February 26, 2008 | By Aliza Marcus and Andrew Apostolou

ALIZA MARCUS AND ANDREW APOSTOLOU

THE CRISIS between Turkey and Iraq, with the United States playing the uneasy role of mediator and friend to both, has escalated with the Turkish land operation launched Feb. 22. Following last fall's spate of attacks inside Turkey by the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, the Bush administration gave Turkey intelligence to facilitate air strikes against key PKK bases in remote Iraqi Kurdish mountains. Washington hoped this would prevent any Turkish military offensive inside Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq's most stable region and the PKK's unwilling host. This policy has clearly failed.

The inability of the United States to rein in Turkey, and the dangers the Turkish invasion poses to Iraqi Kurdistan, demonstrate that a better approach is needed. The core of Turkey's "Kurdish problem" is not the PKK. It is Turkey's denial of basic political and cultural rights to its Kurds, who are about one-fifth of the population. Any resolution of the decades-old conflict was unthinkable because often there were no credible nonviolent Kurdish partners for the ever suspicious Turkish state to talk to. Such partners now exist and the United States should help Turkey to recognize this.

In July 2007, Turkey's Kurds elected 20 members of parliament from the Democratic Society Party, or DTP. A Kurdish nationalist group, DTP also has 54 mayors in largely Kurdish municipalities in Turkey's southeast. These democratically elected politicians are not PKK members. They may sympathize with PKK fighters - who often hail from the same towns and villages. And contrary to government demands, they refuse to label the rebels "terrorists." But DTP politicians oppose violence, whether from the state or the rebels. They call for a state-rebel cease-fire and want to work with Turkish officials to end the conflict.

These elected DTP officials matter because they articulate a Kurdish case separate from PKK violence. In November 2007, DTP called for decentralizing power to Turkey's regions, the first time this Kurdish party has presented a viable political vision. Unlike the PKK, whose demands have ranged from independence to broad cultural rights, DTP's ideas are not punctuated by gunfire.

Unfortunately, Turkey has responded with hostility, not dialogue. Turkey's chief prosecutor may shutter DTP because he claims that statements by party officials, including using the taboo word "Kurdistan" and praising a PKK cease-fire, are tantamount to supporting terrorism.

If the state is successful, this will be at least the fifth time it has closed this Kurdish party (or its predecessors) since 1993. Turkey has already jailed DTP's chairman for allegedly avoiding compulsory military service at a time when he would probably have had to fight fellow Kurds. The state is also investigating DTP's parliamentary chairman for allegedly insulting the Turkish military - he had objected to being barred from an official function by Turkey's politically active armed forces. The popular mayor of Diyarbakir, Turkey's largest Kurdish city, says 30 lawsuits have been filed against him for using the Kurdish language in official settings.

This is where the United States can help. The United States should strengthen these democratically elected Kurdish officials as potential alternatives to the PKK. Washington can do this in two ways. First, Ankara should be told openly and repeatedly that putting Kurdish politicians on trial for representing the ethnic-based interests of their voters is counterproductive. Second, US diplomats in Turkey should meet Kurdish parliamentarians and mayors regularly, especially in their municipal or parliamentary offices. Visiting members of Congress should also see their Kurdish counterparts.

By talking to many genuine Kurdish representatives in Turkey, the United States would oblige the Turkish state to stop treating all expressions of Kurdishness as potential terrorism. Just as usefully, the United States would allow Turkish liberals, who abhor their state's heavy-handedness, to embrace these Kurdish politicians.

Above all, the United States would enhance the credibility of these isolated and publicly reviled, but democratically elected, Kurdish leaders. With a US stamp of approval, they could acquire the strength to build a potent, non-violent alternative to the PKK. The rebel group will not disappear, but Kurdish officials could claim their rightful position as political leader of Turkey's Kurdish community.

The vicious war between the Turkish state and the PKK is just one aspect of a conflict that has prevented democratization in Turkey. By fostering a democratic alternative to the PKK, and encouraging the Turkish state to talk rather than repress, the United States could put both sides on the path to accommodation and away from violence.

Aliza Marcus is author of "Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence." Andrew Apostolou is an analyst of Kurdish politics.