Thursday, February 14, 2008 | Cengiz ÇANDAR

The more we postpone to invite Talabani to Turkey and therefore delay talks about a ‘grand bargain,’ the more the critical foreign policy issue of Kirkuk will turn into a mess

The headscarf ban was lifted through a few constitutional changes. We have yet to witness the last round in the Constitutional Court, where the Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal will challenge the government. The court has two options for its final decision: legal or political.  If its decision is “legal” the headscarf ban will be history and the relevant debates will change course. If the ruling is “political” we will face a new smashup. If covering the head is a religious requirement, therefore freedom of belief, or if it is part of individual freedoms does not rule out the necessity of the ban's removal. But if you discuss the issue on the basis of the Islam-laicism axis, you start the discussions over the “regime” and “fundamental principles of the Republic” automatically. And that makes the issue a part of political polarization and transforms it into a variant of “power struggle.” Followers of the latter option, in other words “fundamentalist secularists,” including the institutions and personas they lean on, constitute the “defeated” in this struggle. The united front of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) to devise constitutional amendments, indicates the change in the country's political composition. Meanwhile political stir over wearing headscarves has retained minds from thinking on “strategic issues” regarding Turkey and kept eyes away from the horizon.

Kirkuk gesture from Talabani

We can neither follow nor can we pay attention to the latest developments about our very own future poking at our nose nor are we being informed about these developments thoroughly. With a few exceptions though. For instance the Taraf daily a week ago published an article titled “A Kirkuk gesture from Talabani.” The consensus between Turkmens of Kirkuk and the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani was covered in depth. As the “seven conditions” for Turkmens that Talabani complied with were spelled out in the daily. However we haven't heard anything on the subject in the big-shot newspapers of the media neither have read any relevant op-ed. If the Kirkuk issue and Turkmens were of no importance then how come northern Iraq is the number one “strategic” and “security issue” that even affects bilateral relations with the United States and who will explain this? First let's see what these “seven conditions” for Turkmens that are dubbed “Kirkuk gesture” approved by Talabani: 1. The Kirkuk Municipality under Kurdish management should be left to Turkmens. 2. The Office of Deputy Governor under Arab management should be appointed to Turkmens. 3. The Health Directorate should be assigned to Turkmens. 4. The Trade Directorate should be left to Turkmens. 5. Turkish should be one of the official languages in addition to Arabic and Kurdish. 6. The District Governorship should be left to Turkmens. 7. Kirkuk Province General Assembly should be managed by a 32 percent rule: Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs should have 32 percents of the seats each, and Christians the remaining 4 percent.

Kurdish-Turkmen consensus?

Item 5 restates the “right” foreseen in the Iraqi constitution already. And others, number one and seven in particular, signal a very serious “Kurdish-Turkmen consensus.” In case of the fulfillment of all, there would not be much to talk about a Turkmen issue. And the issue of the status of Kirkuk will remain. That is to say, will Kirkuk either have a “special status” or a “federal unit,” as stated in the Transitional Law of Administration (TAL) approved in 2004, or will it be bound to the semi-autonomous regional administration in northern Iraq  via the referendum, as it is foreseen in the Iraqi constitution?

Another “formula” is to give an “autonomous status” to Kirkuk first and then bind it with the semi-autonomous regional administration in northern Iraq. In case of the fulfillment of these seven conditions, to determine the institutional identity of Turkmen by the formula above is a very hard row to hoe. Besides what will be the attitude of Turkey, although the issue on paper is about the internal affairs of Iraq and the “constitutional process?” How busy are we with these matters? The more we postpone an invitation of Talabani to Turkey and therefore delay talks about a “grand bargain” on a wider strategic horizon, which the subject also includes the Kurdish issue and the fight against terror, the more this critical foreign policy issue will inevitably turn into a mess, just like the headscarf ban as part of the internal affairs, will it not?

A neo-con assessment:

One of the prominent writers for the Weekly Standard, an influential opinion magazine of the neo-conservatives, Reuel Marc Gerecht, in his article titled “A New Middle East, After All,” talks about the developments in Kirkuk and warns that the developments could drag northern Iraq into chaos in the following paragraph:  “The still unscheduled referendum in which the people of Kirkuk and its environs are to vote on the status of that multi-ethnic city could possibly throw the north of the country into chaos. The Kurds will be tenacious about their "Jerusalem." Although they are somewhat disingenuous in their intentions, the Kurds want unchallenged control over Kirkuk's oil and would strongly prefer to have fewer Arabs living among them, especially Arabs who moved into Kurdish homes emptied by Saddam Hussein. Underestimating the passion of ethnically-based nationalism has a bloody history, and Iraq's Kurds are a passionate, much-abused people. They will not allow Tamim province, which has Kirkuk's oil, to slip from their control to the central government. The Kurds know they could lose a referendum on Kirkuk at this time; Kurdish efforts to drive out and silence the potential ‘no' vote have not yet been sufficiently successful. Nonetheless, the Bush administration would be wise to have a rapid-reaction force ready to preempt Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen animosities in the north.”

Reading these lines together with the “Seven Turkmen Conditions” approved by Talabani and making assessments afterwards is beneficial.

There is nothing wrong to wear headscarf and attend university, but to close eyes and retain minds to other issues through the headscarf discussions have serious drawbacks.