Turkish President Erdogan is struggling to accept the heavy defeat of his party's candidates in the municipal elections of March 31. He is gradually overriding the verdict of the polls by appointing loyal officials, known as kayyum, to replace Kurdish mayors elected by robust majorities through universal suffrage.
Five days after the dismissal, on October 30, and incarceration of Ahmet Ozer, the Kurdish academic and mayor of Esenyurt, the largest district of Istanbul with 1.5 million inhabitants—predominantly Kurdish—three other Kurdish mayors were removed on the morning of November 4, under orders from the Interior Minister. They were swiftly replaced by administrators appointed by Ankara.
Among them is Ahmet Turk, 82 years old, the mayor of the large Kurdish city of Mardin, where he had been elected with 57.4% of the votes. This marks the third time this veteran Kurdish politician and former deputy has been removed after being elected by the people in 2015, 2019, and 2024. In a phone interview with Sözcü TV, reported by Le Monde on November 4, Turk recounted how police agents came to his house at 6 AM to notify him of his removal. "An elected mayor, treated like a dangerous criminal at dawn, without any trial or conviction." In his first statement on social media, the mayor of Mardin declared: “We will not back down in the fight for democracy, peace, and freedom. We will not allow the will of the people to be confiscated.”
Ahmet Turk’s career highlights the immense challenges of pursuing a peaceful political struggle for Kurdish rights in Turkey. Repeatedly elected as a member of parliament, he was imprisoned for four years following the military coup of March 1970. After the 1980 coup, he was again imprisoned and tortured for five years. Arrested again in March 1994 alongside a dozen Kurdish deputies from the Democracy Party (DEP), including Leyla Zana, he spent over eight years behind bars—all under the same accusations of “separatism” and “links with a terrorist organization.”
His young colleague Gülistan Sünük, 31 years old, the first woman elected mayor of Batman—a city of 650,000 inhabitants—with 64.5% of the votes, was also removed without any trial or conviction, effectively through an imperial decree of the Turkish "sultan." She is the most successfully elected mayor among Turkey’s 81 provincial capitals. On her X account, she wrote: “Our municipality, which we won with the highest percentage of votes in Turkey thanks to the efforts of women, youth, and our people, was seized this morning without any notification. We will not accept this regime of plunder and seizure.” In an interview with Le Monde last June, she had reminded readers that in Batman, “out of the past ten years, eight were governed by kayyum, resulting in a near-systematic looting of municipal resources.”
The mayor of Halfeti, in the province of Urfa, Mehmet Karayilan, was also among the Kurdish mayors removed in this wave of dismissals.
On the same day, the Interior Minister appointed kayyum administrators who immediately announced a ten-day ban on gatherings, protests, and press statements. Police surrounded the municipal buildings, denying access to the legitimate mayors and their teams.
Confident of its impunity and unconcerned with the legitimacy of its actions, the Turkish regime has extended its persecution to include mayors from the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey’s main opposition party. The arrest of Ahmet Ozer, the popular CHP mayor of Esenyurt and close advisor to Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, appears intended to discredit and weaken Imamoglu—a potential candidate in the next presidential election. Imamoglu himself faces multiple legal proceedings, including the latest for “insulting President Erdogan.” Reacting to Ozer’s arrest, Imamoglu stated that those in power “are trying to seize authority that the people did not grant them through politically motivated courts... they thrive on lies, slander, and fake news. I reviewed the allegations presented as evidence in the current or purported case—believe me, you would laugh if you read them. I read the seven-page indictment in ten minutes. I apologize to his lawyers, but the person who wrote this needs to see a psychiatrist immediately” (Le Monde, November 4, 2024).
This criticism, perceived as a crime of lèse-majesté by President Erdogan, led to a swift legal complaint against Istanbul’s mayor for “defamation,” with Erdogan demanding 1 million Turkish lira (approximately €27,000) in damages. A similar complaint was filed against CHP leader Özgür Özel, who stated on X: “Without learning any lessons from recent days, disregarding all that has been said, and seizing municipalities they failed to win at the polls, they dare to remove elected politicians they could not subdue. This shameless audacity—stained hands, wicked hearts, and deranged minds—must be resisted. We will do whatever it takes to fight this evil.”
Feeling targeted, the Turkish President seeks to punish and intimidate these dissenting voices using a judiciary under his control. His lawsuit against former CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to proceed to trial soon.
Kurdish political leaders, meanwhile, are no strangers to such political trials. The mayor of Hakkari was arrested, removed, and sentenced to 19 years in prison just weeks after his election. The mayor of Van is under legal investigation and could also be arrested and dismissed at any moment for alleged opinions or supposed links to a terrorist organization. As Le Monde notes, “since 2015, the year the war against the Kurdish movement resumed, and after the 2019 municipal elections, nearly all (143 out of 167) mayors from the pro-Kurdish party who were democratically elected in those two elections have been removed, often arrested, tried, and sentenced.”
It is feared that in the coming months, more Kurdish mayors will be removed, arrested, and convicted on the most unfounded allegations.
During protests against this government crackdown on Kurdish elected officials, several hundred people were arrested, including 231 on November 27 (AFP). Among them were 12 journalists. It is worth noting that Turkey ranks among the worst countries in international press freedom indices compiled by Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House.
The Islamist militias of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, Organization for the Liberation of the Levant) launched a large-scale offensive on November 27 from their stronghold in Idlib against the positions of Syrian regime forces in the Aleppo province. This offensive comes in the wake of a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. It is supported by various pro-Turkish militias of the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA), equipped and financed by Turkey, which appears to be coordinating the efforts of these disparate militias.
The Turkish army has also supplied drones, significant quantities of modern weapons, and operational military intelligence.
Facing a demotivated and poorly equipped Syrian army, which lacks support from Hezbollah and Iranian militias, the Islamists made swift advances, reaching the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, by the end of November. The anticipated Russian air support, on which the Syrian regime had previously relied, has been absent as Russia, embroiled in its exhausting war against Ukraine, has significantly reduced its military presence in Syria. The Kremlin, through its spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, called on November 29 for the Syrian authorities to “restore order in this area and reestablish constitutional authority as quickly as possible.” Meanwhile, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, emphasized “Iran’s continued support for the Syrian government, people, and army in their fight against terrorism” during a phone call with his Syrian counterpart, Bassam al-Sabbagh. However, given the regional context and Iran’s considerable weakening, these statements appear largely rhetorical.
This offensive by Islamists is viewed as a serious threat by the Kurds, Christians, the Alawite minority, and what remains of Syria’s democratic and secular opposition. The prospect of a Sunni Islamist emirate under Turkish protection replacing the brutal Assad regime is deeply concerning. Despite Turkish efforts to present a sanitized image of HTS, this organization remains an offshoot of the Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. Its leader, Al-Joulani, previously fought with al-Qaeda in Iraq and spent five years in Iraqi prisons. HTS is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and many other countries. The Kurds are particularly alarmed by this offensive, which coincides with an attack by Turkish-backed FSA militias on Kurdish positions in the region. The uncertain support of their allies in the International Coalition against Daesh further compounds Kurdish concerns.
During the first half of November, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) completed Operation Enduring Security, a seven-day mission targeting ISIS cells in the city of al-Hol, its surrounding areas, and the al-Hol camp. Supported by the International Coalition, the operation mobilized 5,000 fighters, covering over 200 villages along the Syrian-Iraqi border. It resulted in the arrest of 79 ISIS members, the dismantling of numerous hideouts, and the seizure of weapons. In the al-Hol camp, which houses 40,000 individuals connected to ISIS, the forces disrupted ISIS attempts to reorganize and uncovered evidence of extremism, including torture-related killings. The SDF reported that the operation had been delayed in the past due to recurring Turkish attacks and called for international support to address the humanitarian and security challenges in the region.
On November 11, a terrorist bomb attack targeted an SDF vehicle in Hasakah, killing three members, including two wounded veterans and the driver. The explosion, reportedly triggered remotely, occurred near the al-Salihiya district. This attack took place amid ongoing SDF operations to eliminate ISIS cells in the area.
On November 24, the SDF launched an incursion into the Al-Bab district, held by Turkish-backed militias that frequently attack Kurdish-held areas in Aleppo province. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 15 pro-Turkish militiamen were killed in these clashes (AFP, November 24).
Meanwhile, the Crisis Cell for Lebanese Returnees, established by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), announced that 20,369 people had entered the region from Lebanon. The breakdown includes 7,549 men, 6,228 women, and 6,470 children. Among them, 94 individuals hold Lebanese nationality, and 28 are stateless. The returnees either head to their homes or are hosted by relatives in the region. For those without housing, AANES has designated shelters. Since the escalation between Hezbollah and Israel, many Syrians have left Lebanon for AANES-controlled regions, fearing Assad’s regime, which has displaced the largest number of people in the conflict.
SOHR has reported numerous cases of civilians being detained and released for ransom in Turkish-occupied Afrin. In one case, a civilian from Qarrah Kol village was freed after his family paid a $5,000 ransom following four months of detention by military police in Jendiress, Afrin district, for unknown reasons. Similarly, a civilian from Jowaiq village was released for $2,500 by Al-Jabha Al-Shamiyyah after attempting to cross into Turkey. Another civilian paid a $600 fine for trying to obtain an identity card in Afrin. These incidents are part of ongoing human rights violations in Afrin under the occupation of the Turkish military and its proxy militias.
In other Turkish-occupied territories such as Azzaz and Al-Bab, these militias hoist Turkish flags on public buildings and issue new identity cards written in Arabic and Turkish. Turkish currency is now used for daily transactions. These territories are gradually becoming Turkish protectorates, poised for annexation if the regional and international circumstances allow.
For the first time in forty years, Iraq conducted a nationwide census in its 18 provinces. The operation, carried out with technical support from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), took place calmly on November 20 and 21.
A curfew was imposed during these two days, with the population instructed to stay at home except in cases of emergency. Approximately 120,000 surveyors were mobilized to collect data ranging from the number of people per household, health status, education level, employment status, number of vehicles, and even inventories of household appliances to assess the living standards of residents.
The census questionnaire included religion—without distinguishing between Sunni and Shia—but did not include ethnicity, unlike previous censuses.
Thus, the number of Kurds or Turkmen in the country will remain unknown, seemingly to ease tensions among the various components of the population.
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani emphasized “the importance of the event, which will support development and planning in all sectors” (AFP, November 20). According to the spokesperson for the Ministry of Planning, the census will “shed light on the reality of Iraq in all its details” and help identify the problems paralyzing development in healthcare, education, and housing.
In Kurdistan, the focus was on the so-called “disputed territories” such as Kirkuk and several areas in Nineveh-Mosul province. Article 140 of the 2005 Constitution had called for a census to determine the ethnic composition of these areas and their aspirations to join the Kurdistan Region. Arab and Turkmen leaders in these territories opposed such a census, and the federal government in Baghdad, citing various pretexts, refused to implement this constitutional article.
After months of negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil, the Iraqi government agreed to register only families already present in the disputed territories during the 1957 census. This measure was intended to prevent demographic imbalances caused by populations settled there under Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy and subsequent waves of migration.
Newcomers were registered in their province of origin, while many displaced Kurds from these territories were allowed to return temporarily to be counted.
The first preliminary results of the census were announced on November 25. During a press conference, the Prime Minister revealed that Iraq’s total population has exceeded 45.4 million, including foreigners and refugees. Women represent 49.8% of the population and head 11.33% of households. Youth under 15 account for 36.1% of the population, and approximately 60% are of working age. An Iraqi household averages five members, with an annual population growth rate of 2.3%.
According to these results, the population of autonomous Kurdistan stands at over 6.3 million people, or 13.87% of Iraq’s total population.
This percentage will likely serve as the basis for determining the Kurdistan Region's share of the national budget as well as the number of Kurdish representatives in the Federal Parliament of Baghdad.
The Kurdish population in the disputed territories is estimated at around 2.5 million. Taking into account displaced Arabs and others currently residing in Kurdistan, it is estimated that there are approximately 8 million Kurds in Iraq, or 17.6% of the total population.
Elsewhere in Kurdistan, the promised resumption of oil exports remains unfulfilled despite repeated assurances. The halt in exports since March 2023 has resulted in a loss of $20 billion, according to an estimate published in September by APIKUR, an association of international oil companies operating in Kurdistan (AFP, November 7, 2024).
In addition to disputes between Baghdad, Kurdistan, and oil companies, financial disagreements persist between Iraq and Turkey. Another contentious issue concerns renegotiation of oil contracts: previous agreements with Kurdistan allowed companies to retain part of the produced volumes in addition to recovering costs.
In short, the issue remains far from resolved.
Amidst this tumultuous backdrop, the Kurds found a reason to celebrate with the 240th anniversary of the founding of the city of Sulaymaniyah.
Kurdistan boasts several millennia-old cities such as Erbil (ancient Arbela, more than 6,000 years old), Amed (Diyarbakir, also over 6,000 years old), Urfa (Edessa), Van, and Saqqez.
The city of Sulaymaniyah was founded by the Kurdish Baban dynasty, which sought to rival the splendor of Sinneh (Sanandaj), the capital of the Kurdish Ardalan dynasty in Iranian Kurdistan.
Over the decades, Sulaymaniyah has become a cultural and artistic hub whose influence extends beyond the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. With a population of nearly one million, it is, after Erbil, the second-largest city in autonomous Kurdistan.
The increasingly weakened Iranian regime appears to be making a last-ditch effort by accelerating its preparations to acquire a nuclear bomb, which it believes would guarantee its survival and protection, similar to North Korea.
On the regional level, setbacks are piling up. An entire security architecture built over decades via allied Arab militias is collapsing under the blows of its Israeli enemy. Hamas has been militarily annihilated, the powerful Lebanese Hezbollah has been decapitated and is exhausted, the Syrian regime—central to the so-called “Shia arc”—is on the brink of collapse, and the pro-Iranian Shia militias in Iraq, increasingly resented by the population, seem to be living on borrowed time. Iran’s own military power appears to have been far more severely impacted by Israel's late-October strikes than Tehran admits. It was already known that these strikes largely destroyed and neutralized Iran's Russian-made air defense systems, thanks particularly to Israeli F-35 bombers operating beyond their range.
It has now been revealed (Le Figaro, November 15) that Israel destroyed a major nuclear research center undisclosed to the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The target was reportedly the Taleghan 2 facility located within the Parchin military complex southeast of Tehran. According to a well-informed source cited by the American news site Axios, the Israeli strike “destroyed sophisticated equipment used to design the plastic explosives surrounding uranium in a nuclear device, essential for its detonation. It significantly damaged Iran’s year-long efforts to resume nuclear weapons research.”
Iran's nuclear activities are being closely monitored by the IAEA, whose Board of Governors met in Vienna on November 21. Western diplomats delivered a harsh indictment of Iran, resulting in the adoption of a new critical resolution drafted by London, Paris, and Berlin (E3), in collaboration with Washington. Out of the 35 member states on the Board, 19 voted in favor, 3 (China, Russia, and Burkina Faso) opposed it, while 12 abstained. During the discussions, U.S. Ambassador Laura Holgate denounced the escalation by the Islamic Republic, stating that “Iran’s nuclear activities are deeply troubling.” The E3 group echoed this sentiment, recalling that Iran has amassed enough highly enriched uranium for “four nuclear weapons.” Iran’s behavior, they added, “poses a threat to international security and the global non-proliferation system,” according to a statement cited by Le Monde (November 21). The resolution “reminds Tehran of its legal obligations” under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), ratified in 1970.
Since 2021, Iran has severely restricted its cooperation with the IAEA, shutting down surveillance cameras and revoking accreditation for experienced inspectors. Responding to the adoption of this new resolution, Tehran denounced a “politically motivated move” and announced, on November 22, “the commissioning of new advanced centrifuges” in retaliation. Whether the Iranian regime will pursue its nuclear strategy to completion or whether this is a short-term posture to strengthen its position for future negotiations with the Trump administration remains to be seen (New York Times, November 11).
Meanwhile, Tehran arrested Iranian-American journalist Reza Valizadeh on November 3. Valizadeh, who has worked for opposition radio Ferda and for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, funded by the U.S. government, has been accused of subversion. He is likely to be used as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. On November 12, American airstrikes in Syria targeted Iranian-linked sites, killing four pro-Iranian militiamen (AFP, November 12).
Repression in Iran has intensified, particularly against women. According to the Catholic daily La Croix (November 20), “From clinics to cameras, the country is waging war on women.” Meanwhile, L’Express, in its November 13 issue, denounced “the regime's chilling methods to portray opponents as mentally ill.” Two years after the death of Jîna Mahsa Amini, repression continues, accompanied by a strategy of pathologizing dissenting voices. Behind this propaganda lie genuine mental health issues, ignored by the regime of the mullahs, notes the French weekly. Among these “mad” individuals is a young woman who, on November 2, walked in her underwear in front of her university to protest the mandatory wearing of the hijab and denounce harassment by campus security officials, who deemed her clothing “insufficiently Islamic” (Le Monde, November 4). She became a symbol of Iranian women's struggle against the compulsory hijab. Arrested and hospitalized “for psychiatric disorders,” she was released on November 19. The Iranian judiciary justified her release by stating: “Since she was transferred to the hospital and diagnosed as ill, she was handed over to her family, who is now taking care of her.”
France 24 aired a report on November 13 titled “When hijab repression drives Iranian schoolgirls to suicide.” Suicide has also become a form of protest among Iranian dissidents, despairing over their country’s direction.
On November 13, journalist and human rights activist Kianouch Sinjari took his own life. In a message on social media platform X, he explained his act: “If Fatemeh Sepehari, Nasreen Shakarami, and Arsham Rezaei are not released from prison by 7 PM today, Wednesday, November 13, and the news of their release is not published, I will end my life in protest against the dictatorship of Khamenei and his cronies.” A leader of the United Students' Front in Iran and the Committee of Journalists for Human Rights, Sinjari blogged extensively about the plight of political prisoners. His suicide aimed to awaken consciences regarding the dire conditions of political detainees in Iranian prisons (RFI, November 13).
In Kurdistan, on November 10, the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Iran sentenced prominent Kurdish women’s rights activist Varisheh Moradi to death for “armed rebellion” due to her alleged membership in the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK). Currently held in Tehran’s infamous Evin prison, Moradi has endured torture, prolonged isolation, and severe mistreatment since her arrest in August 2023. To protest her unjust sentence, she launched a 20-day hunger strike, according to the human rights organization Hengaw. Moradi joins Zeynab Jalalian as the second Kurdish woman sentenced to death in Iran.
Simultaneously, four other Kurds, including one from Iraqi Kurdistan, were sentenced to death for “spying for Israel.” Authorities have also extended the prison sentence of Kurdish activist Ahmedreza Haeri from three years and eight months to six years and three months. A native of the Kurdish province of Elam, he was accused of “disrupting national security.” Three Kurds from Shinno were sentenced to 16 months each for participating in a protest marking the second anniversary of Jîna Mahsa Amini’s death.
Authorities continue to target Kurdish activists, including four detainees—one a minor from Swallawa, a local journalist from Saqqez, and three others from Mahabad.
