February 5, 2008 | Commentary | By DAVID L. PHILLIPS

Continued democratization and economic development is the best way for Turkey to drain the swamp of domestic support for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

A comprehensive solution also requires cooperation between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, from whose territory the PKK operates. Instead, Turkey has gone for the military option, risking a regional conflagration that would destabilize Iraq.

After U.S. President George W. Bush agreed on Nov. 5 to provide actionable intelligence on the PKK to Ankara, Turkey launched a series of air strikes against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Though nearly 30 PKK members were killed in the first attack in December, subsequent sorties only struck some empty caves and abandoned settlements, inflicting little damage to the terrorists' infrastructure or capabilities.

The Iraqi Kurdish leadership -- Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government -- has reacted calmly. They are prepared to put up with an air strike or two if it helps mollify Turkish hard-liners and prevent a large-scale ground invasion. But their patience is not without limit. Fear is spreading among Iraqi Kurds, who demand a tougher response from their leaders. Turkish air strikes also endanger civilians nearby, and the regional Kurdish government may have to deal with refugees if the strikes continue.

There is also a growing outcry against the United States among Iraqi Kurds, who are among Washington's strongest allies in the country. They feel betrayed by America's complicity in Turkey's attacks. The U.S. sold out the Iraqi Kurds twice in recent history -- once in 1975 when the CIA ceased support for them, and then again during the U.S.-Iraq war in 1991, when Washington encouraged the Kurds to rebel against Saddam Hussein only to abandon them later when the Baath regime struck back. Iraqi Kurds fear history might be repeating itself.

Knowing that it is in their interest to reduce cross-border violence, Messrs. Talabani and Barzani recently convinced the PKK to announce a cease-fire and intervened to secure the release of eight Turkish soldiers held captive by the PKK.

They have also targeted the PKK's financing and information infrastructure. The Kurdistan Regional Government stepped up efforts to interdict PKK cash couriers by bolstering security at local airports. Checkpoints have been established around PKK bases in Iraq's Qandil Mountains, monitoring the flow of goods and barring all foreign and local press to stop the PKK from using the media for propaganda. The government closed all official PKK offices and shuttered other Iraqi Kurdish groups, like the Democratic Solution Party, that espouse violence against Turkey.

While the regional government is ready to put pressure on the PKK, it is not ready to confront them militarily. Mr. Barzani, whose forces joined Turkish troops in operations against the PKK twice in the 1990s told me that thousands of his men were "martyred" attacking camps that even Saddam believed were too well fortified to destroy.

While taking practical steps to contain the PKK, the regional government has also tried to foster better relations with Ankara. Iraqi Kurds promised Turkey lucrative business opportunities in the region's oil and gas sector once Iraqi legislation on production sharing agreements with foreign partners has been passed. But Turkey has responded with a cold shoulder, rejecting the offer until the PKK problem has been solved.

Worse, it is threatening economic sanctions against the Kurdistan Regional Government for harboring the PKK. While slowing trade at the Harbur Gate on the Turkey-Iraq border, Ankara is also dragging its feet on an agreement to open a second border crossing to facilitate travel and trade with Iraq. Ankara believes its economic leverage will pressure Iraqi Kurds to confront the PKK. But economic sanctions will also hurt Turkish businesses, which have received the lion's share of reconstruction contracts in Northern Iraq.

Ankara also refuses to have any meaningful diplomatic contact with Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government officials. Nor has it responded to the Iraqi Kurdish proposal for a summit on regional security cooperation among the U.S., Iraq, Turkey and the regional government.

With winter immobilizing the PKK in its Qandil stronghold, there is a window of opportunity for the United States to use its influence over Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to foster trilateral cooperation. Not only is the Kurdistan Regional Government key to solving the PKK problem. Trilateral cooperation is critical for the surge in Iraq, where Iraqi Kurdish units fight side by side with the U.S. military, whose supplies are transported via Turkey.

Instead, the PKK has been able to push the U.S. into the unenviable position of taking sides between Turkey and Iraq's Kurds. No doubt the PKK welcomes Turkey's military action because it fuels Kurdish nationalism and undermines moderates seeking a peaceful solution. And the PKK will surely respond to Turkey's attacks by striking back.

The escalation of this deadly conflict also plays into the hands of Turkey's "deep state" -- a web of military and security officials, the bureaucracy, and corrupt politicians with ties to Mafia types waiting in the wings to reassert their power and privileges. Seeing themselves as the defenders of secularism, these forces are deeply distrustful of the Justice and Development Party's Muslim leadership (AKP), which just moved to lift a ban on wearing head scarves in public universities and arrested ultranationalists suspected of political killings. The "deep state" would surely like to use the resurgent PKK as an excuse to crack down on the AKP, thereby shrinking the space for democratic participation and radicalizing Turkey's Islamists. This would also reduce Turkey's chances of joining the European Union.

Instead of giving a green light to further Turkish military actions, the Bush administration should intensify its diplomacy to achieve a nonmilitary solution to the PKK problem. The U.S. should encourage the Kurdistan Regional Government to ratchet up pressure on the PKK by arresting its leaders on Interpol's "Most Wanted" list. And Washington should urge Turkey to deepen and accelerate democratic reforms. This needs to be done quickly before a new round of PKK terror attacks sabotage prospects for conciliation and cooperation among the U.S., Turkey and Kurdish leaders in Iraq.

Mr. Phillips is project director of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and a visiting scholar at Columbia's Center for the Study of Human Rights.