when Transylvania was incorporated into the Habsburg Monarchy; only occasionally did
the Romanians’ loyalty to the Habsburgs coincide with the Imperial Court’s interests. Far more
important to it were the Hungarian ruling groups and the Monarchy’s
international position. When the so-called Compromise of 1867 transformed the
Habsburg Monarchy into a partnership between Austrians and Hungarians and
integrated Transylvania into the new Hungary, the Hungarian government undertook a systematic campaign down to
the First World War to Magyarize the Romanians and thereby extinguish their
ethnic identity.
Romanian nation-formation for nearly two centuries thus took place under the
most adverse conditions, becoming, in effect, a movement of political,
cultural, and economic self-defense.
If we apply Miroslav Hroch’s paradigm of
nation-formation to the Romanians of Transylvania during the period that
concerns us, then two phases are discernible: phase A, from about the 1770s to
the 1820s, a period of scholarly inquiry and the propagation of the new idea of
community, and phase B, from about the 1830s to 1914, a period when the elite
undertook to organize a national movement politically, culturally, and
economically and to gain broad support for their endeavors. Yet, as Hroch (and
the historical ethno-symbolists) would argue, these two phases rested upon a
sense of community whose foundations could be traced back to the Middle Ages.
For the Romanians it was a religious consciousness based on a deep attachment
to their Eastern Orthodox faith and nurtured by the wider Orthodox community,
especially Serbs and Russians. It was a solidarity that separated Romanians
from their German and Magyar neighbors, who were Protestant and Roman Catholic,
and thus reinforced their sense of their unique identity.
Leadership of the Romanian community came
from successive generations of elites, who were distinguished by their higher
education and their attraction to Western European ideas and models of development.
The elites of the eighteenth century, in fact, owed their existence in large
measure to a union of a part of the Orthodox clergy with the Roman Catholic
Church, an event that allowed young Romanians, almost all of them Greek
Catholic clergy, to study in Roman Catholic institutions in, among other
places, Rome and Vienna and introduced them to the transforming currents of
ideas of the European Enlightenment and early Romanticism. In these
cosmopolitan centers they also became acquainted with the aspirations to
nationhood similar to their own of Slav and Magyar elites.
The Church Union with Rome provided a theoretical justification
of their belief in historical progress and gave substance to the idea,
“Romanian nation.” It explained the history of the Romanians since the Roman
conquest of Dacia –their rise
and fall- and presaged a new age of glory. The weaving of these ideas into a
coherent doctrine signified the reconciliation between the Byzantine East and
the Latin West, which provides the key to an understanding of modern theories
of Romanian nationhood. In trying to harmonize the patriarchal Orthodox
tradition of an essentially rural world with the dynamic spirit of urban Europe, Greek Catholic intellectuals made
an indispensable contribution to the creation of a new, distinctive entity
–“Romanian.”
IV
Next I would like to examine
nation-formation carried out by the Jadids of Central Asia. In the first three
decades of the twentieth century a small number of Muslim intellectuals,
Turkic- (Uzbek) and Persian- (Tajik) speakers, in the Russian
Governorate-General of Turkestan and the neighboring Emirate of Bukhara, a
Russian protectorate, were engaged in a mission, Jadidism, to bring Central Asia into the modern world.
Jadidism took its name from usul-i jadid (new method), which was applied
to the modern schools that the reformers advocated in place of the “old” (qadim)
schools, the traditional maktabs (Muslim primary schools) and madrasas
(Muslim colleges). In time “Jadid” or “Jadidchi” became a synonym for reformer.
The methods use by the Jadids to further their cause were didactic, and their
chief instruments, besides schools, were books, newspapers, and the theater.
They did not think of themselves as revolutionaries, but in time as their
project gained strength and they themselves confidence the brand of
enlightenment they preached constituted a fundamental challenge to the Russian
colonial administration, the Emir of Bukhara’s authoritarian rule, and the
traditional Muslim clergy, the ulama, and their near-monopoly of
education and culture. The revolutions of February and October 1917 in Russia proved to be crucial turning-points
for the Jadids, as they were drawn deeper and deeper into political struggle
and had to confront rapid social and political change. Forced to adjust to the
new Bolshevik order, they strove as never before to define themselves as a
nation and to decide on a proper course of development. A few succeeded; most
did not. Jadidism itself as a distinct movement of ideas disappeared into the
general fabric of Soviet society.
V
If we turn now to Kurdish nation-formation
and measure its evolution against Hroch’s paradigm, we can, I think, discern
two phases: A, roughly from the 1890s to 1918, and B, 1918 to 1938. As we
proceed numerous parallels with the Romanian and Jadid cases will be evident.
During the first phase Kurdish
intellectuals laid the ideological and organizational foundations of
nation-formation. They thought of their mission, first of all, as one of
education and persuasion, and thus they embarked on the tasks of enlightenment
by establishing the first Kurdish newspapers and journals, through which they
intended to disseminate their vision of a future Kurdish nation and awaken
Kurds to a consciousness of having a common destiny and of belonging to the
same ethnic community. They also created political and cultural associations to
coordinate all their endeavors. Not least of all they sketched the outlines of
an idea of community that was essentially ethnic. Although the period was,
then, mainly one of intellectual and cultural mobilization, the Kurdish elite
also put forward proposals for new political arrangements that would assure the
integrity of the Kurdish community. In so doing, they recognized the
impossibility of separating political construction from intellectual and
cultural initiatives.
The Kurdish elite undertook their
activities at a time of growing ferment among the diverse peoples of the
Ottoman Empire and in neighboring regions: in the Balkans the Albanians and in
Eastern Anatolia the Armenians asserted their ethnic individuality and strove
to assure their survival as distinct political communities; in Iran after the
turn of the century the constitutional movement gained strength; in India the
struggle of both Muslims and Hindus against British colonialism intensified;
and in Central Asia, as we have seen, Muslim intellectuals confronted Russian
dominance and native despotism. But above all, the Young Turk movement, both at
home in Istanbul and other
cities and in Europe,
influenced Kurdish intellectuals to assert their identity and aspire to some
form of nationhood.
The structure of Kurdish society itself
greatly influenced the course of Kurdish nation-formation and accounts in part for the
successes and failures of its leaders (I shall refer to them from now on as
“intellectuals” or “the elite”). The membership of this elite, which had
committed itself to the raising, or one might almost say, the creation of a
Kurdish national consciousness, was small, and a middle class conscious of its
wider social role, which had become the chief nation-builders for the Romanians
of Transylvania by the latter decades of the nineteenth century, was also small
and lacked cohesion and sufficient awareness of a national mission. The
traditional tribal organization of Kurdish society, the pervasive influence of
religion and the power of the sheikhs, whose prestige rested largely on their
leadership of Sufi orders, were all formidable obstacles to innovation.
One of the difficulties confronting the
elite as they proceeded with national mobilization was to determine who
precisely was a Kurd. Religion and language, often the markers of nationhood
elsewhere, were not uniformly helpful in this case. Although the majority of
Kurds in Turkey were Sunni
Muslims and followers of the Shafi’i mezhep (creed), there were
significant communities of Alevis, whom many Shafi’I Kurds would not accept as
Kurds. Then, too, religious distinctions between Kurds and others were
sometimes blurred. For example, Kurdish Alevis had much in common culturally
with Turkish Alevis, while many Sunni Kurds and their sheikhs were anxious to
preserve the Caliphate and were thus willing to cooperate with the Ottoman or
Turkish Republican government, at least before the secularization campaign of
the Republic in the 1920s. As for language, the majority of Kurds in Turkey spoke Kurmanji, but the Zazas spoke
a language of their own, which, being unintelligible to Kurmanji-speakers,
helped to keep the two parties separate. Besides the absence of distinct
religious and ethnic indicators, simple membership in a tribe or links to one
of the traditional prominent families was often enough to establish one’s
Kurdishness, regardless of ethnicity or other criteria. The enormousness of the task
that lay before those who were intent on creating a modern nation out of such
diversity is evident.
Yet, in a curious way, religion helped to
draw Kurds from many parts of Kurdistan together, despite their different religious and cultural
traditions. Madrasas and the Sufi orders enabled Kurds from various
Kurdish regions to become acquainted with one another and thus contributed to
the creation of a common, even “national,” identity.It was not by chance, then,
that many of the rebellions against Ottoman and, later, Turkish Republican rule
were led by the sheikhs of Sufi brotherhoods.
The leaders of Kurdish nation-formation in
its early phase belonged to the upper strata of Kurdish society. They came from
aristocratic great families such as the Badrkhans and Babans, or they were army
officers or government officials. Some were mollahs such as Said Nursi (1876-1960),
a moderate who had committed himself to improving the status of the Kurds and
belonged to a number of Kurdish associations in Istanbul before the First World War.
They had all had a superior and, to some degree, cosmopolitan education. Many
had spent time in Europe, where
they had come under the influence of Western liberal, enlightened ideas or had
joined progressive Turkish and Armenian intellectuals to oppose the Sultan’s
authoritarian rule.
Kurdish leaders were guided in their
activities by a sense of being Kurdish. Yet, this conviction, rather than being
based on a well-reasoned theory of nation or precise notions of ethnic
community, was more a spontaneous feeling that had been nurtured on historical
and literary sources such as Ehmedî Xanî’s (ca. 1650/1651-1706-1707) great
epic, Mem û Zîn, and the poetry of Hacî Qadrî Koyî (1817-1897). The
elite interpreted Xanî’s references to Kurds and to their need for unity as
recognition that as early as the seventeenth century a Kurdish nation existed,
when what in fact he had in mind by “Kurd” was mainly the tribes and some
intellectuals, but not the peasantry.
Haci Qadri Koyi, who went to Istanbul and became associated with the Badrkhan family later in his career,
evoked a romantic nationalism in his poetry that appealed to a young generation
of Kurdish intellectuals.
The elite itself did not yet conceive of
nation in fully modern terms. The evidence lies in their attitude toward the
mass of the Kurdish people, tribal and peasant alike. They displayed a kind of
paternalism that viewed the mass of the population as children who had to be
led and protected. Not surprisingly, they assigned to themselves the task of
leading their people as a right because of their education and experience.
Disdainful of the rural world because of what they saw as its ignorance and
superstition and its unthinking attachment to tradition, they themselves took
pride in being urban and even European and thus progressive, and they relished Istanbul as their base.
This elite used modern means to advance
their cause: they formed the first Kurdish political organizations, and they
laid the foundations of the Kurdish newspaper press. At first, then, they
conceived of themselves primarily as enlighteners, and in politics they practiced
moderation.
The first, informal association they formed
was linked to the newspaper Kurdistan, which began publication in
Kurdish (Kurmanji) and Turkish in Cairo in 1898. Its publisher and editor was Mikdat Midhat Badrkhan, one
of the sons of Badrkhan, the Emir of the former Kurdish principality of Botan.
It did not represent any particular political organization, and therefore it
offered intellectuals of various ideological hues a forum for the exchange of
ideas. In time, its publisher hoped, it might provide a base from which he and
his colleagues could undertake sustained public initiatives. At first, Badrkhan
focused on cultural and educational goals. He was particularly eager to
acquaint his readers with the accomplishments of contemporary European
civilization and science and to raise their general cultural level. Eventually, Kurdistan, after
brief stays in London and
Folkstone in England, moved to Geneva, Switzerland. The new editor, until the newspaper closed in 1902, was another
son of Emir Badrkhan, Abdurrahman Bey, who was convinced that he could not
effectively pursue an exclusively Kurdish program. He chose, therefore, to
cooperate with the Young Turks in exile and to urge that the Ottoman Empire become a federated state in
which all its peoples should have autonomy.
The elite increasingly felt the need for a
permanent organization to mobilize their forces and coordinate their activities
and founded Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Association for Kurdish Mutual
Assistance and Progress) in Istanbul in September 1908. Their immediate aim was to take advantage of the
new freedom for social and political action made possible in the wake of the
Young Turk revolution. They were particularly eager to unite various small
Kurdish groups with the representatives of leading families. The immediate
initiative for the association’s founding seems to have come from prominent
Kurds recently returned from Europe, who were determined to turn their
watchword, “Unity and Progress,” into reality.
Cultural goals continued to come first, as
is evident from the articles of the newspaper they published for nine months
beginning in November 1908, Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi,
whose publisher, by most accounts, was Abdul Qadır, the son of Sheikh
Ubaydullah, the leader of a rebellion in 1880, and a member of later Kurdish
national committees. The association promoted education as an essential means
of bring about national unity and insisted that Kurdish children pursue their
studies in all subjects in their own language. The elite thus gave continuous
attention to the cultivation of the Kurdish literary language, a task they
intended to carry out by collecting folk stories and legends about the Kurdish
past and by writing a history of the language.
The association soon felt the force of
Turkish nationalism and had to curtail its activities. A serious rupture
between the Young Turks and the Kurdish elite took place in 1909. Where once
the Young Turks had been allied with the Kurds against the Sultan, now they could
no longer ignore the centrifugal tendencies they discerned in the association’s
promotion of the Kurdish language and strengthening of Kurdish culture. They
began to treat Kurds as subversives, and, as a result, the Kürt Teavün ve
Terakki Cemiyeti and its newspaper closed in 1909. For a time its members
carried on educational work in another association, Kürt Neşr-i Maarif
Cemiyeti (Association for Kurdish Educational Publications), which founded
schools and published books in Kurdish.
But continued Young Turk pressure forced it to cease activities in 1910.
Subsequent associations were short-lived.
The most important of these was Heviya Kurd (Kurdish Hope), which was
founded in Istanbul in 1912.
It, too, pursued cultural goals in order to arouse and strengthen a sense of
Kurdish identity and unity in the broader population. It published the first
Kurdish journal, Roja Kurd (Kurdish Day; three issues in 1913) and its
successor, Hetawî Kurd (Kurdish Sun; ten issues in 1913), both of which
promoted Kurdish education, literature, and language. The association broke up at
the start of the First World War when many of its members entered military
service.
These events and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the war signaled the close of the first phase of Kurdish
nation-formation.
Despite the efforts of urban intellectuals
to disseminate a new, national sense of community among Kurds and create a
common Kurdish culture, it must be said that they had had little success. For
example, they had established branches of the Association for Union and
Progress in the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire, but these “clubs,” in
Diyarbekir, Bitlis, and other towns lacked regular links with the center in Istanbul or among themselves. They became,
in effect, local organizations, where, in the absence of intellectuals of the
sort active in Istanbul, local
elites, espousing more traditional views, used the clubs in their own interest.
Nor were the intellectuals in Istanbul successful in establishing contacts with ordinary Kurds in the
capital or anywhere else. Their program did not deal with the social and
economic issues that were of most concern to the mass of Kurds, and they
themselves showed little inclination to meet with the poor and uneducated. In
Istanbul Abdul Qadır was almost alone as an intellectual who developed a
rapport with ordinary Kurds, but it was mainly because they saw him as a holy
man, not because he could connect them to a Kurdish national committee.
The next phase, phase B, of Kurdish
nation-formation covers the period roughly between 1918 and 1938 and is
distinguished by a breakdown of the traditional relationship, or “tacit
contract,”
between the Ottoman government and the minorities of the empire, which had
enabled the Kurds to preserve a large measure of autonomy within
long-established political, social, and religious structures. The collapse of
the Ottoman Empire as a consequence of defeat in the First World War, and its
replacement by an increasingly nationalistic and secularizing Turkish Republic added new strains to the relations between Kurds and Turks. As the
Republic limited Kurdish cultural expression and undermined existing autonomies
and abolished the Caliphate, which had joined Kurds and Turks in a common
Muslim community, the Kurds responded with violence.
In many respects Phase B represented no
serious break with the continuity Kurdish nation-formation. The leadership
remained largely the same as before the First World War. The well-educated
elite of Istanbul –high
functionaries, military officers, academics, wealthy aristocrats, and some
religious figures—were the guiding force. Their methods and goals were, at
first, little changed from those of the first phase. They formed a coordinating
committee, Kurdistan Teâli Cemiyeti (The Association for the Rise of Kurdistan)
in Istanbul in December 1918
under the chairmanship of Abdul Qadır,
and they pursued cultural goals, as their predecessors had. Influenced by
Western models, they were intent on raising their people to a high level of
civilization. To this end, they published a cultural and political journal, Jîn
(Life; 1919) to disseminate their ideas and reinforce a sense of Kurdishness
among broader, literate elements of the population. Indicative of their commitment
to a Kurdish national consciousness was their sponsorship of the first printed
edition of Xanî’s Mem û Zîn in 1919. Their focus on it may also reflect
the same anxiety that Xanî expressed for the Kurds’ lack of unity and for the
need for a strong leader, a king, to liberate them from the domination of
others. They thus seem to have accepted the principle that their own fledgling
national movement had its roots in much earlier times, the seventeenth century.
The elite’s attention to history suggests a
strengthened national consciousness and the acceptance of history as a valuable
instrument for mobilizing public opinion, even though none among them had the
time to write his own work of history.
They thus could not separate the cultural from the political. Their political
awareness found expression, in particular, in their apparent authorization of
Şerif Pasha, a liberal opponent of the former Ottoman government, to
present demands for Kurdish independence at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. At this critical moment
(1920) the Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti, already divided between those who wanted
an independent state and others who were satisfied with some form of autonomy
and continued cooperation with reformist Turks, broke apart in a dispute over
recognition of an Armenian state.
The Kurdish elite soon regrouped. Led by
army officers, they founded the Ciwata Azadi Kurd (Society for Kurdish
Freedom), known simply as Azadi, in 1923 to coordinate more aggressive
resistance to the Turkicization campaign undertaken by the increasingly
nationalist Republican government,
a campaign that severely curtailed Kurdish cultural activities and aimed at the
dissolution of Kurdish tribes and even Muslim religious orders. In response,
the men of Azadi organized a local rebellion at Beyt Sebab in 1924, which may
have been a rehearsal for a more general uprising that they hoped would bring
Kurds together from all over Turkish Kurdistan for a common struggle. It failed, and its leaders
were executed, but armed opposition continued.
The rebellion led by Sheikh Said in 1925,
which Azadi helped to organize with the expectation that it would unite the
Kurds of Turkey and perhaps even attract support from those of Iraq and Iran, pursued both nationalist and traditional objectives. Sheikh Said
himself was guided more by nationalist than religious concerns and tried to
arouse his fellow Kurds to action by citing Ehmedî Xanî’s appeal for Kurdish
brotherhood and for political solidarity.
But the rebellion was not a nationalist uprising. Its main support came from
Zaza-speaking tribes, and their chiefs and many sheikhs and the majority of
villagers displayed no enthusiasm for the nationalist cause of self-government.
Rather, they fought to uphold the traditional order of society against the
drastic changes being imposed upon them by the Turkish Republic. The underlying cause of their
rebellion, then, was opposition to modernism and secularism, which threatened
to destroy their tradition way of life and their religion.
Other rebellions followed. The most important
were those near Mount Ararat in
1929-1930
and in Dersim in 1937-1938.
Yet, as with Sheikh Said’s rebellion, neither was national in the sense that it
enlisted wide support across religious and tribal boundaries and pursued
general Kurdish as opposed to local tribal or religious goals. Only in the
Ararat rebellion did Kurdish political groups have even a modest role, and
members of the urban elite and army officers who participated in it had no
significant support among peasants and nomads.
Significant Kurdish rebellions ended with the Turkish army’s brutal suppression
of the Dersim revolt in 1938.
Kurdish nation-formation in Turkey did not make the transition to
Phase C of Hroch’s paradigm: that of a mass national movement. We may even
doubt that it had met all the criteria of Phase B. As of 1938, when it entered
upon nearly a quarter-century of relative quiescence, the urban elite, the
“nationalists,” either civilians or army officers, had had little success in
establishing contact with the Kurdish masses. They could not overcome tribal
structures and the pervasive influence of the sheikhs. The liberal,
cosmopolitan ideas that the urban elite espoused would undoubtedly have
appealed to a well-established middle class, but Kurdish society lacked the
so-called “middle stratum”; the conservative tribes and peasants could hardly
be receptive to new European social theories. In fact, the anti-Kurdish
policies of the Turkish government itself encouraged a contrary process: the
“ruralization” of Kurdish nation-formation. It was not the urban elites in the
1920s and 1930s, but the Kurdish tribes and religious orders that mounted the
most stubborn resistance to Turkicization and thus offered the most effective
defense of Kurdish culture and identity.
VI
By way of conclusion, what can we say about
the origins and development of nations? The three cases we have sketched
suggest that the roots of modern ethnic nations go back to a time before the nineteenth
century, that the memory of past greatness or of a shared history and culture
or of a sense of religious community drew people together and suggested, at
least to the elites among them, that they possessed a common identity. But it
is also evident that the idea of nation in its ethnic sense –whether Romanian,
Uzbek, Tajik, or Kurdish—emerged relatively recently, and in the period we have
investigated it hardly encompassed all members of the ethnic community in equal
measure. In the early twentieth century the mass of the population had yet to
be persuaded to embrace the nation at the expense of other, more traditional
allegiances.
All three cases provide convincing evidence
that the modern nation was the creation of a relatively small number of well-educated
persons. It was this elite that undertook the task of cultivating those
features of nationhood –history, language, culture—that would strengthen the
sense of common identity. It was this elite who thought about nation in broad
terms as embracing all members of the supposed ethnic community, and it was
they who made efforts to extend the sentiment of ethnic identity to the mass of
the population by all manner of means. It was also they who sought to organize
the nation through associations and institutions and strove to protect the
nation by engaging in politics and, sometimes, violence, and it was they who
formulated the immediate goal of autonomy and the long-term aspiration of
independence. Yet, their own sense of nationhood was deficient, as they were
reluctant to treat the masses as full members of the nation, as their equals.
Nonetheless, we may rightly conclude that elites played the crucial role in
nation-formation. Yet, it is also true that they did not construct nations out
of whole cloth. Rather, they took certain raw materials, for example, existing
sentiments of historical or religious community and tried to mold and expand
these sentiments into an idea of nation, ethnically based and secular, to which
everyone in the community in question could give allegiance.
I would thus date the origins of nations
earlier than the nineteenth century, and I find it difficult in the three cases
we have observed to attribute nation-formation solely to modern economic and
social development, since the regions with which we are concerned were largely
agricultural and rural. Nonetheless, the course of nation-formation was greatly
affected by growing capitalist and industrial development and urbanization. The
composition of the elites themselves was steadily changing, and new generations
adapted their methods and goals to fit new circumstances and opportunities.
It seems to me that the theoretical
explanation for the origins and development of nations that best fits the
Kurdish case, and the Romanian and Jadid case as well, is that proposed by
Anthony Smith and the historical ethno-symbolists. I think they rightly judge
nation-formation to be a long-term process subject to a great variety of
influences, political, economic, social, and emotional, as conditions in the
respective communities evolved and required elites continuously to adjust their
means and goals accordingly.
(*) Professor at Illinois University
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