A swift offensive by a coalition of Syrian rebel militias launched on November 27 from Idlib, with multifaceted support from Turkey, culminated on December 8 in the capture of Damascus. A brutal dictatorship that had ruled for over half a century collapsed in just 12 days. The dictator fled early in the morning to a Russian military base, from where he was discreetly evacuated to Moscow on a military plane that avoided Turkish airspace by flying through Iraq and Iran. His family, already in Moscow, was granted political asylum by President Vladimir Putin, where they own numerous luxury apartments.
While it was widely known that the Syrian regime was hollowed out, riddled with corruption, and despised by the vast majority of a population impoverished by 14 years of devastating war, even the most informed observers did not anticipate such a rapid and dramatic collapse. The regime’s foreign backers—Russia and Iran—preoccupied with their own challenges, ignored its pleas for help. Severely weakened by its confrontation with Israel and domestic unrest, Iran, upon learning of Aleppo’s fall where the Syrian army offered no resistance, chose to cut its losses by urgently evacuating its diplomatic personnel and militias. Russia, whose air force had bombed rebel positions in the early days of the offensive, ultimately opted for non-intervention under an agreement allegedly reached with Turkey to safeguard its interests, including its military bases in Syria. Much of Russia’s military presence in Syria had already been redeployed to the Ukrainian front. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, whose fighters had played a crucial role in defending the Syrian regime, withdrew its forces to counter Israel’s offensive. What remained was the Syrian army—ill-equipped, poorly paid, demoralized, and riddled with corruption—deserting its positions one after another.
The offensive by the rebel coalition, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), also known as the "Organization for the Liberation of the Levant," appears to have been meticulously planned long before the summer. Coordination and planning were carried out with the assistance of the Turkish military and intelligence services (MIT). Turkey provided weapons and equipment, including drones, for the operation, initially scheduled for October. However, President Erdoğan, still holding out hope for a rapprochement with Damascus via Moscow, delayed the operation.
Bashar al-Assad, believing his regime had been bolstered by readmission to the Arab League and normalization with Gulf monarchies, including the UAE, conditioned any meeting with Erdoğan on the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syrian territories they occupy—a precondition unacceptable to Ankara. Consequently, in mid-November, Turkey gave the green light for the rebel offensive, timing it to follow the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
A discreet but decisive sponsor of the offensive, the Turkish president claimed Turkey's role only on December 7, the eve of Damascus's fall, in a speech in Gaziantep, a border city with Syria, expressing hope that everything would proceed calmly. On the same day, his foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, was in Doha, participating in a debate with his Russian and Iranian counterparts. He later claimed to have convinced them not to intervene in favor of a doomed regime and promised that their interests would be preserved in return.
The HTS, the central and structuring force of the victorious rebel coalition, seized the main levers of power, symbolically handed over to it by the outgoing prime minister. Its leader, Abou Mohammed al-Joulani, 40, celebrated the victory in the iconic Umayyad Mosque of Damascus, much like his former idol Al-Baghdadi had celebrated the capture of Mosul by the Islamic State in that city's historic mosque. In the following days, the population was called to the streets to celebrate their liberation. Al-Joulani thus became, by revolutionary legitimacy, the de facto head of state of Syria for a three-month transitional period.
The HTS is the successor of the former Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, and is listed as a terrorist organization by Western countries. Its leader, al-Joulani, fought in al-Qaeda's ranks against the Americans and the Shia population in Iraq, where he was arrested and served five years in prison. He later joined ISIS before creating the Al-Nusra Front with other Syrian and foreign jihadists, which served as al-Qaeda's Syrian branch. Under the persistent advice of Turkish services, and to benefit from humanitarian and military aid transiting through Turkey, he renamed his organization HTS and announced a renunciation of global jihad. Skeptical of this opportunistic transformation, the United States placed a $12 million bounty on the head of this "terrorist" leader, who is also a longtime partner of their Turkish allies and the de facto governor of the rebel province of Idlib, controlled by the HTS. In this province, numerous ISIS jihadists, including its leaders, have found refuge. This province has survived thanks to international aid, notably European, transiting through Turkey. The Turkish army maintains numerous bases there and routinely cooperates with HTS leaders.
The leaders of the HTS administration in Idlib have now been promoted to ministers in the new Syrian government, which includes no women or representatives of Syria's ethno-religious diversity. The HTS's military chief has become the Minister of Defense, the governor of Idlib the Prime Minister, and the director of NGO relations the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Turkish services and a British communications agency are working to "polish" the image of this new Islamist government and its leader. The latter now wears a suit and tie, receives foreign leaders and diplomats, and promises that the new Syria will be inclusive and protective of its minorities, particularly Christians.
The revolutionary Islamism claimed by the new government will likely tolerate what remains of the Christian community scattered across various cities in the country, ensuring a degree of religious freedom without allowing churches to ring their bells, as in Idlib province. Its intentions toward the Alawite minority, from which the Assad clan originates, remain unknown. Concerns also abound regarding women's status under this future Islamic regime, as beyond reassuring statements, it is unclear how strictly Sharia law, which the new government claims to uphold, will be enforced. Practices in Idlib province over recent years are cause for alarm among modern, educated, and secular women from Syria's major cities, who have organized several demonstrations in Damascus to declare that they will not give up their hard-won freedoms (AFP, 24/12).
As for the fate of the Kurds in this new Syria, no information has yet emerged regarding plans from Damascus. During the Battle of Aleppo, local commanders of HTS and Kurdish forces reached a compromise to avoid any military confrontation. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controlled the Kurdish neighborhoods of the city, were able to evacuate to territories under Kurdish administration in exchange for a commitment that no violence or corrective measures would be taken against the Kurdish population of Aleppo—a commitment that has so far been respected. On December 31, direct discussions were held in Damascus between al-Joulani and the SDF's chief commander, General Mazloum Abdi, which were described as "positive" (see AFP, 31/12). These discussions aim to address "through dialogue" the military, political, and economic issues related to the future integration of Kurdish-administered regions, which comprise over a third of Syrian territory, into the new Syria. As a goodwill gesture, the Kurdish administration adopted the new Syrian flag. However, the Kurdish-dominated SDF does not consider itself bound by an agreement signed on December 24 by various armed groups and Syrian militias, which accept their dissolution and gradual integration into the new Syrian army.
The SDF wishes to engage in dialogue with Damascus about building a new army but opposes its own dissolution or the individual integration of its fighters. Having proven its worth in the fight against ISIS, the SDF seeks to serve as a model for a new Syrian army that should be inclusive, secular, national, and provide a significant role for women. The Kurds also advocate for a decentralized government that ensures a high degree of autonomy for Kurds, Druze, and Alawites, a proposal that HTS's leadership refuses to accept. This refusal is driven by HTS's Islamist-nationalist ideology and the strong pressure from its Turkish ally, for whom recognizing an autonomous status for Syrian Kurds represents a "red line" and an "existential threat to Turkey."
Taking advantage of the power vacuum and the offensive by the coalition of rebel militias, Ankara mobilized its Syrian auxiliaries from the "Free Syrian Army" against Kurdish-controlled territories. Exploiting the element of surprise and defections of certain Arab tribal leaders bribed by Turkish services, the towns of Tall Rifat and Manbij, located west of the Euphrates, fell under Turkish control. However, Kurdish forces held their ground on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, notably defending the highly strategic Tishrin Dam, which provides 40% of the region's electricity. Intense fighting between the SDF and Turkish-backed militias resulted in more than 400 deaths, including numerous civilians and two Kurdish journalists from Turkey (AFP, 21/12).
The Turkish-backed militia offensive, supported by Turkish airpower and aimed at "dislodging" the SDF from all its positions, including the emblematic city of Kobane—symbol of Kurdish resistance against ISIS—sparked strong reactions in several Western capitals, particularly Washington, Paris, and Bonn. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham called on the U.S. government to "protect our Kurdish allies." The CENTCOM commander-in-chief visited Rojava to express support for the Kurds. U.S. military personnel in the region were increased to 2,000 soldiers, with American patrols deployed in Kobane to reassure the local Kurdish population. Thanks to U.S. mediation, a ceasefire was reached on December 12 but lasted only a few days.
On December 13, during a visit to Jordan before traveling to Ankara, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated that Syrian Kurdish forces are "essential" for the United States to prevent the resurgence of ISIS activities. Throughout the month, American airstrikes targeted numerous ISIS positions. France and Germany, through their foreign ministers, also urged Turkey to end its offensive against Kurdish forces via its Syrian auxiliaries. However, as Donald Trump’s administration prepares to assume power in Washington, Ankara appears determined to consolidate its advantage on the Syrian chessboard and create a fait accompli to strengthen its position in future negotiations. Responding to Turkey's proposal for "military assistance" (AFP, 15/12), the new Syrian leader al-Joulani, now using his real name, Mohamad al-Charaa, expressed in an interview with the Turkish nationalist daily Yeni Şafak his "gratitude" and support for a strategic agreement with Turkey (Le Monde, 23/12). Such an agreement would provide Turkey with a veneer of legitimacy for its military intervention against Kurdish forces. Ankara also seeks to quickly finalize an agreement with Damascus, akin to the one controversially signed with Tripoli’s puppet government for delineating maritime zones in the eastern Mediterranean, favoring Turkish interests.
While Turkey stands as the potential big winner of Syria’s regime change, it may not reap all the anticipated economic and geopolitical benefits. Syria is a devastated country under international sanctions. It requires European aid and Gulf investment for reconstruction, and lifting the sanctions will require tough negotiations with Western countries, particularly the United States. Following initial contact with Damascus at the end of December, the U.S. temporarily suspended the terrorist organization designation for HTS, removed the bounty on its leader, and authorized emergency humanitarian aid. Gulf countries are wary of Syria becoming a Turkish protectorate after decades of Iranian dominance.
These heavy uncertainties hanging over Syria’s future have not stopped Syrians from celebrating long-awaited and dreamed-of freedom and enjoying, despite material hardships, the present air of liberty. Many are searching for the approximately 100,000 disappeared. Reports of the regime’s notorious prisons dominate media coverage, alongside the drug manufacturing workshops, particularly Captagon, which turned Syria into a narco-state.
On December 30, the new interim government, initially expected to last three months, announced that new elections could not be organized for another four years.
An unusual and opaque negotiation process seems to have been initiated in recent months between Turkish authorities and the historic leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara since 1999.
The Turkish government’s declared goal is to secure a public statement from Öcalan calling on the PKK to end its 40-year guerrilla war, which has claimed over 50,000 lives, more than 80% of them Kurdish. Over these decades, the Turkish army’s massive counter-insurgency campaigns have destroyed 3,400 Kurdish villages and hamlets, forcing the displacement of 2 to 3 million Kurdish civilians. Thousands of civic activists, intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, trade unionists, and Kurdish journalists have been killed by death squads linked to the gendarmerie (JİTEM) and Turkish police in so-called “unsolved murders” known as faili meçhul. The Turkish judiciary, quick to prosecute Kurdish opposition figures—including elected mayors and MPs—for “terrorist propaganda” or “links to a terrorist organization,” has made little effort to investigate these killings.
The new "paradigm" being proposed appears to involve turning the page, announcing the end of the PKK’s armed struggle, and declaring a “reconciliation between the brotherly peoples of Turks and Kurds.”
Is this negotiation tied to a potential amnesty for political prisoners and PKK fighters? Could it include the recognition—short of full autonomy for the Kurdish region—of some cultural and linguistic rights for Turkey’s 26 million Kurds (a recent estimate by the leader of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP)? Or is this merely an attempt to secure the PKK’s surrender or self-dissolution under the guidance of its founder, who might then be released and placed under house arrest?
For now, there is little reliable information available. What is known is that after ten years of isolation and a ban on visits from both his lawyers and family, Öcalan’s nephew, Omer Öcalan, was permitted to visit him in October. This visit came after a call by Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and ally of President Erdoğan, inviting Öcalan to speak before parliament and announce “the dissolution of his terrorist organization (PKK) to finally rid Turkey of the scourge of terrorism, which hampers civil peace and the country’s development.” Bahçeli, the figurehead of Turkish ultranationalism who until recently denied the existence of the Kurdish people, likely did not make such a proposal without the consent and encouragement of Erdoğan, with whom he has been allied since 2015 in an electoral and governing coalition.
On December 28, two MPs from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, were authorized to visit İmralı Island for a lengthy meeting with Öcalan. In a public statement following the visit, they reported that Öcalan appeared “in good health” and “in high spirits.” He reportedly proposed solutions to the Kurdish question in Turkey and emphasized the “urgent need to strengthen Turkish-Kurdish unity.”
Öcalan expressed his determination to contribute to the peace process in Turkey, stating: “I have the competence and the resolve necessary to make a positive contribution to the new process launched by Mr. Bahçeli and Mr. Erdoğan.” He added that he is ready to fulfill his “historic responsibility” (AFP, December 29). Öcalan asked the delegation to share his perspective with the state and all political parties in the country, stating, “This is a time for peace, democracy, and fraternity for Turkey and the region.”
The Turkish government, however, does not use the term “peace process” and shows no signs of easing its repressive policies against Kurdish activists and elected officials. Following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Ankara has escalated its threats and interventions against Syrian Kurds, pledging to “eradicate the terrorist organization PYD,” a reference to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which form the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—key allies of the international coalition against ISIS. When asked about the “new peace process,” Erdoğan repeats his bellicose stance: “Either they (the PKK fighters) will bury their weapons, or they will be buried with their weapons by our heroic army.” This martial rhetoric suggests that what is being framed as a peace process may, in fact, be a calculated maneuver to dominate media narratives, distract public opinion during a deep political and economic crisis, and neutralize the PKK amid regional upheavals where the group could potentially forge alliances with Turkey’s adversaries.
In Turkey, the main opposition CHP remains skeptical of these covert maneuvers, asserting that the only legitimate venue for addressing the Kurdish question is the Turkish parliament. Among Kurdish opinion, still scarred by the unexplained collapse of the 2015 peace process, there is widespread skepticism and division. The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), a « mass organization » affiliated with the PKK, praised Öcalan’s vision and proposals in a statement, declaring: “As a movement for freedom and for the people, we declare that our leader’s views serve as a manifesto and a compass for our struggle in the new year.” However, the KCK also condemned Turkey’s “crimes” in northeastern Syria, where it accused Turkish-backed militias of displacing over 100,000 Kurds and deliberately targeting women and children in acts of genocide against the Kurdish people.
On December 9, the pro-Kurdish Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), the second-largest opposition group in parliament, also criticized Turkey’s interventions in Syria, accusing the government of exacerbating chaos and undermining peace efforts. Co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan, speaking during a parliamentary budget session for 2025, called on the Turkish government to end its aggressive policies toward Syrian Kurds, engage in dialogue with the Rojava administration, and adopt cooperation-oriented policies rather than hostility.
The PKK, for its part, asserts that Turkey’s new initiative is a result of the Turkish army’s repeated failures against the Kurdish guerrilla force, arguing that there is no military solution to the conflict. It claims readiness, in principle, to follow Öcalan’s directives.
Observers and Turkish media outlets close to the government speculate that this process will culminate in a formal appeal from Öcalan in February 2025. By then, much may hinge on the policies of the incoming Trump administration regarding Syrian Kurds and Turkey—critical factors in shaping the future of this opaque and potentially historic process.
A law titled “Hijab and Chastity,” significantly toughening penalties and fines against women who fail to comply with the wearing of the veil, was passed on December 3 by Iran's conservative-dominated parliament. This new law, now finalized, is scheduled to take effect on December 13.
Women not wearing veils in violation of this law will be identified either through omnipresent surveillance cameras in major cities or by trusted individuals of the regime, effectively informants. These informants can report women not wearing veils by providing the police with their vehicle's license plate number or the address of a store or restaurant where unveiled women were present. According to RFI’s Tehran correspondent, taxi drivers are also required to report unveiled women using their vehicles; failure to do so will result in fines. Even foreigners living legally in Iran, such as Afghan or Iraqi refugees, are authorized to report unveiled women.
The fines imposed on women violating this “chastity” law imposed by the clerical regime are especially heavy, ranging from €110 to over €2,000 for repeat offenses, in a country where the minimum wage is just €120. Women unable to pay the fines will face significant restrictions, such as being unable to travel abroad, obtain a driver’s license, or access administrative documents. Publishing photos of unveiled women on social media will also incur steep fines.
Prison sentences are also stipulated for individuals promoting the rejection of the veil or sending photos or videos of unveiled women to foreign media outlets.
This fanatical cultural war against women—half of society—which comes barely two years after the powerful “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, has sparked outrage within civil society.
Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who had pledged during his electoral campaign to “remove morality police from the streets,” expressed public doubts about the “relevance” of this new law. He warned on December 3 that it risks provoking societal tensions in a country already grappling with dire economic difficulties.
“We must avoid doing anything that could further displease the nation,” he added.
Defying the regime, artist Parastoo Ahmadi performed a song without a veil on December 11 in a concert labeled “historic” held in the desert with no audience. Her act sparked a wave of admiration and hope among the public (Libération, December 12). During this unprecedented performance, she wore a necklace shaped like the map of Iran, which has become a new symbol of women’s resistance in the country. The video of her performance, streamed live on YouTube, has been viewed over one million times. Arrested for a few hours, she was subsequently released (Le Monde, December 14). Another artist, rapper Toomaj Salehi, who was arrested in November 2023 and sentenced to one year in prison for supporting protests following Jîna Mahsa Amini’s death, was released on December 2 after serving his sentence.
On December 4, Narges Mohammadi, the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, was temporarily released from prison for medical reasons. Her temporary release is expected to last three weeks, according to her lawyer. Upon her release from prison, lying on an ambulance stretcher with her head uncovered, she chanted “Woman, Life, Freedom” and reaffirmed her determination to continue fighting against the compulsory veil and capital punishment. She was able to meet virtually with the Nobel committee (AFP, December 9) and her family, who are refugees in France.
In light of the president’s reservations, strong reactions from civil society, and fears of a resurgence of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, the implementation of the chastity law was “suspended” on December 19.
Meanwhile, the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights published its 2024 annual report documenting widespread human rights violations in Iran. The report highlights an alarming increase in executions, arbitrary arrests, systemic violence, and abuses targeting marginalized groups.
Executions: 901 people were executed, including 183 Kurds, and 13 for political or religious activities.
Arbitrary Arrests: 1,235 people were arrested, with 51% being Kurds and 137 women among the detainees.
Kolbars (Kurdish border porters): 339 kolbars were killed or injured, 81% by Iranian armed forces.
Femicide: 182 women were murdered, including 28 in so-called “honor killings,” often by close family members.
Deaths in Custody: 22 prisoners died in detention, including nine under torture, many of them political prisoners.
Landmine Victims: 57 individuals were killed or injured by landmines and explosive devices.
In December, Iranian authorities intensified repression against the Kurdish community across Rojhelat (Iranian Kurdistan), leading to numerous arrests, harsh prison sentences, and significant restrictions on fundamental rights and fair trial guarantees.
In Boukan, several civilians received prison sentences for alleged political offenses. Hajar Soltani was sentenced to six months for “propaganda against the state” after being detained without a warrant. Ahmad Hassanzadeh, whose son was killed during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, received a three-month sentence for similar charges.
In Piranshahr, Ayub Damavandi was sentenced to five years and 15 days for “espionage for Israel,” while Rahman Qaderi was sentenced to eight months for “propaganda against the state.” Salam Soltani and Amir Feqeh were both sentenced to five years for alleged collaboration with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). All four faced trials without legal representation.
In Saqqez and Kamyaran, four Kurdish teachers were arrested. While one, Abdollah Karim Golan, was released on bail, the others remain in detention. In Divandareh, four more teachers were dismissed and one exiled.
Kurdish activist and language teacher Idris Menbari from Sanandaj was sentenced to two years for allegedly organizing “security-disrupting” groups. Varisheh Moradi, a Kurdish activist detained in Evin prison, continues to face harsh conditions, including isolation and lack of legal visits, and is sentenced to death on charges of “rebellion.”
On the geopolitical stage, Iran has witnessed the collapse of its so-called “axis of resistance,” painstakingly built over decades to ensure the Islamic Republic's regional influence. The Syrian regime under Assad has fallen, replaced by a pro-Turkish Sunni Islamist government. Hezbollah in Lebanon has been significantly weakened by Israeli strikes, and Hamas is barely surviving amid relentless Israeli bombings. Even Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq are lying low under threats of Israeli retaliation.
After Assad’s regime fell in Syria, Iranian Kurdish political parties issued statements celebrating the Syrian people’s victory and expressing hope for the eventual collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. They urged Kurdish political forces in Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) to maintain unity, strategically address future challenges, and protect their hard-earned gains.
Weakened and cornered, the Iranian regime appears to pin its hopes for survival on its nuclear program. According to Rafael M. Grossi, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as cited by The New York Times on December 6, Iran has made “dramatic leap” toward producing nuclear fuel close to weapon-grade levels. Its production of 60% enriched uranium has quadrupled recently and continues to accelerate. Grossi warned that Iran’s nuclear activities are “deeply concerning,” calling on IAEA member states to take action to halt its march toward producing a nuclear weapon.
Mid-December saw the discovery of a new mass grave near the town of Tal al-Shaikhia in southern Iraq by Kurdish-Iraqi teams tasked with exhuming the remains of Kurdish civilians killed during Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaigns. The remains of approximately 100 women and children were uncovered in a communal burial site, officials announced on December 26.
In a statement to AFP, Diaa Karim, head of the Iraqi Authority for Mass Graves, recounted the painstaking work of excavation: “After removing the first layer of soil and uncovering the remains, it became clear that they belonged to women and children dressed in Kurdish clothing.”
Many of the victims were executed with close-range gunshots to the head, Karim noted, adding that the excavation efforts were ongoing.
The victims are believed to have originated from the Kalar district in the Sulaymaniyah province.
Another nearby mass grave was also discovered, reported Dourgham Kamel, a member of the Mass Graves Exhumation Authority, near the infamous Nougrat Salman prison, where thousands of Kurds and political dissidents were tortured and killed under Saddam Hussein’s regime.
The genocidal campaigns known as Anfal (Spoils), carried out by Saddam Hussein’s regime from 1987 to 1988, claimed 182,000 lives in Kurdistan. Civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, were deported to Iraq’s southern deserts, particularly in the Muthanna province, where they were either executed by gunfire or buried alive “to save bullets,” often in mass graves flattened by bulldozers. Since the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003 and his subsequent execution, mass graves have been regularly discovered by excavation teams combing these vast desert areas. A major discovery included a grave containing the remains of approximately 500 Barzani clan members abducted and killed in 1983. Their remains were repatriated to Kurdistan and buried in the Barzan Martyrs’ Cemetery. However, the remains of another 7,500 Barzanis abducted during the same 1983 roundup have yet to be found.
In other news from Kurdistan and Iraq, negotiations have begun between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to form a coalition government. The first meeting was held in Erbil on December 17 to lay the groundwork and outline the future government’s priorities. The situation in Syria was also discussed, given its potential impact on the Kurdistan Region, which shares a 100 km border with Syria. This situation could also influence the mandate of the International Coalition against ISIS, whose presence in Kurdistan is set to end in 2026. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration has renewed its support for both the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army.
Despite ongoing negotiations with Baghdad and repeated unfulfilled promises, the issue of resuming oil exports from Kurdistan remains unresolved. The Kurdistan Region’s share of the federal budget continues to be delayed, putting additional strain on its economy.
The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Ministry of Finance has criticized the federal Iraqi government for failing to meet its financial obligations to the region, leaving public employees unpaid for three months.
According to the ministry, Baghdad transferred only 10.75 trillion dinars of the 11.58 trillion dinars allocated for 2024 under the federal budget law. To cover the deficit, the KRG allocated approximately 960 billion dinars from its internal revenues to pay salaries. The ministry accused Baghdad of using “insufficient liquidity” as a pretext for withholding payments, forcing the region's public employees to bear the brunt of Iraq’s financial issues.
The statement also highlighted that the federal government has not allocated any funds for development projects in Kurdistan for several years, further exacerbating the strain on the region’s resources. These resources are also used to maintain essential public services, including health, education, and infrastructure.
The KRG Ministry of Finance called on Baghdad to honor its legal and constitutional obligations and to resolve ongoing financial disputes promptly. Public employees in the Kurdistan Region have remained unpaid for three months.
The ongoing suspension of Kurdistan’s oil exports has already caused losses nearing $24 billion for both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, according to the Kurdistan Petroleum Industry Association (APIKUR).
