On January 29, a "Victory Congress" was held in Damascus, bringing together the leaders of the main Sunni Arab militias allied with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to appoint the leader of this group, Ahmed al-Sharaa, as interim president of the Syrian Arab Republic. This decision formalized a de facto situation that had prevailed since the capture of Damascus by HTS and its allies on December 8.
The warlord al-Joulani reclaimed his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and moved into the presidential palace abandoned by Bashar al-Assad, where he was received as a legitimate head of state. He first welcomed the Turkish and Qatari foreign ministers, his longtime sponsors and supporters, followed by Arab and Western envoys. Even the United States, which had placed a $10 million bounty on the jihadist leader who had fought the American army, "suspended" the reward and sent envoys to assess the humanitarian situation on the ground and explore potential avenues for cooperation.
The foreign ministers of France and Germany met with the new ruler of Damascus on January 3 to facilitate a peaceful transition and demand a government that serves the Syrian people and regional stability. In a message on X, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot emphasized "the importance of democratic governance where all components of the Syrian nation are fully recognized and respected." His German counterpart, Annalena Baerbock, stated: "We will continue to judge HTS by its actions, despite our skepticism."
She urged the transitional authorities "not to compromise the political process by imposing excessively long delays before elections or by implementing measures to Islamize the judiciary or the educational system."
The two ministers also met with Christian patriarchs and representatives of Syrian civil society, who expressed "a desire to see the drafting of a constitution guaranteeing equal rights for all citizens while respecting their diversity."
In response to these expectations, Ahmed al-Sharaa assured the two European ministers that a national dialogue conference would be organized by an independent preparatory committee, in which "Syria’s diversity would be represented, including women."
During the meeting, the French minister also expressed "the hope that a political solution could be found with France's allies, the Kurds, to ensure their full integration into the political process now underway."
The German minister, for her part, urged the new authorities in Damascus to avoid "acts of revenge against entire population groups" and to reject "extremism and radical factions. This must be our common goal. And it is also in our own interest: Europe's and Germany’s security are closely linked to it."
France is considering a "gradual and conditional" lifting of sanctions on Syria and is progressively preparing for its return to the country (Le Monde, January 4).
The new Syrian leaders, groomed and coached by Turkish intelligence services and a British communications agency, are delivering moderate and reassuring messages to their Western interlocutors in an effort to secure the lifting of sanctions as soon as possible and to obtain massive humanitarian aid that the war-weary Syrian population desperately needs.
Following Ankara’s advice—since Turkey lacks the means to provide substantial reconstruction aid—the new leadership is courting the Gulf petro-monarchies for support. The new Syrian foreign minister chose Saudi Arabia for his first international trip before embarking on a tour of other Arab states: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.
Following this visit, Saudi Arabia established an air bridge to Syria, delivering food, shelter, and medical supplies. The kingdom also offered to train and equip the Syrian civilian police and replace Iranian oil supplies to help alleviate the country’s energy crisis.
Qatar and Jordan also provided emergency humanitarian aid, aiming to curb the flow of drugs and radical Islamist fighters at the Syrian border and counter Turkish influence, to prevent Syria from becoming a Turkish protectorate after decades as an Iranian ally.
The United Arab Emirates welcomed the Syrian delegation but has been cautious in offering aid to a government led by HTS. However, the Gulf Cooperation Council, dominated by Saudi Arabia, intends to provide technical assistance to rebuild roads, schools, hospitals, and housing in Syria.
On January 7, Qatar Airways became the first international airline to resume commercial flights to Damascus, followed shortly by Turkish Airlines.
On January 27, the European Union decided to gradually suspend sanctions against Syria. The Syrian foreign minister welcomed the decision on X as "a positive step" that "will have a favorable impact on all aspects of Syrian daily life" (Le Monde, January 27).
However, the new Syrian leaders’ moderate and inclusive rhetoric has not translated into governance practices. The transitional government, announced on January 9, consists of close associates, former jihadists, and conservative Islamist technocrats who had already been governing Idlib province (Le Monde, January 9).
No women, Christians, Kurds, or representatives of civil society or other political forces were included. Similarly, the "Victory Congress" on January 27 featured militia leaders who are on Western terrorism lists or wanted for war crimes, such as Ahmad Ihsan Fayyad al-Hayes (Abu Hatim Shaqra), the assassin of Hevrin Khalaf, Secretary General of the Future Syria Party, whose name adorns several streets and squares in France. Another notorious criminal, Mohammed al-Jassim, known as Abu Amsha, responsible for numerous crimes in the Afrin region, was seen alongside several foreign jihadists promoted to generals.
In a press statement, the Administration of Northeast Syria rejected the legitimacy of this congress and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s election as president: "Victory belongs to all components of Syrian society, who expect the convening of an inclusive National Congress to prepare a new Constitution and free parliamentary elections," the statement emphasized.
In this spirit, dozens of prominent Syrian intellectuals launched an online petition on January 3 calling for "the restoration of all freedoms and the election of a constituent assembly" (AFP, January 31). The Druze minority is also seeking its place in this new Syria, while the Alawites feel particularly threatened.
The political transition process is proving highly complex. Ankara is exerting its full influence to exclude or at least marginalize Syrian Kurds and deny them any autonomous status, which it sees as an existential threat to Turkey.
Pro-Turkish militias of the so-called Free Syrian Army have continued their attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions around the strategic Tishrin Dam, despite U.S. and French mediation efforts. Calls for a nationwide ceasefire have been ignored. The Turkish air force regularly bombs SDF positions as well as peaceful demonstrations against the war.
On January 18, a Turkish airstrike killed five civilian protesters, including the renowned Kurdish comedian Bavé Teyar, and injured fifteen others (Rudaw, January 19). Since last December, the fighting has resulted in over 800 deaths.
In the chaos of Syria, Kurdish fighters, lacking air defense systems, are left vulnerable to Turkish aggression—an abandonment that has sparked reactions from public opinion in Europe and the U.S., as well as deep concern among Kurds in Turkey and Iraq about the future of Rojava (Le Monde, January 15).
In an op-ed published in Le Figaro on January 22, former French President François Hollande and former right-wing Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin wrote: "France has a duty to protect the Syrian Kurds." They proposed several initiatives: "Strengthening the French presence, currently modest, in northeastern Syria to deter a Turkish military incursion. Sending emergency humanitarian aid to Kurdish areas for displaced persons. Proposing a UN Security Council resolution to establish a border monitoring mission between northeastern Syria and Turkey to put an end to daily aggressions. Financially and materially supporting Kurdish efforts to guard individuals and families who had served ISIS. Their escape would pose a threat to Europe."
Emergency humanitarian aid is all the more urgent as "the freezing of funds by USAID threatens security in camps where ISIS-affiliated individuals are detained," warned The New York Times (January 30).
On January 31, President Macron called Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani to inquire about the latest developments in Iraq and Syria. He confirmed that "France will continue to support the Syrian Democratic Forces in their fight against ISIS, while respecting Syria’s sovereignty. The Syrian Kurds must be fully integrated into the dialogue," Macron stated, according to the Elysée Palace communiqué (Rudaw, January 31).
The defense of Rojava and the achievements of the Syrian Kurds has become a national cause for all Kurds. Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani sent an envoy who met with SDF Commander-in-Chief General Mazloum Abdi on January 13 and invited him to Erbil. Their highly publicized meeting on January 16 was described as "a powerful moment of Kurdish national unity" by both parties. Barzani assured General Mazloum Abdi of his and Iraqi Kurdistan's support—a note of hope in a challenging time for the Kurdish people.
Coming to power with the ambitious goal of "re-Islamizing" Turkish society, President Erdogan's Islamist-nationalist party is struggling to achieve the expected results. While massive sums have been invested in building new mosques across the country, most remain sparsely attended, often half-empty even during Friday prayers. Even the iconic Hagia Sophia, converted into a mosque by Erdogan, has seen a steady decline in militant attendance month after month.
The most serious setback for the regime is the collapse of birth rates. Despite government-sponsored encouragement broadcast on state television and in mosques, Turkey’s demographic growth rate has plummeted from 2.53% in 2015 to 0.23% in 2024. Even more alarming for Ankara, the number of children per woman has dropped from 2.38 in 2001 to 1.5 in 2024, far below the 2.05 rate needed for generational replacement. While this trend appears global, Turkey’s demographic decline has been "particularly rapid, similar to Italy and Japan" (Le Monde, January 24).
President Erdogan’s repeated exhortations since 2018 to have more children have had little effect. According to him: "One child is strange. Two children create competition. Three children bring balance. Four children bring abundance. Five children fulfill divine will!"
In practice, Kurdish families seem to be the only ones following these precepts, as demographic growth remains strong in Kurdish provinces. Recently estimated at 26 million by the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), Özgür Özel, the Kurdish population could become the majority in a few decades if current trends continue—an alarming prospect for the Turkish regime, which is intensifying its policy of forced assimilation, coupled with fierce repression against those who resist.
On January 13, the Turkish president declared 2024 "the Year of the Family." He established a High Council for Demographic Policies and a Family Institute. Mothers will be eligible to receive a monthly salary between 1,500 TL (€40) and 5,000 TL (€132) for the birth of their first, second, and third children after January 1. Young married couples aged 18 to 29 with modest incomes will be eligible for a 150,000 TL (€4,000) loan.
After proclaiming that the 21st century would be "the Turkish century," while his Indian counterpart Modi promises it will be "the Indian century," Erdogan now aims for 2025 to achieve a miracle: reversing Turkey’s demographic decline.
According to President Erdogan, the declining birth rate is due to "changing morals" that undermine the family. He condemns films and TV series that promote LGBTQ+ ideology, blaming them for many of the country's problems. However, the LGBTQ+ community remains largely invisible in Turkey, and pride parades have been banned since 2015.
Sociologists argue that socio-economic conditions, the high cost of living, meager wages, and soaring rents prevent young people from starting families and raising children. Hyperinflation has wreaked havoc. Official figures place it at 44.9% over the past year, but independent economists from the Inflation Research Group estimate it at 83.4% over the last 12 months (Le Monde, January 30).
In a country where over 60% of the workforce earns minimum wage, it has been set at 22,104 TL (€605). The Turkish lira, which was worth €0.50 when introduced in 2005, has now plummeted to a rate of over 38 TL per euro.
A survey published in early January by the weekly Gazete Oksijen found that 47% of 18-24-year-olds and 39% of 25-49-year-olds believe that the current state of the country does not allow for properly raising a child. Youth suicide rates are at record highs.
To divert public attention from the economic and social crisis, the Turkish president has ramped up inflammatory statements against Israel, against "Kurdish terrorists in Syria," and has positioned himself as a global leader defending Palestinians and oppressed Muslims—except for the Kurds, of course.
At the same time, he continues cracking down on all opposition voices and critics of his policies or the judiciary, which serves his regime.
The NGO Human Rights Watch published its annual report on January 16, denouncing Turkey's "repressive record" on human rights. "The Turkish government must stop filing fabricated criminal charges, issuing detention orders against its critics, dismissing elected local officials, and must comply with binding rulings of the European Court of Human Rights," the NGO stated in a press release (AFP, January 16).
The report also condemned "serious human rights violations committed by the Syrian National Army (SNA) in Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria."
It also noted that since the local elections of March 2024, seven mayors elected from the DEM (Party of Equality and Democracy), the main pro-Kurdish party in Turkey, as well as two CHP mayors, have been arrested and removed from office.
On January 13, the Turkish Interior Minister announced the arrest of another Kurdish mayor, from the Akdeniz district in the coastal province of Mersin, along with four other elected officials for "links to a terrorist organization." All five were dismissed without trial.
On January 15, the Istanbul Public Prosecutor's Office launched a procedure to dismiss the Istanbul Bar Association, its president, and its executive council for "terrorist propaganda." Turkish authorities accused the bar association of demanding an investigation into the deaths of two Kurdish journalists from Turkey, who were killed in late December in Syria by a Turkish drone strike, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (AFP, January 15).
Throughout January, the peculiar "peace process" continued. A delegation of Kurdish DEM deputies met twice—on January 2 and January 22—with Abdullah Öcalan in his prison on Imrali Island. They also visited former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, who has been imprisoned in Edirne, Thrace, since 2016 for "offenses of opinion."
A peace appeal from the PKK leader is expected in mid-February.
On January 21, the Iraqi Parliament passed an amendment to the Personal Status Law that, if finalized, would pave the way for the marriage of young girls as early as the age of nine.
This bill, proposed by conservative Shiite lawmakers for months, was ultimately approved in a half-empty chamber. It allows Iraqi Shiites to follow the precepts of their religious community in family matters—including marriage, inheritance, divorce, and child custody—rather than the state’s legal system. This grants the Shiite clergy oversight in managing family affairs and could encourage early marriages.
The Ja’fari school of jurisprudence, followed by conservative Iraqi and Iranian Shiites, permits the marriage of pubescent girls from the age of nine, as it is believed that the Prophet Muhammad married his last wife, Aisha, at that age.
In practice, child marriages have been steadily increasing over the past two decades. According to UNICEF, cited by Le Monde on January 25, 28% of Iraqi women are married before the age of 18, and 22% of unregistered marriages conducted by religious authorities involve girls younger than 14, in violation of current laws setting the legal marriage age at 18.
The newly adopted parliamentary bill aims to legalize this practice, which allows older men to marry young girls or adolescents, as no adult woman marries a nine-year-old child or a teenager.
Until recently, Iraq prided itself on its Personal Status Law, adopted in 1959 by the revolutionary regime of Kurdish-Arab General Abdel Karim Qassem, who overthrew the British-influenced monarchy on July 14, 1958, and established a republic promoting Arab-Kurdish fraternity. This law, progressive for its time in the Middle East, transferred jurisdiction over family matters from religious authorities to the state and its judicial system. It set the legal marriage age at 18 and restricted polygamy.
This historic achievement is now under threat. If the newly adopted amendment becomes final, it would also violate several international conventions signed by Iraq, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified in 1994) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (ratified in 1986).
Shiite religious authorities now have four months to draft binding regulations for their community regarding personal status. Their text will then be submitted to Parliament for approval.
If Parliament adopts the measure, it will then require the signature of President Abdul Latif Rashid, a liberal Kurdish politician known for his feminist stance, to become law. One of his predecessors—and brother-in-law—Jalal Talabani, who opposed the death penalty, had refused to sign the execution order for his worst enemy, Saddam Hussein. However, the Shiite-dominated government, eager for swift revenge, took advantage of Talabani’s absence from Baghdad and had the order signed by his Shiite vice president instead. As a result, Saddam was hastily executed before he could stand trial for additional crimes against humanity, including the Anfal genocide campaign against the Kurds.
Feminist organizations, numerous NGOs, intellectuals, and many lawmakers from across the political spectrum strongly oppose this archaic bill, accusing it of legalizing pedophilia, and are fighting to prevent its final adoption.
If this new law were to be definitively passed, it would not apply to the autonomous Kurdistan Region, which has its own legislation explicitly prohibiting child marriage.
On the same day, January 21, the Iraqi Parliament also passed a law granting amnesty to Sunni Arabs imprisoned for various offenses and crimes, including participation in insurgent activities, except for those convicted of blood crimes.
Another law passed on the same day allows Kurds and Turkmens in Kirkuk province—who were dispossessed during Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy—to reclaim their lands and properties.
This legislation was introduced just days after Baghdad signed an agreement with British Petroleum (BP) for the exploitation of Kirkuk’s oil fields.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has strongly condemned this agreement, accusing the federal government of violating the Iraqi Constitution and infringing on the rights of the Kurdish people. In a statement issued on January 12, 2025, the KRG reaffirmed its commitment to defending its constitutional authority and protecting the rights of the Kurdistan Region, including Kirkuk.
At the heart of this dispute is Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Federal Constitution, which requires the federal government to hold a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine their administrative status. This referendum was originally scheduled for December 31, 2007. However, successive Baghdad governments have failed to fulfill this obligation, leaving these territories in limbo for nearly two decades.
The KRG’s statement asserts that Baghdad is now unilaterally exploiting Kirkuk’s oil and gas resources, disregarding constitutional provisions. Under Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution, Baghdad is obligated to co-manage existing oil fields, such as those in Kirkuk, with the KRG and to establish revenue-sharing agreements. Additionally, Articles 110 and 115 grant the KRG exclusive authority over newly discovered oil and gas fields.
In a related development, the KRG spokesperson also issued a statement condemning the federal government’s unilateral actions to amend the federal finance law. The KRG claimed that, despite numerous meetings and two readings in the federal Parliament, the final vote on the amendment has not yet taken place.
According to the spokesperson, a new proposal was unexpectedly submitted by the federal government’s representative in Parliament without consultation with the KRG or approval from the federal Council of Ministers. The KRG argues that this unilateral action directly contradicts a prior Council of Ministers decision aimed at amending the finance law to facilitate the resumption of Kurdistan’s oil exports. These exports have been suspended for nearly two years, costing Baghdad over $20 billion and severely impacting Kurdistan’s economy.
The BP agreement is part of a broader Iraq-UK bilateral cooperation initiative announced during Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s visit to London on January 14. During this three-day visit, the prime minister met with King Charles III and his British counterpart, Keir Starmer. Several memoranda of understanding and a strategic partnership agreement were signed.
"This marks a new era of cooperation between the United Kingdom and Iraq that will bring mutual benefits, from trade to defense," said the British prime minister (AFP, January 14).
The two leaders announced trade agreements worth £12.3 billion (over €14 billion). Trade between the two nations is set to increase tenfold compared to last year, according to Keir Starmer.
Iraq has maintained an ambivalent relationship with its former colonial power. Long viewed with suspicion, the UK has regained favor among Iraq’s Shiite majority due to its role in the "liberation war" against Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, which also inflicted significant suffering on Shiites.
The UK’s participation in the International Coalition Against ISIS is also widely appreciated. The coalition’s mandate is set to end in Iraq in September 2025 and in Kurdistan in September 2026.
Uncertainty over the Trump administration’s future policy toward the region has prompted the Iraqi government to balance its relations with Iran by securing a strategic agreement with a Western power to gain access to modern technologies, including in defense.
A migrant return agreement unveiled in November was formally approved to "support the fight against illegal immigration." The agreement ensures that "those who have no legal right to remain in the UK will be swiftly returned to Iraq," according to a statement from the British prime minister’s office. London has also pledged to supply Iraq with £66.5 million (over €79 million) worth of equipment to "strengthen Iraq’s borders and dismantle smuggling networks."
In January, coalition government negotiations in Kurdistan continued without resolution. Discussions between Baghdad and Erbil have taken place in a "positive and constructive atmosphere," yet Baghdad continues to delay the regular disbursement of Kurdistan’s financial allocations.
Nevertheless, Kurdistan remains resilient and is expanding its diplomatic initiatives with neighboring countries, Gulf monarchies, and Western allies. On January 20, Kurdistan Prime Minister Masrour Barzani inaugurated the "Kurdistan House" alongside Iraqi President Latif Rashid, President of the Kurdish Institute of Paris Kendal Nezan, and numerous Kurdish businessmen. The event aimed to promote Kurdistan’s economic potential and strengthen relations with key political and business leaders.
The fall of the Syrian regime has disrupted the regional strategy of the ayatollahs’ regime and significantly reduced its capacity for influence.
This assessment, made by observers and analysts in the aftermath of the collapse of the al-Assad dynasty, appears to be shared by some senior officials of the Islamic Republic. "We have suffered a severe defeat," stated General Esbati bluntly during an address to military personnel gathered at the Vali-e-Asr Mosque in Tehran on December 31, in a discussion titled "Answering Questions on the Collapse of Syria."
A recording of his speech was leaked on social media, notably by the Geneva-based site Abid Media, on January 6. The general declared outright: “I do not consider losing Syria to be something we can take pride in. We have been defeated, and very severely defeated. We have taken a massive blow, and it has been extremely difficult.”
This general, who oversaw military operations in Syria in coordination with Syrian ministers, defense officials, and Russian generals, reportedly held more influence than the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which supervises Iran’s network of regional militias, according to The New York Times on January 8.
During the meeting, he stated that he had left Syria on the last military flight to Tehran the night before Damascus fell to the rebels. He revealed that Iran’s relationship with Bashar al-Assad had been strained during the final months of his regime. Assad had rejected multiple requests from Iranian-backed militias to open a new front against Israel from Syrian territory after Hamas’s attack on October 7. Iran had presented him with comprehensive military plans on how to use Syria’s military resources to strike Israel, the general disclosed.
He also accused Russia of deception, claiming that while Moscow assured them that its aircraft were bombing Syrian rebels, in reality, they were dropping their bombs on empty fields. He reminded the audience that, in the past, whenever Israel struck Iranian targets in Syria, Russian radars had been deliberately turned off, facilitating these attacks.
Syria was a key regional command center for Iran, from which it distributed money and weapons to its network of militias, including Hezbollah and Palestinian militant groups. Iran controlled airports and arms depots and operated missile and drone manufacturing bases. Its loss represents the collapse of a regional strategy built year after year since the inception of the Islamic Republic.
To prevent complete despair among his audience, General Esbati claimed that Iran still maintains networks of operatives that could be activated if the new Syrian regime turned hostile. He cited the example of Iraq, where Iran successfully trained and armed Shiite militias to attack U.S. and British forces. However, Iran shares no border with Syria, and the Iraq-Syria border is predominantly inhabited by Sunni Arabs and Kurds, who hold no sympathy for the Shiite Iranian regime. Its potential allies, the Alawites, reside on the Mediterranean coast, while Hezbollah’s reduced operational capacity limits its ability to destabilize Syria.
Another statement by General Esbati resonated particularly with the Iranian public. He argued that Assad’s fall was inevitable due to rampant corruption, political oppression, and economic hardships, including electricity shortages, fuel scarcity, and wages too low to sustain the population. Bashar al-Assad ignored warnings and calls for reform, leading to the regime’s collapse.
This situation bears an implicit resemblance to that of the Iranian regime, which continues to ignore calls for reform while intensifying repression, provocations, and the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals.
For instance, rapper Amir Tataloo, 37, has been sentenced to death for "insulting the Prophet" (AFP, January 19). Two women were arrested on January 26 for "a dance contrary to Sharia" in a cemetery (NOU, p.80). Two young Kurdish women, Pakhshan Azizi and Warisha Moradi, have been sentenced to death for "armed rebellion against the state" and their alleged affiliation with Kurdish opposition parties. Human Rights Watch has sounded the alarm to prevent their execution, which could take place at any moment.
Victim of "hostage diplomacy," Italian journalist Cecilia Sala was eventually released in exchange for the release of an Iranian engineer, Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, who had been arrested in February at the request of U.S. authorities for allegedly supplying Iran with drone manufacturing plans (The New York Times, January 18).
However, three French hostages remain imprisoned in Iran. They include Cécile Kohler, a French teacher arrested in May 2022 and accused of espionage, as well as Jacques Paris and another Frenchman named Olivier. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot has called their detention "unacceptable" and demanded their immediate release (L’Opinion, January 10).
Similarly, the European Parliament, in an emergency resolution adopted on January 23, urged the release of four European hostages, including the three French detainees held in Iran (RFI, January 23).
Iran has ignored these calls but has expressed willingness to negotiate with Western countries over its nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions. Another round of talks took place in Geneva on January 13 and 14 between French, British, and German representatives. Both sides described these discussions as "frank and constructive."
However, in December, the three European countries had discussed the possible activation of a mechanism to reinstate sanctions against Iran "to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons." Tehran warned that if the Europeans triggered this measure, Iran’s adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) "would no longer make sense" (Le Figaro, January 30). The world now awaits the Trump administration’s position on this sensitive and high-priority issue.
Meanwhile, the Iranian regime is seeking to strengthen its position. On January 17, the Russian and Iranian presidents signed a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty" in Moscow. This agreement includes military and economic components. The treaty stipulates that in the event of an attack on Iran or Russia, neither signatory will provide military or other assistance to the aggressor, effectively enabling continued aggression.
However, unlike other defense agreements Moscow has signed with its allies, the treaty with Iran does not include a mutual defense clause. After meeting with the Iranian president, Vladimir Putin stated that the agreement creates "important and solid foundations for building mutual relations based on trust."
In reality, Russia remains cautious not to upset its key Arab partners, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Consequently, despite multiple requests, Moscow has yet to deliver S-400 air defense systems or next-generation fighter jets to Tehran. Additionally, two nuclear reactors under construction in Bushehr for years remain unfinished.
The only genuinely strategic element of the new agreement is the proposed construction of a "transport corridor" connecting Saint Petersburg to Mumbai via roads, railways, and sea routes, allowing Russia to conduct trade without passing through the Mediterranean. However, no timeline or funding plan has been announced for this ambitious project, which aims to link the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf and then to the Indian Ocean.
Another announced project is the establishment of a "gas hub" in Iran to facilitate the sale of Russian gas in Asia while circumventing Western sanctions. Moscow had made a similarly attractive offer to Turkey to win favor with its president, though this proposal remains "under consideration."
Iran is also courting China, its primary trading partner, which has agreed to supply it with chemicals necessary for producing solid rocket fuel used in ballistic missiles. Israeli airstrikes last October targeted and destroyed Iran’s primary solid propellant production facility, including its mixers, machines used to blend the components of solid rocket fuel—equipment that will be difficult to replace.
As a result, Iran’s solid-fuel missile production could be disrupted for at least a year, according to The Wall Street Journal. In 2023, Iran possessed over 3,000 ballistic missiles. According to L’Opinion on January 27, citing well-informed sources, two Iranian ships loaded in China with chemical materials sufficient to produce fuel for 280 medium-range Iranian missiles.
To project power and deter its adversaries, Iran continues to showcase its military capabilities. On January 18, the IRGC navy unveiled an underground naval facility located "in the southern waters of the country," with vessels "capable of striking American destroyers." This facility is situated 500 meters underground (Le Figaro, January 18).
On January 10, IRGC commander General Hossein Salami conducted a televised visit to an underground missile base. Iran is thus preparing for a military confrontation.
